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

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GIDON GOTTLIEB is the Director of the Middle East Peace Project and Visiting Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, and Distinguished Visiting Fellow at the Hoover Institution for War and Peace. He is currently on leave from the law school of the University of Chicago, where he is the Leo Spitz Professor of International Law and Diplomacy.

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Contents

ARTICLES

Beyond Left and Right
Alan Tonelson 3

America, Know Thyself
Jonathan Clarke 19

Missed Opportunities
Heather Wilson 26

Responses to Wilson
Eliot A. Cohen, Fred C. Iklé, and Eugene V. Rostow 37

Salinastroika
Douglas W. Payne 43

Yeltsin: Shadow of a Doubt
David Satter 52

The Visible Hand
William R. Hawkins 58

The Pacifist and the General
Melvin J. Lasky 66

SHORTS

Turkish Journey
Herb Greer 79

Fields of Dreams
Mario Vargas Llosa 82

BOOKS

An Idea of Britain
Jeane J. Kirkpatrick 86

1849—The Morning After
Norman Stone 91

Eastern Question, Western Answer
James Kurth 96

Geo-Economics 101
Raymond Vernon 102

LETTERS

David Brooks, Hugh Ragsdale, and Robert Goldwin 107

QUARTERLY

Realism and its Rivals
Owen Harries and Michael Lind 110

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Beyond Left and Right

Alan Tonelson

"...if when the chips are down the world's most powerful nation, the United States, acts like a pitiful, helpless giant, the forces of totalitarianism and anarchy will threaten free nations and institutions throughout the world."

—President Richard M. Nixon announcing the U.S. invasion of Cambodia, April 30, 1970.

"The West's worst moral and political disaster since the Nazis is coming to a climax. And just as many politicians and institutions paid for the failure to stop Hitler, so many will pay dearly for allowing the Serbian tyrant, Slobodan Milosevic, to destroy Bosnia."

—Anthony Lewis, "The End of the Affair," *The New York Times*, August 13, 1993.

ANTHONY LEWIS' recent Richard Nixon impersonations are not only amusing, they are genuinely important. They are among the many signs that American thinking about foreign policy is finally entering the post-Cold War era—and perhaps dragging the rest of American politics along with it.

Alan Tonelson is Research Director of the Economic Strategy Institute in Washington, DC. The views expressed here are his own.

In foreign affairs, the old dividing lines are blurring or being ignored, and with good reason. As is clear from any recent op-ed page, familiar classifications such as interventionist and isolationist, hawk and dove, realist and idealist, and multilateralist and unilateralist (at least as they have been used since the end of World War II) no longer make much sense, in the absence of the Cold War's defining conditions. Abroad, those conditions included rigid military and ideological bipolarity and overwhelming American economic predominance within the free world camp; at home, widespread acceptance of a state of national emergency, and of the national priorities and resource allocations that followed therefrom. Because—as it is now fashionable to observe—foreign and domestic policies can no longer be neatly separated, ideological confusion has spilled over into domestic politics. Even ideas as basic to modern politics as Left and Right are undergoing redefinition.

So far, the results seem to be little more than rampant confusion—with San Francisco Democrats clamoring for air strikes and even ground operations all over the world; hardline anticommunists emphasizing the limits to American power; consumer advocates opposing trade liberalization agreements; paleo-conservatives backing interventionist economic policies at home and abroad; the Heritage Foundation

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and the Rainbow Coalition both endorsing big cuts in overseas troop deployments; the mainstream liberals who run "the party of the common man" railing against surging populism, while many conservatives stoke its fires; Carterites and Bushies both decrying "the new isolationism"; and, in the most delicious irony of all, right-wing columnist and former presidential candidate Pat Buchanan picking up George McGovern's plea: "Come home, America."

The confusion and ferment are real enough. Slowly, however, more coherent patterns are becoming apparent. In fact, a new underlying fault line is already emerging in American politics and foreign policy, dividing what might best be called nationalists and internationalists. In terms of American diplomacy, this new alignment will pit a generic model of foreign policy-making that long predates the Cold War—one based at bottom not on resisting totalitarianism, or promoting democracy or world order, but on the belief that international activism itself is the key to American security and prosperity—against a rival approach that is much more radical than any Marxist alternative—a relatively passive strategy whose supreme goal is consolidating American military and economic strength, and enhancing America's freedom of action. In the realm of economic policy, those who argue that the nation-state, as an economic player, is obsolete or dangerous will vie with those convinced of its continuing relevance and legitimacy. In electoral politics, sharp differences in economic interests and cultural outlooks will produce a widening rift between business, professional, and government elites, on the one hand, and wage-earners on the other. The issue of class, in other words, is re-emerging in American politics.

The realignment process will be slow and messy, both intellectually and politically. Although cold re-calculations of interests are threatening many coalitions, most are still held together by sentimental bonds or simple inertia. If they do crystallize, however, the new alignments are likely to be stronger, more durable, and less inclined to compromise than their predecessors—at least until the next sea change occurs. In the meantime, American politics and foreign policy will continue to be influenced by what might be called the strange bedfellows phenomenon—confused divisions and coalitions based more on emotion, historical memory and personality than on substance or logic. In particular, the scene will be distinguished by a disjunction between politico-military outlooks and economic positions.

The Cold War Debate over Means

AMERICAN FOREIGN policy thinking has never been long on ideological coherence, especially since the end of World War II. When conservatives cautiously and reluctantly bought into the Cold War consensus forged by New Deal liberals in the late-1940s, they accepted not only unprecedented American international engagement and all manner of entangling alliances but a big, intrusive national security state at home, as well as Keynesian deficit spending to finance these new foreign ventures. Two decades later, during the Vietnam period, many liberals and conservatives flip-flopped, the former souring on most uses of American power abroad, the latter firming up as the strongest champions of the military tools and strategies needed to give anticommunist internationalism and containment their backbone.

Still, until the Soviet crackup, the Cold War set a durable framework for American thinking about foreign policy and most differences were contained within that framework. Nearly all American leaders and foreign policy analysts accepted the fundamental tenets of an internationalist doctrine that had congealed during and immediately after World War II. In the aftermath of

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that conflict, and with the lesson of the 1930s still fresh, the defining feature of internationalism seemed clear enough, despite disputes over means and tactics: the compelling, inescapable need to thwart an aggressive totalitarianism around the world.

Paradoxically, by removing that particular threat, the Cold War's end has revealed the true foundations of American internationalism: the belief that America will never know genuine security, lasting peace, and sustained prosperity unless the rest of the world also becomes secure, peaceful, prosperous, and democratic; the belief that international security is indivisible—that the inextricably interwoven problems of discontent, political extremism, and aggression are highly contagious and bound to spread around the world once they are allowed to fester anywhere; and the belief that the only way to achieve these goals is to eliminate the conditions that breed discontent wherever they exist, and somehow impose norms of peaceful behavior on all states.

On international economic and trade policy during the Cold War, nearly all influential Americans subscribed to the internationalist goal of a highly integrated world economy in which market forces assured the most efficient possible distribution of resources and thus the greatest prosperity for all the world. Thus the international economic order forged by the United States in the late 1940s centered on an International Monetary Fund to maintain stable exchange rates, and a General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade designed to set rules for international commerce that would prevent the rise of economic blocs.

A faith in *laissez-faire* economics convinced internationalists that even if not all players obeyed the rules, Americans and others would still benefit from the freest possible worldwide flows of goods, services, and capital—at least within the free world camp. Any attempt to respond politically or strategically to economic problems—to try to enhance a country's relative position by limiting or manipulating market forces—would only backfire, because the cheater would become hooked on shortcuts, lose its skills, and deprive its people of the benefits of buying at the best prices. Just as important, the goal of free trade and economic integration maintained that what specific goods and services a state produces, or does not produce, are not important, so long as they reflect the unimpeded forces of comparative advantage. As a result, even liberals were timid about advocating any government intervention in the domestic economy, beyond macroeconomic steering and transfer payments. These beliefs also made it that much easier to soft-pedal economic disputes with allies, in order to maintain the supposedly more important strategic relationships. Of course, internationalists sought to deny U.S. resources and advanced technology to military and ideological enemies. But in the non-communist world, those assets were treated as little more than trinkets, to be doled out periodically as political favors to client states in return for good behavior.

Cold War conditions had two other profound but overlooked effects on American politics that are now rapidly fading. First, they greatly inflated American expectations of foreign policy. Anti-communist consensus and growing abundance throughout the West suspended much of what was normal in world politics—at least among noncommunist countries. Significantly, relationships between the United States and its allies were described more and more in unitary terms such as "the West" and "the Free World," which implied an underlying commonalty of interest. To many internationalists, relations among these countries started to look like domestic politics. Age-old concepts such as relative power, relative gains, and the logic of self-help in particular were widely seen as antiquated (and bitterly resented when resurrected by an

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unashamed traditionalist like de Gaulle). The new foreign policy agenda was managerial—integration, institution building, problem solving, collective security.

At home as well, these conditions appeared to suspend or mitigate much of what had been normal even in domestic politics—especially the bitterness of the struggle over wealth. Indeed, during the early Cold War decades, observers began describing domestic affairs in near-idyllic terms. The "end of ideology" had been achieved. The business cycle had been mastered. Politically and socially, America simply needed to fill in the New Deal's gaps with the Great Society program. Economically, all that was required was Keynesian "fine tuning."

Contrary to the received wisdom, consensus on these fundamental points did not collapse during the Vietnam War, although it is true that some serious cracks appeared. In the main, the ensuing foreign policy debate centered on the best ways to pursue internationalist goals, not on first principles, such as the need for vigorous American engagement throughout the world or to maintain a liberal world economic system at all costs. On the second-order question of means, liberal and conservative internationalists increasingly divided along neat and remarkably predictable lines. For example, the more liberal someone was, the likelier it became that he would frown on using force to advance U.S. foreign policy goals rather than economic and diplomatic substitutes; to support acting multilaterally rather than unilaterally; to give the Soviets the benefit of the doubt in international controversies; and to view Third World radicals as closet nationalists rather than communist stooges. The more conservative someone was, on the other hand, the likelier he was to take the opposite positions. Thus, by the late 1960s, there were very few conservative opponents of the Vietnam War left, and very few liberal supporters. These positions, moreover, corresponded closely—although not perfectly—with clusters of left-wing/liberal and right-wing/conservative positions on domestic issues, from taxing and spending (within a Keynesian framework), to the size of the welfare state, to race relations, to the relative importance of inflation and unemployment.

As far as security and strategy were concerned, this state of affairs persisted essentially until the end of the Cold War. Sometimes, as during Reagan's tough, "evil empire" first term, the cracks widened; sometimes, as in the more mellow period after Reykjavik, they narrowed. For polemical reasons, both liberals and conservatives liked to exaggerate their differences and treat them as fundamental, but in retrospect it is the extent of fundamental agreement that is striking.

In the economic realm, however, the picture was different, and in the 1980s early signs appeared that internationalism's long-standing commitment to free trade, something that had characterized American politics since the 1940s, was facing a philosophical challenge. Even before the Soviet collapse, many large, successful U.S. corporations, as well as labor unions, began questioning strongly the post-war U.S. commitment to free trade and to *laissez-faire* domestic policies. They were joined not only by liberal analysts like Robert Kuttner and Robert Reich, but by conservatives like Kevin Phillips, Clyde V. Prestowitz, Jr., and William Hawkins, who in different ways sought to unearth a Hamiltonian tradition in American conservative economic thinking, one that had been buried first under the *laissez-faire* orthodoxy following World War II, and then reburied under the avalanche of Reaganism. Meanwhile, other liberals such as C. Fred Bergsten (a former Carter administration Treasury Department official), and Charles Schultze (Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors to the President in the Carter years), joined with the Reagan conserva-

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tives to mount an all-out defense of free trade and to discredit the idea of industrial policy.

These early pressures on internationalism suggest that the Cold War consensus would have cracked by now, even had the Soviet Union endured. They also indicate why the Soviet Union's demise has begun to transform domestic politics as well as international relations.

The Gulf War

DURING THE Gulf War debate in the fall and winter of 1990-91, signs of realignment in foreign policy became clearer and extended to core security issues. For the first time since V-J Day, the foreign policy debate transcended tactics and the motives of international adversaries to embrace fundamental issues. Absent a nuclear-armed superpower adversary, how deeply involved in how many regions of the world did a country of America's strength need to be? How important, now, to America's fate were the traditional, systemic internationalist goals of a secure, prosperous, and democratic world? What risks and expenditures were justified in the pursuit of these goals? Could alternative approaches serve U.S. interests more safely and efficiently? All of these questions were debated vigorously immediately before, during, and after the Gulf War.

In the process, the late-Cold War division between conservative interventionists and liberal isolationists was replaced by a more complicated pattern, with differences over intervention appearing on both sides of the ideological spectrum. The debate over the Gulf War divided the conservative Republican administration from liberal Democratic critics, and internationalists from so-called neo-isolationists on the Left and Right. But it also divided staunchly internationalist Democrats like Congressman Stephen Solarz and chairman of the National Intelligence Council Joseph Nye, on the one hand, from fellow internationalist Democrats like Senator Sam Nunn and former Carter National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski (as well as Jesse Jackson) on the other; and Nixon-Ford Republicans like the President, his National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft, and Henry Kissinger from former Secretary of Defense and Director of Central Intelligence James Schlesinger.

Even the security of the Persian Gulf, which most agreed was of major concern to America, did not automatically merit sending American military forces into combat in the eyes of normally interventionist former officials and commentators such as Schlesinger, Kenneth Adelman, Edward Luttwak, and columnists Rowland Evans and Robert Novak—especially when the enemy seemed so formidable, and so capable of inflicting heavy casualties. With Saudi Arabia secured, they maintained, there simply was no hurry to go to war in January, 1991. War threatened to make the Gulf even more unstable over the long run. The effectiveness of sanctions and even diplomacy could and should be tested thoroughly.

Other conservatives and libertarians had either never accepted internationalist objectives to begin with, or now began to challenge them more forcefully. The Cato Institute's Ted Galen Carpenter and Christopher Layne, for example, insisted that, ultimately, market forces would solve America's oil problem in the Gulf—that no matter who controlled the region's vast reserves, oil exporters would have no choice but to sell their output. As for Bush's New World Order rhetoric and liberal hopes for more effective collective security and humanitarian intervention capabilities, these were derided as formulas for open-ended, risky, costly, and above all strategically unnecessary U.S. military operations all around the world. Pat Buchanan agreed with the latter charges and, regarding the Gulf specifically, asked why Americans

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should die to protect oil supplies that West European countries and Japan needed more than the United States. In the absence of a Soviet threat, earlier complaints about burden-sharing within the free world were being replaced by a more fundamental questioning of common interest, in what was increasingly described as a tripartite world. The old unity among the United States, Western Europe, and Japan was no longer assumed.

Among liberals, by contrast, there was almost no Gulf War debate at all. The mainstream of the Democratic party ultimately treated Saddam Hussein's post-Cold War challenge to American security much as it treated most post-Vietnam Cold War-era challenges. True, like most conservatives and moderates, liberals generally favored Bush's initial dispatch of American forces to defend Saudi Arabia. But their "line in the sand" seemed to require an actual attack on those forces before their use could be sanctioned. Thus the liberals put their trust in non-military instruments, such as sanctions. Some, like Rep. Lee Hamilton and New York Governor Mario Cuomo, urged more active and flexible diplomacy. Nearly all urged deference to UN resolutions and to America's coalition allies (save for Kuwait itself, whose monarchical government, they repeatedly emphasized, was not worth American lives).

Domestic economic and political conditions in the early 1990s sharpened the issues at stake. Even as Saddam Hussein was invading Kuwait, a mild-but-persistent recession dragged on. President Bush's decisive response to Kuwait's plight could not have contrasted more sharply with his seeming indifference to his own country's difficulties. In fact, the President frankly admitted that he simply found foreign policy more enjoyable and exciting than domestic affairs.

The contrast between Bush's domestic and foreign policy faces became starker following the Persian Gulf triumph. The war did not jump-start the economy, and despite record popularity ratings Bush declined to spend any political capital—or even much time—on domestic affairs. By the following New Year, Harris Wofford of Pennsylvania had won election to the Senate demanding, "It's time to take care of our own," Bush had finally acknowledged the recession's existence, and had been forced to turn a planned diplomatic love feast in Tokyo into a market-opening exercise. From that point, the tone of the 1992 presidential campaign was set with the domestic debate and the foreign policy debate becoming opposite sides of the same coin. What George Bush's opponents were principally challenging was not any specific foreign policy he was carrying out—although these were criticized as well—but the very place of foreign policy in American life, its long-time primacy over domestic affairs.

Since the end of the Gulf War, the fragmentation of the Cold War coalitions has accelerated, but the continuing tug of old loyalties remains evident as well. The new alignments are succeeding in widening the debate on post-Cold War foreign policy to include the fundamental goals of both security and economic policy. Yet none of the new groupings that have emerged seems broadly enough based to form the core of a politically successful new coalition. Not only are conservatives and liberals each divided into interventionists and non-interventionists on security issues, and nationalists and laissez-fairists on economics, but members of these new groupings often disagree among themselves on foreign policy objectives. In other words, conventional Cold War categories such as liberal and conservative, interventionist and isolationist, realist and idealist, and free trader and protectionist, have lost their predictive power in the post-Cold War world.

There are interventionists who value international stability above all, and interventionists seeking to spark worldwide

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democratic revolution. Meanwhile, the North American Free Trade Agreement attracts the support both of free traders enamored of its market opening features, and closet nationalists looking to consolidate a Western Hemisphere economic bloc in preparation for possible trade wars. Worse, numerous politicians and analysts have found even minimal consistency too confining, and have been prepared to support enthusiastically this month what they were denying vigorously last month. More important, none of these groupings has risen to the main challenge posed by the post-Cold War world at home and abroad: that of sensibly integrating security and economic policies.

Fumblers on the Right

WITH BOTH THE Gulf War and the 1992 election now history, what most observers still call "American conservatism" seems split into no less than three principal factions—conservative realists, democratic crusaders, and conservative minimalists—and these are only barely cohering. Nor, in each case, are their security and economic positions very effectively tied together.

Traditional, mainstream Republican internationalists may be in the greatest disarray. These balance-of-power conservatives or conservative realists—including many of the leading lights of the Nixon, Ford, Reagan, and Bush administrations, as well as many prominent columnists and think tank-ers—appear united in seeking to lower Americans' expectations of the post-Cold War world. All had records as staunch cold warriors and most continue to express general support for traditional internationalist ideas such as global community, stability, and American political leadership. But nearly all have publicly worried that these ideas could become rationales for indiscriminate and dangerous American involvement in manifestly intractable conflicts all over the world.

Their commitment to preventing the disintegration of international politics into complete chaos has always been tempered by classical realism's belief that conflict and insecurity will inevitably characterize a world of fully sovereign political entities, whether they be nation-states, smaller units, or larger blocs and federations. Consequently, they have raised important questions about U.S. military interventions in Kurdistan, Bosnia, and elsewhere, as well as about liberals' plans for an international collective security system centered on so politically fragmented and militarily inexperienced an organization as the UN. In particular, they have recognized that desirability of ends alone can not justify pursuing foreign policy goals. Cost, risk, need, and feasibility require consideration as well. His ringing rhetoric about "a Pax Universalis" notwithstanding, George Bush belonged to this group. He shied away from U.S. military intervention to halt aggression in Bosnia and plunged into Somalia only after months of hesitation—and after the election.

These conservatives entertain no illusions about the international environment turning benign or tranquil after the Cold War; their seeming passivity has not been rooted in optimism. Indeed, as Kissinger and others (including the editors of *The National Interest*) have repeatedly warned, internationalist hopes for major post-Cold War progress toward a more Wilsonian world are bound to be dashed by the profound disagreements still dividing even the industrialized democracies, and by the sheer limits on American power, wealth, and wisdom. More important, these conservatives have drawn a critical post-Soviet distinction between the fact of disorder, tragedy, and misery around the world on the one hand, and threats to the United States on the other.

Indeed, what has impressed conservative realists most about the post-Soviet,

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post-Cold War world is how questionable it has left a key tenet of internationalism—the indivisibility of international security and prosperity. Without a superpower adversary to exploit global turmoil, many local problems have seemed just that to these officials and analysts—local. In the words of the Heritage Foundation's April, 1992 report *Making the World Safe for America*, "In the post-Soviet world, the job of protecting America's vital interests...will be less strenuous. With foreign policy no longer a zero-sum game, America can choose not to become involved in many conflicts." Other countries could take the lead in intervening in trouble spots around the world, or, failing that, these crises could be left unattended.

Despite this apparent coherence, on the most important issue that America has faced in the post-Cold War era—launching the Gulf War—the mainstream conservative camp split wide open. Moreover, even after the Gulf War, their realpolitik leanings have raised many unanswered questions. What do these conservatives mean precisely when they set "order" and "stability" as major goals of U.S. foreign policy? Are they simply trying to cool the public expectations allegedly excited by conservative and liberal champions of a crusade for global democracy? Are they so nostalgic for the Cold War that they have begun to equate freedom with chaos, as critics like George Will and William Safire have charged, and as Bush's August 1991 "Chicken Kiev" speech allegedly confirmed? And are not their hopes for maintaining order and balancing power even in Third World regions themselves somewhat utopian, containing the seeds of a dangerous new interventionism despite their intentions?

The conservative realists are divided on important economic questions as well. The Bush administration, so alert to Saddam's threat to American national and economic security, adopted a deliberately passive approach to other economic security challenges—a passivity justified, if not inspired by, internationalist economics and *laissez-faire* ideology. Bush and his top economic advisors subscribed wholeheartedly to the internationalist goal of a highly interdependent, market-driven world economy. In fact, despite sharpening trade disputes among the advanced industrialized countries and deteriorating U.S. economic performance, the administration and other *laissez-faire* advocates remained convinced that the world economy had already become a largely non-strategic realm, a positive-sum game. Aside from the arms industry, resources and technology, it seemed, existed apart from international power relationships—and from any state supervision at all. Economic competition was something engaged in by private actors, and winning and losing meant little in national terms.

These views dovetailed perfectly with the skeptical Reaganite doctrine that government can do nothing right economically. Bush and his top advisors believed them so strongly that ultimately their economic policy, foreign and domestic, became reduced to a pitch for trade liberalization treaties during a prolonged period of slow worldwide economic growth—a new GATT accord and NAFTA—as panaceas for the wide array of ills suffered by an ailing U.S. economy. Their devotion to worldwide economic interdependence and integration inhibited them from responding even when foreign enterprises moved to acquire the last American-owned manufacturers of militarily critical high technology products.

Other conservative realists, however, have begun entertaining doubts about internationalism's firm commitment to GATT-style multilateral trade liberalization and *laissez-faire* economics. Charles Krauthammer—who in late 1992 seemed to defect to realism from the global democracy camp—has characterized more nationalistic economic policies as "an essential fea-

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ture of the fascist world view." But, Kissinger (in a journal article written with Cyrus Vance) has endorsed a policy of managed trade vis-à-vis Japan, and in large part supported NAFTA not on ideological grounds but in preemptive response to the prospect that international trade and investment patterns will become increasingly regionalized. If trade blocs are emerging in Europe and East Asia, he and other realists have reasoned, America needs one of its own—both to create a more level global playing field, and to pull its partners back toward a global approach. Characteristically, Edward Luttwak, who opposed the Desert Storm decision, has gone much further, offering an ambitious theoretical argument for the advent of an age of "geo-economics."[1] Traditional geo-politics will be largely displaced and, even in a world of democracies, great powers will instead pursue their traditional interests and conduct their traditional struggles with economic weapons—to capture world markets and wield financial and technological leverage.

Yet how far would most of the balance-of-power realists be prepared to go towards satisfying public demands that America's short-term self-interest should take precedence over internationalism's insistence that the international economic "system" be allowed to operate autonomously? After all, most are not instinctive or philosophical economic nationalists. The same skepticism they have long held regarding government as an international social engineer feeds doubts about government as a manager of world trade and investment. Further, apart from periodic complaints about burden-sharing, few have been inclined to question seriously America's security commitments to Western Europe and Japan for economic or any other reasons.

Even bigger questions have dogged the second main conservative group —neoconservative democratic crusaders such as Patrick Glynn, Ben Wattenberg, and Joshua Muravchik (all of the American Enterprise Institute), Charles Krauthammer (at least before 1993), and the editors of *The New Republic*. These analysts and commentators have urged the anchoring of U.S. foreign policy in a quest to democratize the world. Consistent with the something-for-nothing approach of Reaganomics, this movement promised epochal results for a pittance—chiefly the limited commitment of resources required by the "Reagan Doctrine" which advocated speeding communism's collapse by arming insurgents against pro-Soviet Third World governments. When in an era of huge budget deficits, the costs of extending the Reagan Doctrine to many nondemocratic countries after the Cold War were raised as an objection, Wattenberg asked, "[Did] anyone remember what the merchandise trade balance was of the Roman Empire?"

The Cold War and Gulf War triumphs gave the democratic crusaders—as well as mainstream liberal internationalists—a boost. All major obstacles to finishing the worldwide democratic revolution seemed gone, and America stood at the end of history as the lone superpower. Since the Bush administration rejected their advice and the political fortunes of the crusade began to sag, the neoconservative crusaders began looking homeward—to a Democratic party with an old human rights tradition and a desperate need to puncture President Bush's foreign policy balloon. Quickly they spotted their candidate—Bill Clinton, who, along with his allies at the Democratic Leadership Council, had decided a decade before that Democratic foreign policies had to champion American values aggressively in order to win back the presidency.

Yet with Russia threatening to fly apart, ethnic wars raging around half the former Soviet rim, and numerous Third

[1] "From Geopolitics to Geo-Economics," *The National Interest*, No. 20, Summer 1990, p. 17. See Raymond Vernon's review of Luttwak's *The Endangered American Dream* on p. 102.

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World states sliding into anarchy, global democratization started to look like nothing so much as a quaint vestige of Cold War days—and euphoric early post-Cold War days. Its underlying triumphalism began to ring especially hollow.

Moreover, a funny thing happened on the way to the White House. The recession dragged on, economics came back with a vengeance, and the crusaders were blindsided. Clinton dutifully delivered speeches outlining a foreign policy that fused realism with democratic idealism, and was just as dutifully praised for his responsibility by the staunchly internationalist national press corps. But few voters were listening. They were more interested in the economy, stupid, than in millennial change abroad. Krauthammer probably spoke for many crusaders by blaming the victims. In the middle of the longest economic slump since the Great Depression, one characterized by adverse structural changes in everything from peacetime debt levels to eroded technological and industrial superiority, Krauthammer complained that the country was in a "foul" and "irrational" mood, and railed at the seeming absurdity that "...7 percent unemployment heralds the end of the American dream."

Thus it is not surprising that little has been heard of global democratization in recent months, outside a few sentences in policy speeches. In fact, despite Clinton's victory and his appointment of mainstream liberal human rights advocates like Anthony Lake to senior positions, both the neoconservative and DLC democracy crusaders—such as Joshua Muravchik and Will Marshall—were marginalized in the new administration's staffing. And even the trickle of funds allotted by Washington to democratization in recent years faces major cuts. With hard economic times continuing at home, the democracy crusade seems more remote than ever from the principal concerns of most Americans, and consequently difficult to finance. Despite this and some other significant defections, neoconservatives such as Muravchik, Wattenberg, and the editors of *The New Republic* have maintained their alliance with other interventionists on the Right and Left in favor of U.S. military operations in dysfunctional, broken lands all over the world.

The third major conservative group is usually branded as isolationist, but the term minimalist is freer of historical baggage, and therefore preferable. This foreign policy position unites a variety of factions that disagree profoundly in many respects, including their general philosophical approaches and their views on economics. The quasi-libertarian analysts at the Cato Institute, New Right stalwarts such as Pat Buchanan and Paul Weyrich, and to a significant extent Ross Perot—whose skimpy 1992 foreign policy platform had a strong minimalist tinge—all reject traditional internationalist goals of strong U.S. alliance relationships and effective global collective security systems, as well as ambitious schemes of worldwide welfare promotion and social engineering (read "nation-building"), especially when supervised by international organizations. They have even less use for cherished internationalist notions of American world leadership and international responsibility—at least when it creates any significant costs or risks. The minimalists' objective is supremely nationalist: "strategic independence" for the United States.

The libertarian minimalists, however, have an unusual view of strategic independence, one completely lacking an economic dimension. Energy insecurity, trade and current account deficits, eroding industrial and technological superiority, rising foreign ownership of critical U.S. industries—their single-minded determination to shrink the state's role in modern American life gives libertarians confidence that market forces will eventually solve any problems created for the country by these trends. Indeed, like the *laissez-faire* champions of the Bush

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administration, they define most of these trends as pluses, not minuses, for the United States, for most benefit individuals by widening consumer and investor choice, and reducing consumer prices. And although, like the realists, the libertarians view foreign governments as so Machiavellian in security and political affairs that they can never be trusted to respect American interests, in the economic realm these same governments are seen as either benign or helpless before the integrating power of the invisible hand.

The New Rightists and Perot share the libertarians' relaxed attitudes toward security threats, and many angrily opposed the Gulf War. Yet they have developed a strong fear of international economic threats. Buchanan, Weyrich, and Perot, for example, all oppose NAFTA. Both Buchanan and Perot favor tit-for-tat reciprocity-based trade policies, even if they jeopardize U.S. alliances with Japan and Western Europe, and both favor major government initiatives to strengthen the American industrial and technology bases. And where the libertarians believe "the more the merrier" when it comes to immigration, the New Right fears both the economic and cultural consequences of a continuing influx.

Out of Left Field

WHILE CONSERVATIVES have divided among realists, democratic crusaders, and minimalists, an unmistakable new interventionism has begun to take hold across the left half of the political spectrum—and particularly, it seems, among those who, only a short while ago, opposed Desert Storm. This group includes, among others, Anthony Lewis, Jesse Jackson, Senators Joseph Biden and Claiborne Pell, and, not least, Bill Clinton—who, at best, waffled on the Gulf War issue. Many of the new interventionist Democrats turned on Clinton when he balked at intervening militarily in the former Yugoslavia, just as they (led by Clinton himself during the campaign) blasted Bush for timidity in the face of Serbian aggression. These liberal interventionists also have urged Clinton not to "cut and run" in Somalia. And as their cries for U.S. action have become more insistent, so have their invocations of America's alleged need to lead the world community toward their objectives.

Underlying the new interventionism is the belief that the international community is acquiring the right to intervene in the domestic affairs of states when human rights are massively violated or order has broken down. The new interventionism has also been bolstered by the end-of-Cold-War gridlock at the United Nations. The Soviet collapse has ostensibly opened a real possibility of creating a politically neutral force that represents humanity at large, and that would work to end suffering and foster progress wherever the need arises.

Although many of the new interventionists opposed fighting "a war for oil," they have favored using military force—even unilaterally, if necessary—in areas such as Kurdistan, Bosnia, Somalia, and Haiti. No significant U.S. interests are at stake in these regions, but liberals have portrayed intervention as necessary to advance internationalism's key systemic goals: greater international prosperity and stability, as well as a kinder, gentler world. If successful, such peacekeeping, peace-making, and nation-building operations would also further the grander internationalist objective of a true world community governed by law rather than force—an objective they see as the ultimate guarantor of American security and prosperity, and which has been dear to liberal hearts since the Enlightenment.

Their strategy of advancing U.S. interests indirectly, by improving the international environment as a whole, reflects mainstream Cold War internationalist thinking. But the reluctance of liberal inter-

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ventionists to defend unilaterally purely U.S. interests (such as Gulf oil) presents political dangers. With memories of their Cold War-era foreign policy positions still warm, it inevitably calls to mind the "McGovernite" or "Carterite" tendencies of that time—tendencies that got Democrats into trouble with the American electorate, for good reason. So striking has been the contrast between the Gulf and post-Gulf stances of liberals, that some of their critics sardonically accuse them of favoring military actions only when no serious purely U.S. interests are at stake. But this jibe points to a central truth about liberal internationalism. Whether during the Cold War or after the Cold War, purely U.S. national interests were never its top priority. In fact, they were not even supposed to exist.

Like the post-Cold War Right, contemporary liberalism is deeply divided on economic issues. Although many liberals hesitated to use force when the world's single most important commodity was threatened, they still clamor loudly for stronger non-military responses to other economic challenges resulting from America's allegedly declining economic competitiveness. Firmly committed to a timorous, often paralyzing, multilateralism when key American security interests are at stake, many liberals nonetheless stress the need for unilateralism in trade policy—particularly in dealing with those countries that are America's principal security allies and trade partners, and are now its strongest competitors. House Majority Leader Richard Gephardt, Senate Majority Leader George Mitchell, Mario Cuomo, and 1992 Democratic presidential contenders Sen. Bob Kerrey and Sen. Tom Harkin all fret about the state of the American manufacturing base and the defense industrial base, and regularly sound the alarm when foreign enterprises take over U.S. high tech companies. This economic nationalism meshes nicely with the liberal support for activist government in general. But why are they simultaneously so confident that international cooperation can solve chronic security dilemmas and so skeptical that such cooperation can resolve new economic frictions?

An equally striking but different mismatch of military and economic strategies is found among members of a final major group, the *laissez-faire* liberals. True to their internationalist roots, these liberals consider both international politics and international economics to be positive-sum games; place a high priority on enhancing security, prosperity, and democracy around the world; and see strengthening international institutions as a key to success.

As a guide for U.S. foreign policy, the *laissez-faire* liberals' internationalism suffers from the same strategic flaw as *laissez-faire* conservatism: it sets an ambitious international agenda while neglecting the economic base required for effective power projection. When they do consider the resulting ends-means gap in foreign policy, like their more nationalistically minded liberal counterparts they offer solutions manifestly inadequate to closing it—ranging from empowering the UN or some other viable collective security system (proposed by John Steinbrunner of Brookings, among others), to establishing a United States-EC-Japan troika to share the burdens and decision-making for world leadership (an idea advanced by C. Fred Bergsten and Harvard political scientist Stanley Hoffmann), to relying more on America's so-called soft-power assets—its reputation, its persuasiveness, its pop culture (Joseph Nye's contribution).

Moreover, the *laissez-faire* liberals are strange progressives indeed. Although they continue to countenance all manner of interventionist economic policies and activist government at home (principally through macroeconomic policies and transfer payments rather than microeconomic measures), when it comes to international

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economic policies, they slavishly worship the invisible hand. Thus it is perfectly all right to preserve a job by extending a summer employment program, but not by enforcing American anti-dumping laws. In practice, making operational *laissez-faire* liberalism's vision of a tightly integrated world economy run strictly according to market mechanisms would involve countenancing a massive transfer of political power to private—capitalist—entities. And for all their confidence that America can pursue ambitious agendas at home and abroad, none of these moderately left Wilsonians has considered the fate of domestic reform in a nation bogged down in protracted, messy military operations all around the world. Perhaps after one or two more Somalia-style fiascoes they will be prepared to do so.

A New Alignment

THE CONTRADICTIONS permeating these various groups and coalitions indicate how unstable they are. And in fact, three major forces—social, political, and intellectual—are already breaking them apart, establishing new dividing lines in American foreign policy, and by extension reordering American politics.

The social factor arises from the different impact of world economic trends on different classes. The fall of communism notwithstanding, Marx was not completely wrong or stupid: Where you stand on an issue is invariably influenced by where you sit. Thus it is not surprising that, with the Cold War state of emergency and American economic predominance now both mere memories, our foreign policy debate increasingly pits social and economic classes against each other, focusing on the questions of who pays the costs and who incurs most of the risks involved in competing security and economic policies.

Polls repeatedly show that the best educated and wealthiest Americans are the staunchest internationalists on both security and economic issues. The surveys also show strong support for internationalist policies to be lacking nearly everywhere else in the social spectrum. The standard conclusion is that internationalist policies are therefore clearly superior—since, after all, their strongest backers are the best qualified to express an opinion. But it is also true that the best and the brightest tend to escape the worst consequences of these policies—from military service to unemployment. This phenomenon is especially striking among two groups that have traditionally championed the cause of ordinary Americans—or have claimed to do so —journalists (especially the national press corps) and academics. To take a current example, no group, whether liberal or conservative in persuasion, has been more supportive of the North American Free Trade Agreement than these. Yet no one from either group has ever lost a job directly to foreign competition.

That having been said, divisions among elites themselves warn against a purely class-based interpretation of American foreign policy—and always have. Many card-carrying members of the foreign policy establishment—Jeane Kirkpatrick, William Hyland, Edward Luttwak—not only write compellingly about domestic interests but actually recommend the redirection of attention and reordering of priorities that would make effective responses possible. Nonetheless, a remarkable share of our foreign policy debate still consists of affluent internationalists searching for new opportunities for risking their countrymen's lives and resources, and developing ever more arcane justifications for doing so, and then lamenting the public's determination to put America's needs first.

The second and related force influencing new alignments is political. American foreign policy and politics are increasingly divided on the issue of national priorities just mentioned above, and on the related

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question of an interested versus a disinterested approach to foreign policy— that is, the question of how extensively our foreign policy should be concerned with directly benefiting the American people. Both issues frontally challenge internationalism's belief that the best route—and in fact the only sound route—to American security and prosperity is a roundabout one. That is to say, internationalism has always held that the national interest can only be served indirectly. Consistent with its view that harmony is the natural state of relations among countries, internationalism has a "trickle-down" theory of foreign policy—security and prosperity are best secured as byproducts of the quest for a better world. Thus the effort to assure a rising tide should receive most of the country's resources and attention, in the belief that only thus will America's boat stay afloat and be lifted, along with all others.

When the global and domestic tides were rising, as they were during the early Cold War decades of rapid economic growth and rising living standards, it was reasonable to assume that domestic matters like employment and living standards would sort themselves out. Even when growth slowed during the 1970s, political and social tensions were dampened by the continuing external threat. But with both key Cold War conditions gone, the public is demanding that less attention and resources be devoted to foreign policy, that American resources and lives not be risked if America's security is not clearly at stake, and that foreign policy initiatives generally focus much more tightly on enhancing domestic welfare. Consequently, U.S. military involvement in remote Third World backwaters simply in order to strengthen the UN's peacekeeping capabilities and buttress something as nebulous as "international stability" are non-starters. And domestic support has eroded and is eroding for trade agreements that preserve the international trading system but have the net effect of costing American jobs; or major aid programs (e.g., for the former Soviet Union) whose returns will only come far down the road, if at all; or alliance policies that sacrifice U.S. economic interests for often hazy geo-political ends. Thus, nationalist policies have increasing political appeal.

The third force is intellectual. Although still inchoate, a new realist nationalism shows signs of becoming a full-blown alternative to internationalist foreign policy, and to complete the realignment of domestic politics. Such a new foreign policy approach would break decisively with internationalism by abandoning the quest for worldwide security, prosperity, and democracy as the best guarantors of American well-being. Instead, it would conclude that in a world likely to remain highly unstable, America's future is best assured by restoring and consolidating its own military and economic strength, and the health of its social and political systems. For success on these fronts is likeliest to provide the country the flexibility and options needed to cope successfully with threats—and opportunities—that are ever more difficult to foresee.

In fact, this new nationalism amounts to an entirely new model of American foreign policy. At bottom, internationalism has been a policy of activism. Understandably patterning itself after the foreign policies of past great powers, it believes that the measure of America's international effectiveness—in fact, of great-power status itself—is how much American does on the world stage: how many armies and navies it can send to distant regions, how many alliances it can lead, how many international disputes it can mediate, how many international organizations it can join, how much foreign aid it can dole out, how effectively it can promote human rights. After all, these are the kinds of things that great powers have always done. In contrast, the new nationalism maintains that great powers should ultimately be defined by what they are, not by what they do—by the strengths they can

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bring to whatever international policy and course of behavior they choose—and that unlike the relatively small, relatively vulnerable great powers of Europe's past, the United States—even in a technologically shrunken world—remains rich, strong, and geo-politically secure enough to survive and prosper through its own devices.

Whether of the Left or the Right, America's new nationalists will increasingly be seen as champions of "the little man," because of their focus on directly enhancing and defending America's security and prosperity. The safety and welfare of ordinary Americans—keeping them out of unnecessary wars (which they wind up fighting), preserving their jobs, and minimizing their foreign policy expenses—will never be far from the minds of the new nationalists because they see these objectives as the *sine qua non* of foreign policy, not simply beneficial side effects. Their focus on the immediate and tangible effects of American foreign policy on ordinary citizens is what best explains the clearest sign that the new nationalism is taking hold: the unprecedented Left-Right coalition that has formed to oppose NAFTA, a coalition that includes Ross Perot, Ralph Nader, Pat Buchanan, Jesse Jackson, and Lane Kirkland. (It also explains Ronald Reagan, Jimmy Carter, George Bush, and Bill Clinton—all still committed to the old internationalism—lining up in favor of the treaty.) Whether this coalition will hold together following the NAFTA vote and turn its attention to a broader assault on internationalist goals and priorities will go far toward determining the shape of American politics for decades.

Indeed, the anti-NAFTA coalition looms as the core of the nationalist faction likely to emerge from the current transitional period in American politics. At the mass public level, it would be comprised of blue collar union members; white collar middle managers and small businessmen from the Perotista ranks; family- and community-oriented immigrants; and grass-roots environmental activists. At the intellectual level, this coalition could attract liberal and conservative economic nationalists, and possibly—for tactical reasons—some conservative realists. The coalition's program would revolve around a definition of U.S. interests broad enough to transcend isolationism but narrow enough to avoid any risk of imperial overstretch.[2] It would proceed in terms of a "lean and mean" military, built around precision-guided air and naval strike weapons and oriented toward punitive and counter-proliferation missions; of unilateralism (except where conditions permit limited, ad hoc coalitions to advance short- and medium-term U.S. interests by serving as force and resource multipliers); of reciprocity-based trade policies and performance standards to ensure that foreign investments strengthen the U.S. industrial base; of joint government-business initiatives to develop and commercialize new technologies; of new incentives for savings and investment and greater fiscal responsibility.

At the other pole would gather America's internationalists. The social base of internationalism would include many big multinational businesses and their upper-level managers, financiers, professionals, and retailers. Journalists and the rest of the mass

[2]With U.S. military spending slated to decline to only 3 percent of gross national product by the late 1990s (compared with 8-10 percent of GNP during the 1950s and 1960s), the country would seem to have ample room actually to increase defense budgets—and thus international activism—without encountering the overstretch problem. But "imperial overstretch" is a political, not a purely economic, concept, one that makes sense only in terms of the American public's expectations and priorities. In principle, after all, the United States could fund practically any foreign policy endeavor it wished by raising taxes high enough and/or channeling all wealth into international affairs.

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media, as well as academics, also tend to support an idealistic globalism. Other members of a new internationalist coalition might include minorities whose fear of cultural conservative nationalists outweighs their qualms about job-destroying internationalist free-trade economics, and affluent, mainstream environmentalists. At the intellectual level, the new internationalism could invite mainstream *laissez-faire* liberals; *laissez-faire* conservatives; neoconservative democratic crusaders; and those conservative realists who only pay lip service to economics. It might even include those liberals further out on the Left whose abhorrence of military force used for national ends and one-world interventionist impulses would outweigh their commitment to social and economic justice at home. Much of what they lack in numbers, the internationalists would make up for in money, influence, and the aura of respectability that their media allies will continue to provide.

Just as the emergence of a strongly populist bipartisan nationalist coalition has already forced many conservatives to reconsider their blanket hostility to a significant domestic role for the state, the emergence of a strongly elitist bipartisan internationalist coalition should soon bring American liberalism to a crossroads—and perhaps a parting of the ways. For, however bipartisan it has been since World War II's end, American internationalism has roots that are plainly on the Left. Yet with the country's engines of economic growth sputtering, the devotion of mainstream liberalism to internationalism is clashing with its avowed central domestic priority—its commitment to "the little man."

So far internationalism shows clear signs of winning. Perhaps, as internationalism holds, the pursuit of systemic global change will in fact best serve the long-term interests of ordinary Americans. But the results will be a long time coming at best, and what looks to some like indirect pursuit looks to others like subordination. Given the staggering uncertainty of long-term goals, and the internationalists' increasingly elitist makeup, it is legitimate to ask whether abstractions such as collective security and "the international economic system" have not in fact become their highest priorities. At the least, liberal internationalists may be tempted to favor sacrificing the short-term interests of their core constituencies (though not necessarily their own interests) for the sake of grandiose objectives that seem forever over the horizon. (That, alas, is what "vision" all too often amounts to.) If they do so, they may wind up permanently alienating labor, minorities, and the white collar middle class whether they intend to or not—and lose their identity as champions of the underdog and as agents of progressive change in the process. Internationalists of the Right will face similar problems. Without offering voters something more than NAFTA, the continuing "creative destruction" of their jobs, endless foreign interventions, and Marilyn Quayle's definition of family values, it is difficult to see them avoiding George Bush's political fate.

Difficult as they would be to hold together, these coalitions contain fewer contradictions than many of today's alignments. But even if the anti-NAFTA coalition falls apart, a new nationalism—and a new internationalism—will have many opportunities to coalesce for the long haul. The internationalists' Wilsonian attraction to foreign quagmires, their clear reluctance to rethink America's major international commitments and world role, and their tightening embrace of the Bush trade policies all but guarantee it. Indeed, one can predict now the dominant TV news image of the late-1990s: hardhats marching outside the United Nations, the State Department, the *Washington Post* editorial offices, and the Carnegie Endowment building during America's next world peacekeeping quagmire, carrying signs and chanting, "Hell no, we won't go!" □

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America, Know Thyself

Jonathan Clarke

AFTER NEARLY A year of the Clinton administration there is still no consensus, either among the foreign policy elite or in the country at large, about America's role in the world. What are America's foreign purposes? Is America the world's leader, the global policeman, the default guardian of morality? Will America act unilaterally or only in company? Which counts more, national interest or humanitarian goals? Do economic objectives take precedence over all others? No one really knows, least of all in the White House or on Capitol Hill.

The Delphic Oracle instructed the ancient Greeks to "Know Thyself." This exhortation to self-knowledge is never more apt than today. One of the reasons for the present confusion is that the line between reality and rhetoric and the distinction between ends and means have become blurred almost beyond the point of clarification. As leaders seek inspiration to define the nation's new role, they themselves barely know whether they are drawing on fact or fiction. A look inward and into history may clarify the view outward and to the future. By returning to the historical roots of its national identity, America may be able to find a way out of its present disorientation.

This will be a formidable task. During the Cold War a set of policy assumptions and habits of thought established itself as eternally sacrosanct: projection of American values through world leadership, global responsibility, forward force deployment, and a large national security establishment. These assumptions performed as the disk operating system for three generations of American foreign policy makers. By their very success, they became second nature—in George Bush's words, "essential." In speech after speech, President Bill Clinton has shown that he is not the man to break the mold.

To combat any challenge to these assumptions, an opposite view came into being which stated that pre-Cold War foreign relations inhabited a world where, in Reinhold Niebuhr's words, "we lived for a century not only in the illusion but in the reality of innocency," or, in the more demotic phrasing of the *Wabash Plain Dealer* on the outbreak of World War I, "we never appreciated so keenly as now the foresight of our forefathers in emigrating from Europe."

This tradition acquired the label of "isolationism." Described by Bush as "folly" and by Clinton as "poison," it remains the trump card to be played by those who assert that the international system will collapse into anarchy unless America mounts an eternal "watch on the Rhine." Under this disqualifying rubric, it becomes possible to dismiss any deviation from the interventionist paradigm as, in the words of National Security Adviser Anthony Lake, "the rhetoric of Neo-Know-Nothings."

The fact that this factory-installed memory is seriously inadequate does not prevent it from being remarkably pervasive. UN Ambassador Madeleine Albright, for example, has described

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American engagement in the world as a "tradition that goes back a half century." This is to suppress, distort, or forget pre-1945 diplomatic history. Self-knowledge will be impossible unless we recapture the truth of the past.

Two impediments stand in the way of this goal.

First, received wisdom teaches that prior to 1945 foreign policy wallowed in the primeval slime of isolationism. In fact, throughout its history, the nation has been fully engaged in world affairs on the basis of policies that display a consistent theme of geopolitical realism. For the purposes of public presentation, however, this realist concept has become encrusted with various universalist and absolutist ideals. This has made the tradition difficult to discern and to identify.

Today, these notions have taken on a life of their own. Like discombobulated secret agents, we have come to believe our own cover stories or legends. We take at face value McKinley's protestations that the primary purpose for his annexation of the Philippines was to encompass the Christianization of the inhabitants (who, of course, had been Catholic for three hundred years) rather than to thwart German ambitions or provide a springboard for trade. We have forgotten the vital distinction between sentimentality and reality. The direct result is the contemporary fantasy that the nation is able to conduct a "selfless" or "humanitarian" foreign policy, as in Somalia, without connection to national interest. Unless this confusion is clarified, it will be impossible to formulate a rational foreign policy.

America as Arbiter

FROM THE EARLIEST days of the Republic, its founders foresaw an intimate engagement in world affairs by the United States. In 1776 Thomas Paine advocated independence from Britain so that the United States would be able to extend relations to all European countries. Writing in 1787, John Jay advocated the advantages of a single government for the United states precisely on the ground that he foresaw extensive involvement with foreign countries: "America has already formed treaties with no less than six foreign nations and all of them, except Prussia, are maritime and therefore able to annoy and injure us."

Washington himself did not object to these treaties. He qualified his Farewell Address warning about "permanent alliances" with the (usually overlooked) proviso, "so far, I mean, as we are at liberty to do it, for let me not be understood as capable of preaching infidelity to existing arrangements." Nor do the actions of the early presidents provide any evidence of a wish to duck their foreign responsibilities. Adams expanded the navy and army to wage an undeclared war with France in defense of American commercial interests; Jefferson's first cabinet meeting in 1801 was devoted to debating whether to send a naval squadron to the Mediterranean to protect American shipping from attacks from Tripoli; Madison went to war with Britain over the issue of the impressment of American sailors.

Instead of isolationism, a much more satisfactory characterization for the strategic approach of these statesmen is that they saw the national interest as lying in freedom of action. This careful analysis of American self-interest led to the policy of neutrality between the belligerent parties in the Napoleonic wars then raging in Europe. Not only was this the best safeguard for American independence in terms of avoiding attacks against the fledgling republic but it also brought substantial commercial advantage through the potential for trade with both sides.

Activism in the Americas balanced neutrality in Europe. In 1787 Alexander Hamilton wrote: "By a steady adherence to the Union, we may hope erelong to become the arbiter of Europe in America, and to be able to incline the balance of European competitions in this part of the world as our interest may dictate." In 1820 Henry Clay, then Speaker of the House of Representatives, continued this focus on hemispheric interests by urging early recognition of Latin American independence: "It is in our power to create a system of which we shall be the center...this country would become the place

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of deposit of the commerce of the world." These thoughts later found practical expression in the Monroe Doctrine, an extraordinarily vigorous assertion of American interests over those of the European powers in Latin America and of Russia in the Oregon country (albeit one dependent on British naval power for its execution).

This conception of national interest proved useful in cases analogous to those we face today between the contending poles of moral theory and rational prudence. For example, in 1823 then Congressman Daniel Webster, a future Secretary of State, counseled against military intervention, despite being a strong supporter of Greek independence aspirations from Turkey. Had the national interest been more immediate, for example in Latin America, he would advocate a different course on the grounds that "our duty to ourselves, our policy, and wisdom might indicate very different courses as fit to be pursued by us in the two cases."

It may be objected that, even if it is conceded that the early Republic was more actively engaged on foreign affairs than latter day commentators allow, its focus was defensive and parochial. Whilst this may have, as Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan wrote in 1894, "befitted (the nation) in her infancy," this is too narrow a concept for a mature country engaged, in George Kennan's words, "as a participant in the affairs of the international community as a whole."

In an obvious sense this is clearly correct. Throughout the rest of the nineteenth century America's relations with the outside world intensified by way of the annexation of Texas, the Mexican war, the completion of continental expansion, and the acquisition of imperial possessions in the Pacific and Far East. In the wake of these developments, foreign policy became more complex, though far from dominant in terms of government dispositions—in Cleveland's time, the State Department still numbered only sixty employees and the Navy ranked below that of Chile. An important continuity, however, was the survival of the geopolitical realism inherited from the early Republic. Unfortunately, in a development which haunts us today, this tradition began to be buried by slogans that have their home in marketing campaigns rather than in foreign policy analysis.

For example, a new journalistic concept, Manifest Destiny, sprung up to array the vast territorial expansion to the west coast in the splendid trappings of inevitability and divine ineluctability. In the words of Herman Melville writing to celebrate the Mexican war, "We Americans are the peculiar, chosen people—the Israel of our time; we bear the ark of the liberties of the world...God has predestined...the rest of the nations must be in our rear."

It is doubtful, however, that any of the political actors of the time actively shared this view. Equivocation over Texan annexation for reasons of sectional politics deprived respectively Martin Van Buren of the Democratic nomination and Henry Clay of the presidency in the 1844 election. Among those who favored annexation such as Andrew Jackson who declared, "Texas must be ours, our security demands it," the prime motivation was to fend off any reassertion of Mexican sovereignty or a back-door re-establishment of British influence which the scheming of the British Foreign Secretary Lord Aberdeen might have brought about in the form of a joint British-Mexican guarantee for a slave-free Texan republic independent of the United States. In 1845 President James Polk brought the matter home in his statement to Congress that he could not overlook "attempts by European powers to interfere with the independent actions of the nations of this continent."

Similarly realistic calculations underlay the western expansion put in train by the Polk administration. As Polk's emissary in Mexico, William S. Parrot, reported, the weak Mexican hold over the lush Pacific lands was arousing "great interest in everything Californian in English circles." There was talk that Britain might cancel the debt owed to it by Mexico in exchange for California. It was also believed that the French and British, both of whom were in the process of establishing Pacific empires, entertained designs on San Francisco Bay.

To counter these threats, Polk first

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attempted to buy California but, when the Mexican refusal together with her negative reaction to the annexation of Texas made war inevitable, Polk proceeded with great subtlety. He quickly defied a significant body of congressional opinion to reach a deal with the British to fix the boundaries of Oregon along their present lines rather than the much larger American claim that extended up to Russian Alaska and that had formed part of his election platform to "re-occupy Oregon." The upcoming war against Mexico dictated a prudent sacrifice.

The successful consolidation of Texas and the West left expansion as the *leitmotif* for the rest of the century. William Henry Seward, Lincoln and Johnson's Secretary of State, remarked that "there is not in the history of the Roman empire an ambition for aggrandizement so marked as that which characterized the American people."

This was not, however, an irrational or uncontrolled impulse. Poets such as Walt Whitman could assert that it was in mankind's interest that American power and influence should be extended "the farther the better" and Darwinist books such as *Our Country* by Josiah Strong could trumpet the world mission of the Anglo-Saxon race. These views did not, however, enjoy broad support. Seward's own expansionist projects in Cuba, the Caribbean, and Hawaii came to nothing in the face of congressional opposition (largely based on a political reluctance to annex non-white peoples). In later opposition to Seward, James Bryce wrote that Americans, "have none of the earth-hunger which burns in the great nations of Europe." In the main the statesmen and the Congress of the day took sober, geopolitical calculation—commercial opportunity, great power competition, and the decline of British sea power—as their guiding principle.

In the last third of the nineteenth century, these three factors formed a tight nexus at the center of American strategic thinking. Asian trade exercised a compelling lure. Senator Thomas Hart Benton remarked "whatever power controls the Asiatic trade was destined to world dominance" and Senator Marcus A. Hanna, a prominent Chicago business leader, declared, "we can and will take a large slice of the commerce of Asia." After the annexation of the Philippines Henry Cabot Lodge exclaimed enthusiastically, "we hold the other side of the Pacific and the value to this country is almost beyond imagination."

Burgeoning trade—exports tripled between 1870 and 1900—reinforced the arguments for a strong navy. Seward had earlier noted that "the nation must command the empire of the seas which alone is the real empire." Mahan now developed this argument further in his advocacy of a naval building program "to affirm the importance of distant markets and the relation to them of our own immense powers of production." The report of the Naval Policy Board in 1890 stressed the need for a fleet capable of protecting the "highways of commerce." By the end of the century the American fleet was the third most powerful in the world.

The same report also noted the need that the balance of power approach traditional in European geo-strategy now had "world wide application." The United States was being drawn into the great power scramble for empire. In Mahan's words, "the American people were forced to look outward, whether they willed or not." Henry Cabot Lodge noted "the great powers are rapidly absorbing for their future expansion and their present defense all the waste places on the earth. As one of the great nations of the world, the United States must not fall out of the line of march." Typical disputes were those with Germany and Britain over Samoa in 1878 and with Britain over Venezuela in 1895.

At the same time the increasing British preoccupation with the rising German naval threat in Europe began to weaken her activities in the western hemisphere, a fact manifested by the British concessions over Venezuela. This led some to re-evaluate the traditional American distaste for international treaties. Mahan advocated an accord with Britain and Brooks Adams wrote, "the continent which, when Washington lived, gave a boundless field for the expansion of America, has been filled; and the risk of isolation promises to be more risky than the risk of

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alliances." Later Henry Adams wrote "We have got to support France against Germany and fortify the Atlantic system beyond attack; for if Germany breaks down England or France, she becomes the center of the military world and we are lost."

The rules of engagement for American involvement with the world that emerged from this period allowed for a broader interpretation of American interests than was the case in the early Republic. In Cabot Lodge's words, the American people "had begun to turn their eyes to those interests of the United States that lie beyond our borders." In hard reality, however, national interest and freedom of action remained the key principles, much as they had in Washington's day.

At the rhetorical level, however, policy was increasingly assuming the vestments of a moral mission. Mahan said that the American people were taking on the "inevitable tasks and appointed lot in the work of upholding the common interests of civilization" and Theodore Roosevelt wrote that it was "incumbent on all civilized and orderly powers to insist on the proper policing of the world." The war against Cuba, long the object of ambition for American slave holders, had been orchestrated in crudely moral terms by means of a press battle between the Hearst and Pulitzer newspaper empires. Victory against the Spanish led Senator Albert J. Beveridge to congratulate his countrymen on becoming the "master organizers of the world." There was much talk redolent of the urging of the arch-imperialist Rudyard Kipling to "take up the white man's burden."

The Rhetoric of Redemption

AMERICA'S EMERGENCE as a great power brought about a decisive shift in the psychology of the American approach to foreign affairs. From earliest colonial times, Americans had asserted their special status. The classic statement is colonial Massachusetts Governor John Winthrop's description of America as a "city on a hill." Jefferson proclaimed that the "last hope of human liberty rests on us." At this stage, however, this did not kindle missionary zeal. Instead, Americans were nervous that over-close connection with Europe would, in Benjamin Franklin's words, "corrupt and poison us." This led Jefferson to counsel that America should exert moral authority as a "standing monument and example for the aim and imitation of other countries." In 1841 John Quincy Adams said of America, "She is the well-wisher to the freedom and independence of all. She is the champion and vindicator only of her own."

As the United States became more actively engaged in the world this vision of America as passive role-model began to metamorphize. In 1786 the Spanish Ambassador in London counselled John Adams, "Sir, I take it for granted that you will have sense enough to see us in Europe cut each other's throats with a philosophic tranquility." By the end of the next century, this sentiment was reversed. The rhetoric with which statesmen now mobilized public opinion portrayed the nation as an agent of redemption. John Hay, McKinley's and Roosevelt's Secretary of State, said that God had "marked the American people as his chosen nation to finally lead in the redemption of the world." The Reverend Washington Gladden justified the annexation of the Philippines with the words "in saving others, we may save ourselves."

This is the psychological legacy with which we are living today. Rather than the careful geo-political calculations which characterized the practical policy of this period, we remember Roosevelt's rhetorical flourishes which argued that "Chronic wrongdoing or impotence may force the United States, however reluctantly, in flagrant cases of such wrongdoing or impotence to the exercise of an international police power." Enter the Global Policeman. Teddy Roosevelt also laid the cornerstone of pro-active world leadership by declaring "we have played a great part in the world and we are bent upon making our future even larger than our past"—a premonition of the idea of America as the World's Only Superpower.

The twentieth century has seen the histori-

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cal pattern continue. Practical policy formation has placed geo-politics at the core. Wilson did not take the United States into World War I until unrestricted submarine warfare posed an immediate threat to American security; the United States remained reluctant to involve itself militarily in Europe in the inter-war years so long as this appeared to be British and French policy; Roosevelt kept the British war effort afloat; Truman understood the global threat posed by expansionist communism. At the same time, the rhetorical superstructure of foreign policy grew ever more elaborate—for some good reasons. As the country has become more diverse, as communications have improved, as Congress has demanded an increasing role in the international sphere, presidents have needed to muster support for their policies by presenting all decisions as simple and stark choices between good and evil.

Administrations of all persuasions have played this game. Wilson said that "the force of America is the force of moral principle" and Reagan spoke of the "evil empire." More recently Bush portrayed Saddam Hussein as "worse than Hitler." The Clinton administration is continuing this approach inasmuch as it applies negative labels to certain countries, such as Iraq, Libya, and Iran, as "backlash" nations beyond the pale of civilization, or characterizes complex phenomena such as Islamic fundamentalism as "threats."

This marriage of geopolitical realism and redemptive idealism was well suited to the period of territorial expansion and the fighting of two world wars. It reached its highest state in underpinning the conduct of the Cold War. It is, however, much less well adapted to contemporary requirements. Geopolitics, the credibility of the rhetoric, and the availability of resources have all moved on.

Rhetoric vs. Reality

A FUNDAMENTAL RETURN to basics is required. The geopolitical rationale provided by the Soviet Union for fifty years has disappeared; public opinion is echoing Clinton's own campaign statements by displaying a minimal interest in foreign affairs; the American share of world production, which peaked at 40 percent in 1950 when the assumptions of the Cold War were put in place, has now returned to its 1870 level of 20 percent.

As if these changes were not momentous enough, policy makers are also having to cope with their own psychological disequilibrium. They have inherited attitudes based on America's "monopoly on power" or Colin Powell's comment about Somalia that "only America could do it." But the substance, whether of vital interest, public consensus, or national wealth, has drained away.

In their confusion, policymakers have made a further mistake in misreading the terms of their predecessors' will. The latters' legacy was the geopolitical insight that the Soviet Union represented a systemic challenge expressed to American interests on a global basis. From this an immensely complex set of actions followed: alliances, the Marshall Plan, the United Nations, GATT, the IMF, and so on. To put these actions into effect the United States had, in Walter Lippman's words, to sound "the tocsin of an ideological crusade." The statement which became known as the Truman doctrine is an excellent example:

> At the present moment in world history nearly every nation must choose between alternative ways of life. The choice is too often not a free one.
>
> One way of life is based upon the will of the majority, and is distinguished by free institutions, representative government, free elections, guarantees of individual liberty, freedom of speech and religion, and freedom from political oppression.
>
> The second way of life is based upon the will of a minority forcibly imposed upon the majority. It relies upon terror and oppression, a controlled press and radio, fixed elections, and the suppression of personal freedoms.
>
> I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.

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This rhetoric is manifestly sincere. It is, however, not in any way to diminish this sincerity to note that it was preceded by a clear-headed analysis of American geopolitical self-interest.

This sequence of analysis is in danger of being lost. Today, rhetoric—whether in the form of Clinton's "conscience of the international community," Lake's "enlargement," or Albright's "moral dimension"—has come to precede rather than follow the identification of American geo-political interest. In part this has a trivial explanation. Like most other people, Americans feel squeamish about admitting that their overseas actions are self-interested rather than altruistic—despite the fact that self-interest has an excellent pedigree in American political thinking. Patrick Henry, no one's idea of a hard-hearted cynic, wrote that "the rock of political salvation is self-love."

A more serious development is that reality and rhetoric are becoming confused. The means through which the United States pursued its Cold War goals—world leadership, global responsibility, strategic alliances, declaratory morality, and so on—have become ends in themselves. Geopolitical analysis is taking second place. When the President or other members of the administration speak about America's "vital interests" it has become unclear whether they are affirming something rhetorical or substantive. The key mistake made by the administration's foreign policy team and its academic cheerleaders is to fail to realize that incremental change is not enough. Nor is it enough simply to change the rhetoric. Contrary to Lake, foreign policy is more than a word association game.

As we have seen, this is not only contrary to the American historical experience, but makes it impossible to reform a national consensus on foreign policy. Mahan cautioned that "in our country, national policy, if it is to be steadfast and consistent, must be identified with public conviction." To date the administration has tried to produce conviction through rhetoric rather than fundamentals. The result has been, as Mahan foresaw, an erratic policy, that lacks credibility either at home or overseas. When in his inaugural address, Clinton asserted, with perfect Cold War cadence, that the United States would use force "when the conscience of the international community is defied," his audience did not hurry out to update their Reserve status. No one checked their maps to establish the location of Banja Luka, Huambo, or Tblisi. No strutting dictator quaked in his boots. Somehow there was a general intuition that these were mere words.

Plenty of complex issues offer themselves. How are American interests to be advanced in an era when military power seems inconclusive? Does a united Europe continue to be desirable? How will China's emergence as Asia's pre-eminent military and economic power affect American interests there? If anti-proliferation fails, what is America's place in a world of twenty-plus nuclear powers? What about immigration, overpopulation, and mass poverty? There are no easy answers. But the present approach which confuses image with reality is a blind alley.

This is where the self-knowledge that derives from an accurate reading of the past can be so useful. American foreign policy has seen its greatest successes when the link between geopolitical reality and public sentiment has been strongest, as in the western expansion in the mid-nineteenth century and the post-World War II international order. The converse may be seen in the War of 1812 and Vietnam.

Over the years, the consistent refrain from the American people in their response to foreign policy challenges is a demand for an answer to the question asked by Jefferson in 1801 in relation to his proposed Mediterranean naval expedition—"What shall be the object?" As we have seen, the answers have often been purveyed in terms of allegorical righteousness which have deliberately concealed the hard edge of geopolitical realism. There is no reason why this pattern should not continue. As we have also seen, however, sequence is all-important. For a policy to carry conviction, reality must precede allegory. The worry about this administration is that they do not know which is which. □

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Missed Opportunities

Washington Politics and Nuclear Proliferation

Heather Wilson

IN HIS FIRST press conference after winning the election, Bill Clinton listed his top five foreign policy priorities. Third on his list, after cutting the defense budget and reducing nuclear arsenals, was "working hard to stop the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction." That President Clinton gave this task such salience reflected the increasing seriousness of the proliferation threat.

In recent months, the proliferation problem has become specific and acute. In early November, as North Korea made menacing noises about the possibility of UN sanctions, and increased its troops along the DMZ, President Clinton acknowledged that North Korea's likely development of nuclear weapons is a "grave issue" for the United States. At the same time, he admitted that there is "a lot of disagreement about what we should do" to stop them.

The determination of one of the world's least rational regimes to build nuclear weapons highlights the importance of developing an effective policy to control proliferation and to respond to proliferants when our efforts at control fail.

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This same lesson should have been learned from the Gulf War. Through the mechanism of UN inspections, we discovered after the war that our intelligence about the Iraqi nuclear weapons program had woefully underestimated the progress the Iraqis had made. While the intelligence community spent months on lessons learned, the most important lesson didn't require much analysis: countries like Iraq can build nuclear weapons and we can't be confident we know about it. The cold reality of fighting a war against a regional power which was on the verge of having weapons of mass destruction revealed our vulnerabilities, even if we were fortunate enough to have escaped paying a huge price.

In the months following the Gulf War, the collapse of the Soviet Union reduced the danger of a global thermonuclear war almost to zero. But in an ironic twist of fate, its collapse also ushered in an era of disorder in which the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the expertise to build them has accelerated.

In response to this growing threat, the United States should by now have adopted a comprehensive non-proliferation program. Such a program would have focused, to begin with, on developing new defensive technologies and enhancing and integrating intelligence capabilities. This should have been coupled with an effective emergency assistance program to accelerate safe and secure

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dismantlement of the former Soviet arsenal and to ensure that former Soviet bomb builders do not ply their trade in hostile countries. An active regional strategy should have been combined with a strengthening of export controls to deter potential proliferants. Finally, single Washington agencies should have been empowered to coordinate and implement the different elements of the non-proliferation program, with specific policy guidance from the White House. None of this has happened.

The Gravity of the Threat

FOR A LONG time, the nuclear club was one of the world's most exclusive: the United States, the Soviet Union, China, France, and Britain were the only acknowledged members. Even before proliferation became a significant concern in the late 1980s, there was a handful of states which probably qualified for membership in this exclusive group, most notably India, Israel, South Africa, and Pakistan. But the neighborhood around the club is changing and more states are aspiring to membership. The spread of computers and advanced technology and the growth of scientifically trained elites is making it possible for less wealthy states to begin to develop and maintain a nuclear capability.[1]

While states engaged in nuclear weapons research may choose to terminate their programs before they actually develop weapons, Taiwan, Iran, Algeria, and Libya are conducting such research. Argentina and Brazil went beyond research and began to develop nuclear material production facilities before their widely praised decisions to refrain from further development. Iraq actually had succeeded in producing nuclear weapons material and North Korea not only has produced it, but is probably developing nuclear weapons in which to use it. Most of the countries which are developing nuclear weapons are also developing or already have ballistic missiles. Even when sounding rockets and space launch programs are excluded, most Middle Eastern countries, North and South Korea, India and Pakistan, South Africa, Brazil and Argentina, Libya and Tunisia have or are developing ballistic missiles of varying ranges and payloads.

Germany, Japan, and Canada could almost certainly develop nuclear weapons in a fairly short period of time but have chosen not to do so. Japan's recent flirtation with the idea of developing it's own nuclear deterrent in response to the North Korean threat illustrates how proliferation can fuel regional arms races.

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the aftershocks which continue to rock the successor Republics have increased the risk of proliferation. In a process that might be described as proliferation by disintegration, the Soviet Union went from a single unified military command structure with control over an arsenal of some 28,000 warheads, to a loosely affiliated Commonwealth which included four nuclear-armed Republics.[2]

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[1]See Tom Clancy and Russell Seitz, "Five Minutes Past Midnight and Welcome to the Age of Proliferation," *The National Interest*, Winter 1991/92.

[2]Belarus, armed with 81 single warhead SS-25 ICBMs at the time of the collapse, has ratified START I and acceded to the Non-Proliferation Treaty in February 1993 as a non-nuclear weapons state. Kazakhstan has 1410 warheads on 104 SS-18 missiles and 40 Bear-H bombers. While Kazakhstan has ratified START I, it has not ratified the Non-Proliferation Treaty as it committed itself to do in the Lisbon Protocols of May 1992. Ukraine was left with 46 SS-24 and 130 SS-19 ICBMs in addition to 30 Bear-H and Blackjack bombers and has some 1656 strategic nuclear warheads. While Ukraine initially agreed to relinquish its nuclear weapons and comply with START I and the Non-Proliferation Treaty, it has been equivocating on that commitment for eighteen months, in part because of inept American diplomacy.

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It is difficult to describe the magnitude of the proliferation threat caused by the collapse of the Soviet Union. Potential proliferation threats used to be discussed in terms of grams of special nuclear material which might be in the wrong hands.

It takes only about 15 kilograms of highly enriched uranium or 6 kilograms of plutonium to make a nuclear weapon. Just as a result of the arms control agreements already signed, by the end of the decade between 300,000 and 500,000 kilograms of uranium and 60,000 kilograms of plutonium will have been released from the arsenal of the former Soviet Union.

Building a nuclear weapon is relatively easy compared to the difficulty of refining uranium and plutonium to the concentrations required to make a nuclear explosion. The breakdown of central control in the Soviet Union and the surfeit of weapons-grade nuclear material raise the prospect that countries determined to develop nuclear weapons will not have to make their own nuclear material; they'll just buy it.

There have been too many reports of attempts to sell or buy nuclear material from the former Soviet Republics to be complacent about the security of the former Soviet stockpile. Just based on its value for use as nuclear fuel, the uranium and plutonium in warheads from the former Soviet stockpile destined to be dismantled is worth an estimated $7 billion. In a country where inflation was 1000 percent in 1993, where the currency is worthless, scientists are going unpaid by the institutes which employ them, and selling state property for private gain is common, the temptation to sell "just a little bit" of this valuable material is very great indeed.[3]

Even if our diplomatic efforts to limit proliferation are reasonably successful, we must anticipate that, over the next ten years, more states will join the nuclear club. Some of them will have interests very different from our own.

Plane Tickets to Moscow

IN THE CLOSING months of 1991, the Bush administration and several members of Congress recognized that the failed August coup and the triumph of the reformers in Russia offered an opportunity to influence the future composition and posture of the nuclear forces in the former Soviet Union. Senators Nunn and Lugar sponsored the Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 1991. Signed by the President in December of 1991, the Act allowed $400 million of reprogrammed Defense Department funds to be used to ensure the safety and security of weapons of the former Soviet Union, to accelerate dismantlement of those weapons, and to prevent proliferation. $800 million more was added in the FY93 and FY94 budgets for a total of $1.2 billion available to make secure and dismantle former Soviet weapons.

Designed as an emergency effort to deal with a critical problem, the Nunn-Lugar program has failed in practice. Two years after its establishment, about $100 million has been spent on a laundry list of peripheral activities. Legalistic arrangements for imple-

[3]While the proliferation of nuclear weapons is the subject of this article, chemical and biological agents are also a threat. The proliferation of chemical and biological weapons is harder to characterize because these weapons are so much easier to produce. A country sophisticated enough to produce fertilizer can produce chemical weapons. Likewise, biological toxins are relatively easy to produce, if more difficult to use discriminately on the battlefield. In the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia acknowledged that the Soviet Union had continued its offensive biological warfare research well into the Gorbachev era. Like their counterparts at nuclear weapons research facilities, these experts may be tempted to take lucrative positions in countries which would like to benefit from the post-Soviet military yard sale.

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mentation remain uncompleted and unratified, and missiles remain targeted against the U.S. With further aftershocks rocking the collapsed Soviet empire, our failure to act decisively may become one of the greatest lost opportunities of this decade.

In a classic example of Washington bureaucratic politics, no senior official in the Bush administration actively supported Nunn-Lugar, but every agency wanted to be in charge of it. While the bill specified that the Department of Defense was to be the executive agent for the program, in a move that spelled disaster for rapid action, DOD ceded control to an interagency arms control policy working group with participants from the State Department, the Department of Energy, the National Security Council Staff, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and the intelligence community. Within the State Department, at least three different offices vied for leadership responsibility for the program.

While this interagency group had effectively managed complex arms control negotiations like START and CFE, it was entirely incapable of the rapid decision making needed for a program like Nunn-Lugar. At a time when the Russian government was reeling with rapid changes and internecine suspicions, and the governments of other republics were just forming, the U.S. team chose to use formal bilateral arms control as the diplomatic paradigm for running the Nunn-Lugar program. Delegations of dozens, representing all agencies, trooped to Moscow in November and December 1991 and January 1992, forcing the Russians to sit across the table similarly represented but reluctant to talk because of the distrust and disagreement among players on their own side.

A less-charitable view of this arrangement can also be offered. By bogging the program down in bureaucracy in Washington and putting the Russians in a forum where it was virtually impossible for them to articulate their needs, senior administration officials could ensure the program's failure. While plausible, this explanation ignores the fact that these same senior officials were under increasing political pressure from the Congress to show some progress.

By late January 1992, Secretary of State Baker made it clear that he wanted to reach initial agreement on areas of cooperation when he went to Moscow in February. Now feeling the heat, the bureaucracy developed a laundry list compiled largely of notions picked up from cocktail party conversation with members of the Russian delegation. The intent was not to promote U.S. security interests, but to make some progress that was politically sustainable with the Congress.

Baker and his delegation of dozens went to Moscow in February 1992. Sitting across the table from a phalanx of men who distrusted each other, Baker recited a list of possibilities to prompt a discussion. There was none. The Russians did not know what they needed and each item on the list appealed to the parochial interest of one or another Russian ministry. Yeltsin said all of the ideas sounded good to him and Baker was able to announce a shopping list of initial areas of assistance: fissile material containers, armored blankets, conversion of Russian rail cars, accident response equipment, nuclear materials storage, and reprocessing of uranium and plutonium.

Throughout this process, there was never an attempt to evaluate the weaknesses in the Russian system in order to identify where U.S. assistance might make the most difference. Likewise, the U.S. never evaluated its own security interests so as to target programs in a way that would maximize benefits to the United States.

Divisions and competing agendas on the Russian side provided opportunities that the U.S. could have seized if it had evaluated its own interests and had been prepared to act more flexibly to pursue them. In a tradition which will be familiar to Americans who have

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dealt with corrupt city machine politics, the Minister for Atomic Energy, Victor Mikhailov, wanted the $400 million turned over to him to build a storage facility, with a percentage certain to go into unrelated projects and the pockets of functionaries. Academician Velikov, advisor to Yeltsin and Vice President of the Russian Academy of Sciences, wanted to use the money to keep his scientists employed at his institutes. General Zelentsov of the Ministry of Defense was less self-serving than the rest, but initially insisted that storage for warheads must be hardened against nuclear attack—presumably from the United States. The Russians were divided and did not know what they needed. The February agreement in principle on areas of assistance was a classic case of providing the solution without knowing the problem or knowing our own interests. Once the shopping list was publicly announced by Secretary Baker, the bureaucracy was committed to pursuing and defending this agenda, even if the programs made no sense.

The next mistake the U.S. made was to negotiate detailed formal agreements on each area of assistance. Instead of signing a general agreement and moving forward with practical assistance, Baker turned his agreement in principle over to technical working groups to work out details. What began as emergency assistance became full employment for arms controllers. As one member of the U.S. delegation commented some months later, "What we'll get for the $400 million is a lot of plane tickets to Moscow." These technical teams spent months negotiating details in formal government-to-government agreements, some of which are still unfinished or unratified. With a plausible story to report to Congress and a course of cooperation charted, much of the political pressure abated and senior officials paid little attention to the implementation of the Nunn-Lugar program.

Nuclear Scientists

WHILE THE control of nuclear warheads was the initial focus of attention when the Soviet Union collapsed, the future of Russian nuclear weapons scientists quickly became an area of concern. Repressive Soviet policies which kept bomb designers in their closed cities in Cheliabinsk and Arzamas dissolved with the Union. In testimony before Congress in early 1992, the CIA estimated that there were some 1 million people employed in the Russian nuclear weapons complex, some 1000 to 2000 of whom had the ability to make a nuclear device.

In January of 1992, while the U.S. government was reviewing visa requirements and exploring possible cooperation between U.S. and Russian national laboratories, a consortium of three American Fortune 200 companies proposed to the U.S. government that they absorb large numbers of these scientists and retain them to do commercial work while remaining in Russia. At that time, a top Russian scientist could be retained for about $1,000 a year. These companies, which already had operations in Russia and could use their infrastructure to provide basic supplies and food stuffs to employed scientists, believed that access to food, the opportunity to get commercial experience, and a chance to stay in their own country would be very attractive to many nuclear weapons scientists even if they were paid considerably less than they might get if they emigrated to a country trying to develop nuclear weapons. With the consortium's combined revenues of $15 billion per year and 100,000 employees, gainfully employing 1,000 to 2,000 scientists at these rates would not have been difficult.

Senior officials in the Bush administration were not interested in this kind of a private sector initiative. Instead, in February 1992, they announced their

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intent to establish a $25 million science center jointly with the European Community and Japan which would accept grant applications from former weapons scientists. The bureaucratic application and sponsorship procedures established by the United States, EC, and Japan have not yet delayed any applications because the sponsors chose to negotiate a formal government-to-government agreement to establish the center, and it hasn't been approved yet. Almost two years after the problem was identified, *not one dollar* of Nunn-Lugar funds has been used to redirect Russian nuclear weapons scientists to non-weapons work.

Senator Hank Brown (R-Colorado) was eager to ensure that Russian nuclear weapons builders would have the opportunity to come to the United States if they were determined to emigrate. He sponsored the Soviet Scientist Immigration Act which became law in October of 1992. The law allows 750 unused immigration slots to be used by scientists formerly employed in the Soviet nuclear weapons program. Unfortunately, the Immigration and Naturalization Service cannot decide how to write the regulations. Over a year after the passage of the law, not one former Soviet bomb builder has been allowed to come to the United States under this special rule. One assumes countries like Iraq don't have these kinds of problems.

The Ukrainian Blunder

IN DECEMBER 1991, Secretary Baker visited the capitals of all four of the former Soviet Republics which had nuclear weapons. He succeeded in getting the three non-Russian Republics to agree to give up their strategic nuclear weapons and return the warheads to Russia for dismantlement. This agreement was formalized in May 1992 at a meeting in Lisbon, where the three non-Russian Republics agreed to implement the START I Treaty and accede to the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty as non-nuclear weapons states.

After we got a commitment from the Ukrainians to become non-nuclear, we ignored them. Large delegations continued to go to Moscow to discuss financing the Russian arms reduction program, and in Washington aid to Russia was a major issue. All the while, the Russians made clear that they intended to keep their nuclear weapons. But there was no assistance for—or even a foreign policy toward—Ukraine.

In April 1992, Ukraine formally requested assistance from the U.S. for destroying ICBMs. While continuing to threaten to block any assistance unless Ukraine ratified START and acceded to the NPT, in the summer the U.S. began discussions with Ukraine on providing assistance.

As right-wing resistance to giving nuclear warheads to Russia without recognition of Ukrainian borders grew in the Rada, the U.S. reached agreement with Russia to buy highly enriched uranium from dismantled warheads. Because some of the uranium would come from warheads now in Ukraine, the Ukrainians argued that they deserved some compensation. In addition, they were balking at implementing some of the expensive technical requirements of the START I Treaty unless they received some assistance. While continuing to dangle carrots for the Russians, the U.S. used a stick on the Ukrainians, threatening no assistance unless Ukraine went non-nuclear. The contrast with our policy towards the Russians only served to inflame the political problem in Kiev. In November 1992, when Prime Minister Leonid Kuchma formally announced that Ukraine was unwilling to give strategic nuclear weapons on its soil to the Russians, the U.S. finally offered $175 million in dismantlement assistance to Ukraine if and only if Ukraine ratified START and acceded to the Non-

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Proliferation Treaty.

From the administration's perspective, linking financial assistance to START ratification and NPT accession was leverage to get Ukraine to go non-nuclear. In reality, this linkage made little sense. The assistance the U.S. would provide, if used properly, would bring Ukraine into de facto compliance with the terms of the START treaty even if the Rada did not ratify it. Rather than work the practical problem, de-mate the warheads, and destroy the ICBMs and their silos, the U.S. held out for Ukrainian ratification of a document negotiated before Ukraine existed as an independent state.

The Clinton administration continued the policy of linking aid to START ratification and NPT accession. In the spring of 1993, Clinton refused to meet with Prime Minister Kuchma, fueling the perception in Kiev that the U.S. was so fixated on the need to give political and economic support to Russia that it was turning a blind eye to Russia's relations with its neighbors.

In April 1993, while talks on Ukrainian compliance with START and the NPT were clearly stalled, a U.S. company which had been working quietly with Ukraine to develop a program for the safe destruction of ICBMs received a letter from Ukrainian Minister of Engineering V. Antonov who has responsibility for implementing the missile destruction program. Antonov said that Ukraine was now prepared to proceed with a joint venture to remove nuclear warheads from SS-19s so that liquid fuel could be removed and the missiles destroyed. The company informed the U.S. government. While key U.S. officials thought the Antonov letter was a positive indication that the Ukrainians were now prepared to move forward, the company was told that formal agreements between the U.S. and the Ukrainian governments were not finalized. Without an agreement to provide assistance as well as ratification of START I and NPT accession, the U.S. would not contract to provide assistance. The U.S. company informed the Ukrainian government that it was unable to proceed and another opportunity was lost.

In June of 1993, the Clinton administration did initiate a more reasonable approach to Ukraine. Secretary of Defense Aspin proposed to accelerate dismantlement by de-mating warheads, destroying the ICBMs, and putting the warheads under international control in Ukraine, pending transportation to Russia. The uranium in the warheads would be purchased by the U.S. or returned to Ukraine as reactor fuel. While initially promising, the U.S. took the position that the details of this arrangement must be worked out by Ukraine and Russia, and that the U.S. would remain on the sidelines. Without U.S. follow through, this initiative quickly lost momentum.

In July, Ukraine confirmed that it had asked the Russians to return to Ukraine to de-mate the warheads from a field of ten ICBMs for safety reasons. Published reports in September 1993 illustrate the need for a more active U.S. policy. Apparently, the de-mated warheads were stored in a poorly designed storage shelter or a shelter not designed for the number of warheads deposited there. The bunker began to overheat. At a recent conference in Kiev, Ukrainian government officials suggested that the Russians had over-dramatized the problem to illustrate the need to return the warheads to Russia promptly, but they never denied that there had been a problem and that the warheads had been improperly stored.

The Kravchuk-Yeltsin agreement in early September 1993 to relinquish the Black Sea fleet and return all nuclear weapons to Russia was a surprise. The agreement requires ratification and Kiev is unlikely to take any further action until the outcome of the current political crisis in Russia becomes clear.

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A Slow Start

IN THE YEAR since President Clinton made his pronouncement that preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction was one of his top three foreign policy priorities, the rhetoric about the importance of non-proliferation has continued unabated. But the administration has largely failed to develop coherent policies to meet this new challenge.

To be fair, Clinton did not inherit a well-oiled policy machine as far as non-proliferation is concerned. During the campaign, the Clinton team correctly identified non-proliferation as a foreign policy area where changes were needed, changes for which the new President could take credit. But aside from creating some new offices and position titles and turning up the volume about the importance of the problem, very little of substance has been done.

Last summer an administration task force attempted to develop a new policy for non-proliferation. Unfortunately, to do the job they relied on the same interagency mechanisms and many of the same people who had been running non-proliferation policy previously. Announced by President Clinton in his speech to the UN General Assembly on September 27, 1993, this new policy contains some new initiatives, but has several serious flaws. Far from providing a new framework, the policy rehashes current programs with a few new twists and steps gingerly around the bureaucratic knots which have hindered decisive action for the past two years. More importantly, the general preference for multilateralism which characterizes much of the Clinton foreign policy threatens to sidetrack the development of adequate defenses against proliferants in the event that diplomacy fails—and in the area of proliferation, it is very likely that our diplomacy will fail. Finally, responding to pressure from industry and the Commerce Department, the Clinton administration will relax controls on exporting missile technology. The parameters of these new export control rules are still being developed, but the direction is troublesome. America, in a state of denial and bureaucratic stasis for nearly two years, can no longer afford idle rhetoric about proliferation.

Clinton's new policy emphasizes multilateral strategies including harmonization of export controls and coordination of sanctions. While an activist diplomacy to strengthen non-proliferation norms is not, on its own, objectionable, there are elements of the administration which consider multilateral diplomacy to be inconsistent with developing the military capability to defend against proliferants when diplomacy fails.

The last White House policy document from the Bush administration on non-proliferation, NSD-70, broke new ground by directing the Defense Department to develop capabilities to defend against proliferants, including capabilities for pre-emptive military action. Reportedly, in last summer's review, there were strong disagreements between State and Defense about whether we should develop this counter-proliferation capability. As far as the policy is concerned, it appears that State won. Improving our defenses and developing military options has received almost no support from the White House.

To their credit, Defense Department officials are continuing to pursue counter-proliferation programs. Assistant Secretary of Defense Ash Carter and Under Secretary of Defense John Deutsch are proceeding from the reasonable assumption that if we are involved in a conflict with a regional power in the future, it is likely that it will be armed with nuclear weapons. Defense is identifying gaps in our current program so that

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they may be filled. The question is whether DOD officials can sustain a program to fill those gaps without the policy support of the White House, and with open opposition from State.

For all the rhetoric about making non-proliferation a higher priority, the new policy loosens constraints on exports of missile technology in deference to U.S. industry that wants to enter the international commercial space market. Even with all its caveats about selling only to countries which support non-proliferation norms, it will be more difficult for the U.S. to convince other countries not to export missile technology to their friends if we export to ours. Moreover, today's friends can become tomorrow's enemies. Would the U.S. have sold missile technology to the Shah of Iran before his fall? If so, we would certainly regret that decision today.

Bureaucratic politics continues to bedevil U.S. non-proliferation strategy. Because everyone wants to be in charge of a presidential priority, turf fights emerged anew as the Clinton team took office. There are now at least three directorates on the National Security Council Staff with overlapping responsibilities for non-proliferation. The intelligence community's non-proliferation center claims to be the focal point for intelligence policy, but does not coordinate closely with DOD and the Department of Energy which spend millions each year on research, analysis, and collection on non-proliferation. In an effort to put one person in charge, Strobe Talbott at the State Department was named as the focal point for all matters relating to the former Soviet Union, but he is not actively involved in non-proliferation matters, leaving this to Ambassador Jim Goodby. At the same time, Under Secretary of State Lynn Davis has responsibility for political-military affairs, which include non-proliferation and arms control. Predictably, there have been serious turf fights between State and Defense where Ash Carter has attempted to take a leadership role in ways that the State Department thinks is within its purview.

The summer policy review failed to cut through this bureaucratic Gordian knot. It is not unusual for the White House to direct certain departments to take responsibility for particular programs or initiatives. Clinton's non-proliferation policy, however, is silent on agency responsibility. According to one insider, "That was just in the too hard pile." As a result, we can expect policy by committee and consensus to continue to be the painfully slow mechanism for action.

Finally, Clinton's non-proliferation policy says virtually nothing about the arsenal of the former Soviet Union. While this may initially appear to be a curious omission, the sad truth is that it is probably a reflection of arbitrary bureaucratic lines of demarcation. It may be difficult to believe, but the people who work on non-proliferation are not the same people who work on the Nunn-Lugar program. Rather than develop a comprehensive policy, the Clinton administration accepted the turf as it found it and circumscribed its policy accordingly.

Toward a Proactive Policy

IN FEBRUARY 1992, in testimony before Congress, Under Secretary of State for International Security Affairs Reginald Bartholomew said, "In sum, I think the prospects are good for beginning some tangible assistance efforts [for the Former Soviet Union] in the next several weeks." Almost two years later, virtually nothing has been done. We have delivered 500 armored blankets, some emergency response equipment, and a few prototype nuclear material containers to the Russians. We have also experimented with safety modifications to a Russian rail car and done some work on designs for a

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storage facility. It is difficult to see how any of these activities have accelerated dismantlement, helped prevent proliferation, or even contributed measurably to the safety and security of the Russian stockpile.

With another political crisis rocking Russia, the opportunity to facilitate the dismantlement of the former Soviet stockpile and prevent proliferation from that program may have already passed. Nevertheless, the U.S. still needs a comprehensive non-proliferation policy and the will to implement it.

We must anticipate that the enemies we are likely to face in any regional conflict in the future will be armed with weapons of mass destruction. The acquisition of these weapons will be driven by regional factors largely beyond U.S. influence. It is also probable that the U.S. will be unable to deter the use of these weapons simply by possessing a nuclear deterrent of its own. It is therefore essential that the U.S. develop the capability to defend itself against proliferants. At a minimum, we must develop more accurate real-time intelligence capabilities to locate precisely nuclear warheads and delivery vehicles, and integrate that information with weapons systems capable of destroying them. In a war against a nuclear-armed enemy, "Scud busting" cannot be left to luck. We must also develop the capability to intercept ballistic missiles in the ascent phase. Intercepting warheads in the last moments before impact, a sight made familiar as Patriot missiles fired at incoming Scuds in the Gulf War, is not good enough if a nuclear weapon is on board. Finally, we must develop and deploy more sophisticated chemical and biological detection systems and we must develop and acquire vaccines and continue our chemical warfare defense program.

The development of a military capability to defend ourselves against proliferants raises controversial questions about how and when that capability should be used. There are circumstances in which the U.S. should be prepared to use military force preemptively to destroy the weapons of mass destruction of another state. Likewise, we should have the capability to act covertly to disable or destroy those weapons. It isn't necessary to spell out in advance the precise circumstances in which the U.S. would act preemptively. But proliferants must never be allowed to assume that the U.S. will wait to be attacked with nuclear weapons before we will act. More importantly, we should not fail to develop these military capabilities because we are afraid of the controversy which might ensue.

The Clinton administration's preoccupation with multilateralism to the exclusion of the unilateral pursuit of U.S. interests is a problem much broader than our non-proliferation program. Proliferation *is* a multinational problem which requires coordination and cooperation among like-minded states. However, as with other areas of our foreign policy, the U.S. should be prepared to act alone if it is in our national interest to do so.

The U.S. must abandon its bureaucratic approach to providing assistance to the former Soviet Union for the safeguarding and dismantlement of nuclear weapons. The Washington interagency community should agree on a general policy approved by the President, and one agency, probably the Department of Defense, should be empowered to carry it out. We should have abandoned the notion of negotiating formal government-to-government agreements requiring ratification long ago. Instead, the U.S. should facilitate practical assistance, using the resources of private corporations wherever reasonable, and focus its efforts on areas where U.S. assistance can make the most difference fastest. In particular, this would include efforts to improve accountability and safe storage of nuclear materials, and

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environmentally safe destruction of ICBMs and their fuel.

The inability of the Immigration and Naturalization Service to write regulations is a scandalous excuse for failing to allow former Soviet bomb designers to come to the United States. The U.S. must coordinate its intelligence and immigration activities to ensure that bomb builders who are leaving the former Soviet Union can come to America. More directly, some Nunn-Lugar funds should be used to redirect the efforts of former Soviet bomb builders, not through a bureaucratic multinational science center, but through private industry, universities, and National Science Foundation grants.

The United States should seek to strengthen the Missile Technology Control Regime, rather than weaken it by trying to distinguish between acceptable commercial space launch sales and unacceptable missile activities. These limitations will continue to be unpopular with the U.S. space and missile industry, but to do otherwise sends the wrong message to other suppliers of missile technology.

Finally, the United States should pursue an active regional strategy to combat proliferation with a three-part approach which would seek to lessen the motivation to develop weapons of mass destruction, cause political and economic pain to those regimes which do choose to develop them, and, where possible, extend the U.S. counter-proliferation defensive umbrella to the threatened neighbors of proliferants. For example, the U.S. should ensure that any ascent-phase ballistic missile interception capability is made available for the defense of Japan and South Korea, either based on land or at sea.

The principles on which the Clinton non-proliferation policy is based are misguided, and follow on the heels of a Bush administration policy which was outdated. Countering proliferation is not about "building a new consensus" that non-proliferation is important. Rather, having accepted its importance, we must decide to use U.S. resources and influence to prevent proliferation where possible, to assist countries in a rapid and flexible way when opportunities arise to dismantle weapons, and to defend against proliferants when our diplomatic efforts fail. □

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Three Comments

Eliot Cohen:

HEATHER WILSON'S article will, no doubt, win her few friends among her former colleagues in the Bush administration or among their successors. In fact, in the proliferation area, remarkably enough, these have proven to be one and the same—the thorough-going purge of Bush appointees that swept the Pentagon left a number of holdovers in the State Department and National Security Council. In any event, Wilson is probably right to say that neither administration has done very much to stop proliferation, with one major exception. The war against Iraq, launched in part to head off Iraq's bid for regional hegemony, turned into an assault on her nuclear potential. Had the Bush administration flinched from that conflict, or had it pursued its anti-Iraq policy less vigorously after the war, the world might well have witnessed the use of nuclear weapons in the Middle East before the end of the decade. Furthermore, by explicitly making the Iraqi nuclear program a target of attack, Bush legitimized the American use of armed force for this aim. In these respects, then, he deserves rather more credit than she gives him.

Wilson errs, I think, in her assumption that American governments can do very much to stem proliferation. Three forces have come together to increase the danger of proliferation in the 1990s. First, over the decades technological know-how has diffused, putting nuclear potential within the range of a number of states. Second, the collapse of the Soviet Union has created a vast pool of scientists available for hire to work on such programs. It has also, in all likelihood, made nuclear material, including weapons, available for sale to potential proliferators. At the same time, the implosion of the Soviet state has removed from the world stage a major military power that had come to see the benefits of preventing nuclear proliferation. Third, and ironically, the Persian Gulf War has made it clear that no country can match the United States in conventional conflict. To a hostile general staff, nuclear weapons look increasingly attractive as means of deterring either the Yankees or (more likely) their local clients, who provide the necessary bases from which American military power operates.

It is hard to see how any American strategy, no matter how clever the conception or assiduous the implementation could do more than meliorate the fundamental problem. The American government cannot legally prevent nuclear physicists from learning their trade at American universities, much less other institutions overseas. Nor can the United States simply buy up all the former Soviet Union's nuclear weapons or pay off all the rogue scientists or impoverished guards, technicians, and operators who maintain the former Soviet arsenal. And, as suggested above, the Gulf War sowed the seeds of future proliferation even as it uprooted one of the more dangerous threats.

Of course it makes sense to pursue marginal remedies as energetically as possible, including those developed by Wilson in her article. But both technically and politically they can achieve only limited success. The problem of detecting mobile missiles during the Gulf War offers a good example. Even if American pilots had received instantaneous warning of Scud launches (and some did, when they witnessed the actual firing of the missiles),

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they simply could not locate the launchers with sufficient accuracy to bring weapons to bear on them. The relatively crude nature of the Iraqi missiles imposed restrictions on where and how their crews could operate that will not apply in the future. If ever the United States manages to defeat the ballistic missile, the low-flying (and soon, stealthy) cruise missile will prove a more difficult challenge yet. As for the talk of pre-emptive war, would that the United States were willing to engage in it, should the need arise. But really, who can imagine a president authorizing a large-scale, unilateral air and possibly ground attack against a country that has done no direct harm to the United States or its allies? The days of Osirak-type raids on a single, easily located and above-surface nuclear facility are over. Secrecy, camouflage, deception, and dispersion will make preemption a far more extensive and uncertain operation than ever before.

It is altogether proper to be gloomy about the proliferation problem. In addition to undertaking the kind of measures Wilson suggests, the American government needs to prepare itself, materially, organizationally, and psychologically, for the day after the first nuclear weapon is used in anger. Then, but only then, will the kinds of drastic measures she favors become real policy options. The material preparation requires, among other things, a renewal of investment in the development of sophisticated nuclear weapons which the United States might use to destroy a nascent nuclear arsenal. It is technically feasible to develop nuclear weapons that could do useful work against such limited targets, without incinerating cities or blasting into the air large quantities of radioactive dust. The organizational preparation entails a kind of war planning unfamiliar to the armed forces in the recent past—crippling, punitive strikes against opponents whom the United States cannot disarm, or sudden, preemptive blows thrown at very short notice. The psychological preparation will prove the most difficult of all, however, for it will require a confession that none of the cleverly conceived arms control efforts (export controls, buy-back plans, and international agreements) will do more than defer the dark day on which, for the first time since Nagasaki, a country uses an atomic bomb as a weapon of war. □

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Fred Iklé:

NOBODY SHOULD have nuclear weapons but us—and sometimes, methinks, not even us. Since the dawn of the nuclear age, the United States has always worried that some other country was about to acquire "the bomb." During World War II that other country was Nazi Germany, at the end of the war it was the Soviet Union. But even England and France, whose scientists had contributed to the Manhattan Project, were cut off from America's follow-on work on weaponry.

In the third year of the nuclear age the world was at its zenith in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. Early in 1947, the total global inventory of ready atomic bombs was—incredibly and exactly—zero! The United States had not yet built additional atomic bombs since 1945, when it had used its only two against Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Never since has the nuclear age had such a good year—and never again will it have.

The gathering storm of the Cold War soon brought our expulsion from this Garden of Eden. By the time Kim Il Sung's forces invaded South Korea, Harry Truman could command about 300 atomic

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bombs, Joseph Stalin perhaps half a dozen. But the Cold War's huge nuclear build up—whose detritus, now scattered over the former Soviet Union, justify Heather Wilson's fears—followed the outbreak of the Korean war. Before the North Korean surprise attack, the Atlantic Alliance was without a NATO (i.e. without the military North Atlantic *Organization*), there were no U.S. forces in South Korea, Japan did not have a security alliance with the United States, the U.S. nuclear build-up proceeded at a leisurely pace, and U.S. defense budgets were one third as large as they were after 1950. Among all the allies Stalin chose, North Korea was to be second only to Nazi Germany in the harm it eventually caused the Soviet Union. And what bitter irony; with Stalin and Truman long gone, today the same evil Kim Il Sung, still all-powerful in the half-country that he had tortured so much, poses one of the most acute threats of nuclear "proliferation."

In the jargon of defense experts, "proliferation" came to mean the spread of nuclear weapons to a country which (it was assumed) had previously not possessed them. All the anxiety tended to be riveted on the country next in line to acquire "the bomb," which automatically became the bad guy in the situation. By contrast, once a country had come into possession of nuclear weapons, it was quickly transformed into a partner in nuclear stability and arms control. Thus, many officials and experts assured us during the last two decades of the Cold War that the enormous Soviet nuclear arsenals, or China's growing missile forces, need not worry us all that much. These latent infernos, it was argued, were safely tucked away under the comfortable blanket of "stable" nuclear deterrence. If anything needed to be done, it was to make this blanket a bit heavier—for example, by getting rid of MIRVs (multiple nuclear warheads on missiles) to enhance "deterrence stability."

By focusing on the shattered, grand nuclear order of the former Soviet Union, Heather Wilson—almost inadvertently—refocuses on the basic problem. The threat of the nuclear age is not just the "proliferation" of nuclear arms from the good guys to the bad guys. It is, more fundamentally, the extraordinary (and in emotive terms incomprehensible), destructiveness of nuclear weapons and of the plutonium poison that has become so plentiful. Measured in the few millennia of human history, what is genuinely stable, alas, is the pernicious lethality of plutonium; the apparent stability of mutual nuclear deterrence can disappear as a result of one coup d'état, one sudden civil war, one human mistake.

Now in fairness it must be said that our policy of keeping "the bomb" from the next bad guy has been extraordinarily beneficial and comparatively successful. It helped us reach the end of the Cold War with only a few governments—less than a dozen?—explicitly or even implicitly asserting their sovereign right to possess nuclear weapons. And, mercifully, so far our anti-proliferation measures have kept nuclear weapons from terrorist organizations.

Successful prevention beats a painful remedy; but that does not negate the importance of having a way to cope, should prevention fail. Heather Wilson walks us through the dense underbrush of bureaucratic malfeasance that has been hobbling the response of governments—in Washington, Moscow, and elsewhere—to the new dangers of proliferation that make it so compelling that we be prepared for failure. If the world should someday be confronted with a reckless regime that actually decided to use nuclear weapons, only a coordinated U.S.-Russian response could contain the swiftly expanding dangers. And to this end it is vital that the United States and Russia overcome the confrontational relationship between their

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nuclear forces.

Such a transformation is achievable by building a genuine military partnership between the two nuclear superpowers. America and Russian defense officials have begun to share a growing understanding of the specific steps needed to bring this transformation about.[1]

If the opportunity to force a genuine strategic partnership between the United States and Russia will be seized, the towering nuclear strength and know-how of the two erstwhile rival super-rival superpowers need no longer cancel each other out. Harnessed together, these inherited assets can be turned around to help keep the world community from sliding into an age darkened by nuclear terrorism and nuclear confrontation everywhere. □

Fred Charles Iklé was undersecretary of defense for policy in the Reagan administration and is currently a Distinguished Scholar at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC.

Eugene V. Rostow:

HEATHER WILSON'S account of the dismal ways the United States government makes non-proliferation policy is entirely plausible and all-too-familiar to one who has toiled in the trenches. There is no reason, alas, to doubt Dr. Wilson's analysis, and every reason to believe it is correct.

Thus far, Dr. Wilson shows, United States policy towards the proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction continues to rely on three tools of policy which have long since demonstrated their futility and irrelevance: export controls; IAEA inspections and other forms of intelligence collection; and, *in extremis*, economic sanctions. Toward the end of her essay, Wilson sketches the elements of a more realistic approach, but does not consider their implications, nor examine their basis in international law. My comment will be confined to this part of her article; it seeks to support and elaborate the recommendations she makes.

President Truman's decision to use the weapon in Japan was dominated by the view that the atomic bomb was merely another form of aerial warfare. It was natural for this opinion to prevail at the end of six years of bitter war, when the United States faced the daunting task of invading Japan. It did not take long, however, for the American perception of the nuclear weapon to change. The 1946 Baruch Plan was a bold and far-reaching proposal, which would have put nuclear technology under the control of a United Nations agency, and eliminated nuclear weapons altogether. Stalin's rejection of the American offer even as a basis for discussion was one of the tragic turning points of the Cold War.

The United States did not take Stalin's action as final, however. Instead, it launched a long succession of nuclear arms control efforts which attempted to stabilize the arms race, and perhaps bring the Cold War to an end. These attempts included the Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968 and the creation of the International Atomic Energy Agency to enforce that treaty. These efforts were generally successful, with comparatively little nuclear proliferation taking place during the years 1945-1989—far less than had been feared in the late forties and fifties.

In recent years, however, the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the perception of a more isolationist United States in

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[1]Several of the steps are explained in *Harmonizing the Evolution of US and Russian Defense Policies*, a report that the Center for Strategic International Studies has prepared jointly with an expert group in Moscow.

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the wake of the Soviet collapse has stimulated a considerable number of states to accelerate their nuclear programs. The proliferation efforts made by the governments of Iraq, Iran, North Korea, and so on have changed both the character of the proliferation problem and the methods with which to combat it.

Use of force to deal with the threat of nuclear proliferation goes back to the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, when the United States used force and threatened to use more force in order to get Soviet missiles and nuclear warheads out of Cuba. All Americans, most Europeans, and most people elsewhere in the world understood and agreed with what President Kennedy did on that occasion. The world simply could not tolerate having nuclear missiles under the control or potential control of Castro.

From the point of view of international law and international politics, the American decision is not easy to reconcile with the principle of the equal sovereignty of all states under the United Nations Charter. Yet the world accepted Kennedy's action as wise and legal. The Soviet missiles could not have been fired because our nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union in 1962 was very great—5 to 1 or 7 to 1, the figures vary with the times and the degree of expertise of the estimators, but it was an overwhelming superiority. Bolstered by that fact, President Kennedy faced down the Soviet maneuver and the missiles and warheads were withdrawn. The same kind of action was taken on the same grounds by the Israelis in 1981, when they bombed the Osirak reactor in Iraq. While the Security Council passed nonbinding resolutions against the attack, most countries were in fact relieved by its success, and both the United States and the Soviet Union later publicly praised what Israel had done.

A right to use force against the deployment of nuclear weapons in certain pariah states was formally confirmed by the cease fire agreement in the Gulf War. That agreement was ratified by the Security Council. It therefore had the unanimous support of all the great powers and some of the other powers sitting on the Security Council. They decreed that Iraq could not possess nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction. The United States has been sparring with Saddam Hussein ever since because he does not want to comply with the Security Council's "mandatory" decisions. He has been playing hide and seek with the IAEA inspectors, waiting for us to get tired of the exercise. The nuclear question in Iraq remains unfinished business. Exactly the same sort of thing is going on now in North Korea, in Iran, and perhaps in other states as well. These developments have led Japan to indicate publicly that it will almost surely become a nuclear power if North Korea is allowed to do so. Credible reports indicate that North Korea has already passed that fateful threshold.

Dr. Wilson's article recognizes the risk implicit in these trends. "We must anticipate that the enemies we are likely to face in any regional conflict in the future will be armed with weapons of mass destruction...It is also probable that the United States will be unable to deter the use of these weapons simply by possessing a nuclear deterrent of its own." As General de Gaulle and Henry Kissinger used to say, "Who can believe that the United States would risk nuclear bombs on New York in order to respond to a nuclear attack on Paris?" Dr. Wilson urges a vigorous SDI program to develop weapons capable of intercepting missiles at the launch phase—that is, space-based weapons. And she recognizes that it may well be necessary to use military force preemptively to destroy the weapons of mass destruction of other states, overtly or covertly.

I fully and emphatically agree with Dr. Wilson's conclusions. Justifying such a course legally raises some far-reaching questions of law and politics, however, directly challenging the fundamental principle of the state system, the sovereign equality of states. The ABM Treaty would

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have to be clarified and amended in order to legitimize space-based weapons capable of interception at launch,[1] and the basic law dealing with the international use of force would have to be modified, in usage at least if not in form. The emergence of an international legal norm declaring that certain so-called outlaw or pariah states have fewer sovereign powers than the others would surely cause a storm of protest.

During the Cuban Missile Crisis, President Kennedy argued that the Soviet emplacement of nuclear tipped missiles in Cuba was an armed attack, or at least a threat of an armed attack on the United States.[2] Although the world informally supported President Kennedy's 1962 intervention in Cuba, the cease-fire agreement and Security Council Resolutions in the Gulf War go a long way toward favorably recognizing that the Non-Proliferation Treaty has been accepted as a universally binding norm of customary international law. This doctrine might well provide a more satisfactory legal foundation for using force to prevent or undo proliferation than the precedent of the Cuban Missile Crisis standing alone. In view of the nature of the nuclear weapon and the dangers of nuclear proliferation to the system of world politics, international law should also acknowledge the duty of the Security Council and the right of states to use force to destroy the weapons of the offending state or states, and to make it impossible for those states to resume their nuclear efforts.

During the first decades of the nuclear age, the nuclear powers came to realize through the discipline of experience that nuclear weapons in the hands of reasonably rational governments could not in fact be detonated in war, but were a weapon of incalculable importance nonetheless, so long as the United States continued to hold a second-strike capability, because they enabled the victims of aggression to use conventional weapons in self-defense.

Some years ago, a few far-sighted strategists—General Gallois and Herman Kahn, particularly, concluded that a world which allowed general proliferation would be a peaceful world, because each country would be paralyzed by the fear of nuclear reprisal, and would therefore eschew aggression with conventional force. This analysis depends, however, upon the assumption that all the actors would be equally rational. Does the Gallois-Kahn theory apply to the present rulers of Iran, Iraq, and North Korea? Certainly no one can say that during the worst years of the Cold War the risk of reprisal by the United States nuclear arsenal deterred the Soviet Union from significant aggression in carefully chosen places carried out by conventional proxy forces, and occasionally, by conventional Soviet forces as well. On the other hand, deterrence is usually no more than uncertainty. The American nuclear arsenal will surely continue to radiate uncertainty for a long time.

A world in which Iran, Iraq, North Korea, Syria, and Libya, among others, possess weapons of mass destruction would be a world in chaos. □

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[1] I am among those who believe that the ABM treaty authorizes research and development on space based anti-ballistic missiles, but the Clinton administration has embraced the so-called restrictive interpretation.

[2] I have discussed that argument in its setting of nuclear strategy in Chapter 15 of my recent book, *Toward Managed Peace* (1993).

Eugene V. Rostow is a former director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (1981-1983); Sterling Professor of Law and Public Affairs Emeritus, Yale University; Distinguished Research Professor of Law and Diplomacy, National Defense University. Some of the ideas in this paper are mentioned in the author's Toward Managed Peace *(1993), available in paperback as* A Breakfast for Bonaparte *(1993).*

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Salinastroika:

Less than Meets the Eye

Douglas W. Payne

PRESIDENT CARLOS Salinas de Gortari took office in 1988 after an election most Mexicans believe he lost. Despite systematic fraud and enormous expenditures of state resources, the electoral alchemists of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) were able to conjure but a bare majority of votes for Salinas, according to official results. He was confirmed by the PRI-controlled Congress amid fisticuffs and raucous demonstrations by opposition legislators, while sealed packets of uninspected ballots from around the country lay strewn in the basement under armed guard. Never opened, they were eventually destroyed.

The legitimacy of the PRI, the party of the Mexican Revolution, in power since 1929, had been severely damaged. With the country mired in a prolonged economic crisis, a number of observers questioned whether Mexico, once considered a model of stability and civilian rule in Latin America, was on the verge of upheaval.

Salinas forged ahead, promising both "democracy and modernization with growth." But his accomplishments have been primarily on the economic front. Salinas has wielded the enormous power of the Mexican presidency to impose a remarkable overhaul and radical opening of the economy. The question is whether his intention has been to use renewed economic growth to lay the groundwork for a transition to democracy, or to refinance, retool, and preserve the PRI's domination of the country.

After five years, the basic structures of the traditional state-party system are still intact. Modest political liberalization under Salinas has been designed primarily to quiet opposition protests and international criticism. Despite somewhat improved electoral laws, the Federal Electoral Institute which must enforce them remains answerable to the Interior Ministry, the president's principal instrument for controlling national politics.

As Salinas enters the final year of his term, it is evident that whatever ideas he may have once had about serious political reform, the priority now is to maintain political control during the presidential succession. As he stated in September when touting the latest electoral reforms, the new laws would ensure "political civility" and reduce the "perspective of tension" in the presidential elections next August.

Salinas is angling to avoid a repetition of the trauma of 1988. But while economic modernization seems to have instilled a measure of optimism among many Mexicans, his political maneuvering has not resolved the crisis of legitimacy at the root of the PRI's near collapse. Recent opinion polls indicate that barely a third of the electorate believes the 1994 vote will be clean. Last July, after a poor turnout in two state elections won by the PRI, the joke among Mexicans was that

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the televised soccer match between Mexico and Argentina the same day had been a better draw because the outcome was not known in advance.

In August a ranking PRI official assured a forum on democracy in Latin America that the PRI not only would win next year's election, it would "win legitimacy, too." But legitimacy will not be attained simply by engineering a less dirty election. It must be achieved by establishing a system of checks and balances through which citizens can hold their government accountable—in short, a democratic rule of law.

That will not be Salinas's legacy. What he will be remembered for is creating a climate that has quickened the impulse toward democratization in Mexican society. Breaking down commercial barriers has meant the erosion of psychological barriers to modernity which are rooted in Spanish colonialism and have sustained Mexico's authoritarian traditions. Along with investment dollars have come democratic values and ideas about modern civil society that are fueling the demand for more independent and meaningful political expression.

The process will be difficult to reverse because the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) virtually guarantees that Mexico will remain open to the world. Salinas therefore will be handing on the challenge of political modernization to his hand-picked successor. However, the next president will also be beholden, as his predecessors have been, to the political system that has brought him to power. Although the genie of democracy is out of the bottle, the urge to preserve rather than transform that system will remain strong.

Rule by Power Rather than Law

ON PAPER Mexico's political framework is not unlike that of the United States. The Mexican Constitution of 1917 provides for an elected bicameral congress, a supreme court, and a president elected for a six-year term. It defines citizens' rights in a similar, although much broader way than the U.S. Constitution. Governors and legislative bodies of the thirty-one states are elected as are municipal governments, with the exception of the Federal District (Mexico City) whose chief executive is appointed by the president.

But the nature of power in Mexico and how it functions do not correspond to the constitution. The violent turmoil of the 1910-17 Revolution did not end with its implementation, as revolutionary generals fought for power in a series of civil wars, mutinies and revolts that lasted nearly through the 1920s. One of those generals, Plutarco Elías Calles, finally put an end to the fratricide in "the revolutionary family" by founding the National Revolutionary Party, later renamed the Institutional Revolutionary Party, in 1929.

While the constitution of 1917 drew on the U.S. and French revolutionary experience, in creating the PRI Calles adapted the concepts of centralism and political party fronts that were then taking hold in Europe. The potential of these ideas was later demonstrated in the extreme in the rise of fascism in Germany, Italy, and Spain.

For Calles, however, who had become President in 1924, the need was not to achieve power, but to consolidate it. He therefore established the PRI as an all-embracing party of the state, imposing membership on government officials, bureaucratic sectors, intellectuals, judges, the hundreds of parties and movements spawned by the Revolution, and the army. It was an authoritarian, top-down structure held together through cooptation, corruption and, when those failed, repression.

Calles wrapped the PRI in the national colors of green, white, and red, and declared the party's allegiance to the "ideals of the Mexican Revolution." But its real allegiance was to monopoly power and stability. The democratic framework enshrined in the Constitution was reduced to trappings, elections to ritual formalities. The separation of

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powers would exist only on paper, the gloss on a pyramid of power headed by the president in the personalistic tradition that dates back to the Aztec empire of Moctezuma and the Spanish Conquest by Hernán Cortés.

One "ideal" enshrined in the constitution that Calles could not subvert was the principle of "No reelection," the rallying cry against the former dictatorship of Porfirio Díaz. Although Calles managed to control the government from behind the scenes for a number of years, he was eventually forced to give way to Gen. Lázaro Cárdenas, a popular young governor from the state of Michoacán.

Cárdenas is best remembered for nationalizing the oil industry and carrying out a major land reform. But he is also responsible for institutionalizing a distinctly corporatist structure within the rough-hewn state-party system created by Calles. Under Cárdenas, the country's political forces were organized into four sectors—labor, agricultural (peasant), "popular" or middle class, and military—extending the PRI's reach into virtually the entire life of the country. (The army was later removed from the party to become, in effect, a silent partner of the state.) The party, equipped with an executive committee headed by a presidential appointee, had been made into a powerful instrument of the presidency and the electoral arm of the state—what is still referred to today as the "PRI machine."

It is within the state-party machine that the formal business of governing Mexico takes place, secretly and with little legal foundation. Policy emanates from the president and is rubber-stamped by the congress. The Supreme Court, subservient to the president, has never struck down a federal law on constitutional grounds.

The oil and glue of the machine is provided by a complex system of patronage, graft, and nepotism in which success in climbing the ladder is determined more by loyalty to higher-ups and the ability to broker deals than honesty or merit. Its equilibrium is based on an informal consensus among PRI elites that political competition and differences over economic or other policies will be settled internally and without jeopardizing the system. Its longevity is abetted by the ritual six-year turnover of the presidency, which allows new blood to rise through the system as the next president installs his own governing team.

For decades, the PRI machine ran relatively smoothly. Cárdenas's successors, in an informal alliance with the private sector and foreign capital, effectively applied a statist economic model that produced growth of more than 6 percent a year through the 1970s. The so-called "Mexican miracle" provided the resources needed to sustain the state-party system and the juice with which to coopt the media, intellectuals, student radicals, fledgling opposition parties, and any others who might threaten it. When the economy nose-dived in 1982, the machine nearly ran out of fuel.

Breakdown

DURING THE 1970s, as the world economy became more interdependent, Mexico's protectionist, state-led economic model began to display signs of obsolescence—rising unemployment, a sagging agricultural sector, and a widening budget deficit. President José López Portillo (1976-82) bet the store on huge new oil discoveries, borrowing wildly from abroad against future sales, and spending heavily to maintain economic expansion. As world oil prices plummeted in 1982 amid global recession, Mexico went bankrupt.

When President Miguel de la Madrid took office in 1982, the economy was in steep decline, the budget deficit was 16.5 percent of GDP, inflation was nearly 100 percent, and Mexico was unable to pay the interest on its more than $80 billion foreign debt. Foreign investment had stalled and the private sector, angered and alarmed by López Portillo's nationalization of the banks,

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was taking billions of dollars out of the country in capital flight.

De la Madrid put together a cabinet of proficient *técnicos*, or technocrats, like himself and concentrated on renegotiating the debt and stabilizing the economy by steering toward a more market-oriented system. A key role was played by his minister of budget and planning, Carlos Salinas, who, like de la Madrid, was a product of Harvard.

However, as de la Madrid and his team attended to the economy, the PRI machine was breaking down for lack of resources. Inflation, a two-thirds drop in the purchasing power of the minimum wage, and unemployment of over 20 percent, eroded the PRI's three-pillared support base—workers, peasants, and the middle class.

Moreover, the country appeared to have outgrown the system. The "Mexican miracle," coupled with rapid population growth, had fundamentally changed the nature of Mexican society. At the time of the Revolution, Mexico was a poor and primarily rural nation of less than 20 million people. In less than six decades it had become a largely urban, mostly literate nation of 80 million people enthralled by consumer goods and modern communications. The old myths and revolutionary rhetoric of the PRI rang hollow. For the middle class that had expanded to nearly 25 percent of the population but was now sliding back toward poverty, the PRI machine had become an anachronism and, with rumors of runaway corruption, something to be scorned.

Mexican society has long tolerated the idea of self-enrichment through political office. But there are limits, and the López Portillo administration shattered them. López Portillo and his entourage, including the Mexico City police chief, the infamous Arturo Durazo Moreno, retired to palatial mansions after absconding with an estimated $3-5 billion. Upon taking office, de la Madrid initiated an anti-corruption campaign, and a few heads rolled. But the effort failed to placate the public. When the campaign stagnated toward the end of de la Madrid's term, anticorruption sentiment increased, fueled by a series of scandals involving Mexico's notoriously corrupt police.

Then, in late 1987, the PRI suffered its first rupture. During the decade, differences over economic policy had widened between *técnicos*, like de la Madrid and Salinas, and *políticos* who advocated a return to statist and populist traditions and less subservience to international creditors. When de la Madrid chose Salinas to be the PRI's presidential candidate in the 1988 election, the traditional consensus among the PRI elite fractured. Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas, Governor of Michoacán and son of the revered former President, left the party and announced he would run against Salinas. Former Labor Minister Porfirio Muñoz Ledo also bolted, and the two began fashioning a left-wing populist movement to support Cárdenas's candidacy.

There was also a problem developing on the right. The conservative National Action Party (PAN), relatively tame since its founding in 1939 by businessmen and Catholic intellectuals, had been hotly contesting elections in northern states since 1982. With the backing of small business and industrialists alienated by the PRI, the PAN tapped into mounting popular discontent and turned election fraud into a volatile issue. In the mid-1980s unprecedented protests erupted in numerous states where the PRI had rigged the vote. The focal point was Chihuahua, where PAN supporters blocked bridges to the United States and clashed violently with police.

In 1988 the PAN nominated Manuel Clouthier, an entrepreneur and fiery campaigner, and looked to expand its appeal beyond its northern strongholds. But the wild card was Cárdenas. He wrapped himself in the image of his father and charged the PRI with betraying the nationalist traditions of the Revolution.

President de la Madrid had won 74 per-

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cent of the vote in the 1982 elections, the lowest percentage ever despite the inflated official results. To ensure against the unthinkable in 1988, the PRI dug deep into state coffers to promote Salinas. Backed by the mostly coopted Mexican media, Salinas campaigned tirelessly, promising political and economic modernization.

Mexico voted on July 6, 1988. Most Mexicans believed the PRI would win by hook or by crook and, in fact, fraud was blatant and systematic. The PRI machine cranked into gear as members of its myriad organizations were trucked in "carousels" from poll to poll to stuff "tacos" (wads of ballots) into the boxes. Other practices included doctored registration lists, duplicate credentials and voter intimidation. It wasn't enough.

Manuel Bartlett Díaz, the Interior Minister at the time and the President's overseer of the federal electoral commission, had promised election results within twenty-four hours thanks to a new computerized system. But the night of the election, he announced that the computers had failed. At first he claimed that high turnout and overloaded circuits were the reasons, then laid the blame on "atmospheric conditions."

After one of the longest weeks in Mexican history, the results were finally announced—50.36 percent for Salinas, 31.12 percent for Cárdenas, 17.07 percent for Clouthier. The losers were irate. In the weeks that followed Cárdenas rallied a quarter-million protesters in Mexico City, while the PANistas blocked highways and bridges in six states. The protests finally tapered off after Salinas's victory was confirmed by the PRI-dominated Congress two months later. But in the eyes of most Mexicans, the PRI had been deeply wounded.

Salinastroika

IT WILL NEVER be known whether Cárdenas actually won the election or not. But Salinas, taking office with the weakest mandate of any PRI leader before him, understood that the election had been a political disaster. The 41-year-old technocrat determined that the answer to the political problem lay in fixing the economy.

After assembling a cabinet that included a number of young, Ivy League-educated economic specialists like himself, Salinas initiated a stunning overhaul. By slashing tariffs, privatizing money-losing state enterprises, and cutting back the bloated bureaucracy, he lowered inflation substantially, reduced the gaping budget deficit, and renewed economic growth.

But interest payments on the foreign debt and the cost of the growing trade imbalance as imports flooded the country continued to eat up dollar earnings from manufacturing and oil. It was soon apparent that the economic reform package would not generate enough capital to fund Salinas's political agenda of rebuilding the constituencies lost by the PRI in the 1980s—workers, the poor, and especially the middle class. Greater levels of foreign investment were required. That is why Salinas announced in May 1990 that Mexico was seeking a free-trade agreement with the United States.

In the wake of the 1988 fiasco, and with the NAFTA debate bringing greater attention to Mexico's lack of democracy, Salinas was forced to operate in a complex political minefield with both domestic and international dimensions. First, in order to undertake his economic program, he had to dispel the image of a cautious technocrat and establish the authority of his presidency.

He did so quickly and in spectacular fashion by deploying the army to arrest Joaquín Hernández Galicia, the powerful oil workers chief who had turned the union into a personal fiefdom. The arrest was the start of an anti-corruption campaign designed to improve the PRI's image both at home and abroad. But more important, the ouster of Hernández, whose support for Cárdenas in 1988 was an open secret, was a clear message to every PRI kingpin that insubordination would not be tolerated.

Salinas also further concentrated the

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already formidable powers of the presidency, giving himself more direct hands-on control of the nation. Shortly after taking office, he created a technical cabinet, headed by José Córdoba, his chief of staff. It has five departments—international relations, the economy, social welfare, agriculture, and national security. The latter incorporates the military, the Interior Ministry (a combination FBI, CIA, and NSA), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the attorney general. National security policy and political and media control are now run directly out of the president's office. For the first time since the days of the generals the army has been integrated into the political decision-making process.

Despite the numerous instruments at his disposal, Salinas has still not found it easy to command the political landscape. He has had to contend with the PAN and Cárdenas's Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) in dozens of state and local elections and in the mid-term congressional elections in 1991. And he has had to do it with the international community and NAFTA critics watching closely.

In 1989 he allowed the PAN to win an election in the state of Baja California Norte, the first time the PRI had lost a governorship in its history. The maneuver had three objectives that have remained constant throughout Salinas's term: One, to temper the demands for political reform by the PAN, already feeling a bit more comfortable with the PRI because of Salinas's market economic reforms. Two, to diminish the likelihood of the PAN and the PRD uniting around a pro-democracy platform, the PRI's nightmare. And three, to help establish Salinas's credentials as a political reformer abroad.

Salinas conceded another governorship to the PAN in the state of Chihuahua in 1992. But in between 1989 and then, the electoral scene proved more difficult to manage. A number of state and local elections were marked by blatant fraud and violent crackdowns against opposition protests. As the international press homed in, the PRI resorted to more sophisticated election engineering—heavier campaign spending even by traditional PRI standards, and more extensive use of the compliant media. The Mexican media, although nominally independent, are largely controlled by the government through regulatory bodies, dependence on the government for advertising revenue and operating costs and, frequently, outright intimidation.

Prior to the 1991 mid-term congressional elections Salinas touted a proposal for modest electoral reforms. The PRI made enough modifications, including the elaboration of a new voter registration list, to get the PAN to endorse the package, to the dismay of the PRD. But even with the reforms, the elections were inherently unfair and tainted by fraud. The PRI vastly outspent the opposition, but because there was no independent audit it was impossible to know by how much or exactly where the resources came from.

The PRI retained its overwhelming majority in the congress, but its celebration of a "landslide" victory was cut short when mounting opposition protests over fraud drew a critical response from the major U.S. media. A number of state elections were held at the same time as the congressional vote and anti-fraud protests were especially fierce in the central states of Guanajuato and San Luis Potosí. A sharply worded *New York Times* editorial (August 26, 1991) was followed by a *Wall Street Journal* editorial (August 29, 1991) that expressly called for the Guanajuato vote to be overturned.

The day of the *Journal* editorial, Salinas ordered the PRI's governor-elect in Guanajuato to decline the office. He clearly was concerned by the potentially damaging effects of the fraud on the government's image abroad during the NAFTA debate. But he had also established a dangerous precedent. The opposition realized that a loss on election day could be overturned later in the streets, and Salinas has since removed at least two more governors under similar conditions.

These maneuvers confirmed the president's final authority in electoral matters and

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the subservient role of the national electoral commission, and were a stunning reminder that the rule of law in Mexico exists more on paper than in practice. Both the *Times* and the *Journal* have been staunch advocates of NAFTA. Is the PRI counting on their editorialists to be less critical if a similar electoral scenario arises on a national scale in 1994?

Public Distrust

SALINAS'S ACROBATIC stage-managing of Mexico's political arena under an ever brighter international spotlight appears to have left Mexicans no less distrustful of the government than they were in 1988. As mentioned earlier, opinion polls conducted last summer indicate that only a third believe the 1994 election will be clean. Moreover, a series of incidents in the last two years may have weakened even further whatever trust in the PRI still remains.

In April 1992 a major gas explosion killed more than 200 people in Guadalajara, Mexico's second-largest city. Salinas publicly demanded that those responsible be identified within seventy-two hours. More than a year later the government issued a report blaming a leaky pipe. Most people in Guadalajara, however, believe the explosion was caused by local managers of Pemex, the government petroleum monopoly, siphoning off gas to sell illegally on the side.

Last June 29 a Norwegian tanker ran aground off Mexico's western coast a few hundred miles north of Acapulco. It was carrying a cargo of 4,400 tons of sulfuric acid. The government, evidently anxious over criticism in the U.S. about Mexico's environmental safeguards, assured that the entire cargo remained safely on board. As local fisherman displayed dead fish and seabirds, a Florida-based salvage company hired to remove the cargo reported the tanker had already emptied into the sea.

On November 1, 1992, Salinas, in his fourth state-of-the-nation address, promised new electoral reforms and called upon all political parties to make "transparent" their sources of income. The following March, word leaked out about a secret fund-raising dinner attended by Salinas on February 23, during which about thirty of Mexico's wealthiest business executives, most of whom had been beneficiaries of Salinas's privatization program, had been asked and agreed to contribute at least $25 million apiece to the PRI.

On May 24, Cardinal Juan Jesús Posadas Ocampo, Archbishop of Guadalajara, was gunned down in the parking lot of Guadalajara's international airport. Two months later the government issued a report saying the Cardinal had been caught in a crossfire between two rival drug gangs. It did not explain why police at the airport ordered a passenger jet delayed for twenty minutes after the shooting, enabling eight of the gunmen to board the plane and escape, or why the gunmen were not apprehended when the plane landed in Tijuana.

The popular Cardinal, who had spoken out against the rampant use of Mexico's second largest city as a drug-trafficking base, was widely perceived as the only remaining authority figure in town not to be cooperating with the dealers. In a local survey, few city residents said they believed the killing was accidental and many thought the Cardinal had been murdered as a warning to the government to back off from its anti-drug campaign.

Average Mexicans live daily with corruption, from the *mordida*, or bribe, demanded by underpaid traffic cops, judges, and low-level government functionaries, to the payoffs for government contracts and licenses that result in shoddy building construction. After high-profile anti-corruption campaigns by both the de la Madrid and Salinas governments, incidents like those recounted above give Mexicans the impression, again confirmed by opinion polls, that either the PRI is not serious about the problem, or that nothing can be done about it.

Salinas's anti-corruption effort has been more intensive than that of his predecessors, not only because he has had to mind Mexico's image with NAFTA in the balance but, more

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important, because pervasive corruption undermines Mexico's ability to compete as a trade-dependent nation in the global economy. Corruption exists and will continue to exist in the world's industrialized nations, but most enjoy a democratic rule of law through which it can be curbed.

Mexico's culture of corruption dates back to long before the PRI. But the way the PRI was established and the way the party rules not only reflect that culture, they have reinforced it. Salinas has fired numerous officials, including attorney generals and police chiefs, and replaced them with apparently well-intentioned people. But simply switching heads will not transform the guts of an entrenched 64-year-old system.

The vast and labyrinthian network of patronage, payoffs, graft, and illegal transactions makes the Mexican political system especially vulnerable to penetration by the hemispheric drug trade. Up to 70 percent of all cocaine that enters the United States now comes through Mexico. There are numerous competing Mexican cartels, but with the possible exception of the killing of the Cardinal, the traffickers haven't taken on the state, Colombian-style—targeting politicians, judges, and the media. It is not unreasonable to think that despite the government's anti-drug efforts, the state is so naturally accommodating the traffickers don't have to resort to such measures.

Salinas himself probably understands that to establish a rule of law in Mexico would require an overhaul of the state-party system to match his overhaul of the economy. But rare is the leader who is willing to dismantle the structures upon which his power is based.

When confronted by criticism in the United States about the continued lack of democracy in Mexico, Salinas frequently cites the chaos of the former Soviet Union as the result of pushing political reform in advance of economic restructuring. The stability card has been an effective retort in the debate over NAFTA. However, in another sense, Salinas is echoing the traditional concerns of his predecessors. For the PRI was established not only as a vehicle for monopolizing power, but as a system for stabilizing the nation after the Mexican Revolution. On a more personal level, though, Salinas cannot have envied the fate of Gorbachev.

Engineering the Transition

FOR OVER A year Salinas has been working to ensure an orderly presidential transition. Last January he appointed Patrocinio González Garrido, the governor of the southern state of Chiapas, as Interior Minister. González has been labeled a reactionary by the PRD for his repressive tactics against left-wing peasant groups. But within the PRI, he stands out for his strong personal loyalty to the President, indicating that Salinas plans to stage-manage the 1994 election in the same hands-on fashion as he did the others.

NAFTA has helped to keep the PAN and the PRD apart. The PAN is generally for it, the PRD against it. But the "Millionaires Banquet" last February sparked renewed demands from both parties for electoral reform, particularly to guarantee fairer competition, and the PRI responded with a new reform package last summer.

Its modest measures included regulations on political-party financing, campaign spending limits, and more access for opposition parties to the media. Even though the new laws will still have to be enforced by a PRI-controlled electoral body under the authority of the Interior Ministry, the PAN agreed to endorse them. The PRD did not, but Cárdenas is running for president again anyway.

Another change doubles the number of seats in the Senate, which might result in more opposition representation but will not threaten the PRI's majority (the PRI currently holds 61 of 64 seats). The measure reflects traditional PRI cooptation techniques, dating back to the implementation in the 1970s of proportional representation for a segment of the currently 500-member Chamber of Deputies.

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Both the PRD and the PAN have suffered from internal dissent and neither has been able to build a strong national organization. Cárdenas again is a wild card, but it appears he no longer has the cachet he had in 1988. The PAN candidate looks to be Diego Fernández de Cevallos, the party's most prominent congressman, who has been frequently criticized for being too accommodating toward Salinas.

The surge in foreign investment that is expected to follow the approval of NAFTA may enable the PRI to go on a spending spree and simply overpower the opposition in next year's election. Moreover, Salinas has available billions of dollars to help boost the PRI candidate, over and above what the party has at its disposal.[1] Last January, the congress passed Salinas's budget which included about $11 billion for the discretionary use of the office of the presidency. It was announced that $2.5 billion would go to the Solidarity anti-poverty program.

Independent surveys have shown that Solidarity funding, about $10 billion over the last five years, has been concentrated not in the poorest states, but in states where Cárdenas had done well in 1988 and where gubernatorial elections have been held. Salinas has heavily promoted the program, making weekly televised appearances throughout the country to distribute funding. It is Mexican *personalismo*, the president bestowing largesse upon his subjects.

This modern version of the patron-client tradition may win votes among some of the poor, who constitute at least half the population. But it is in sharp contrast to what many Mexicans began learning in the 1980s; namely, how to organize among themselves to make do when the government cannot or does not deliver. A strong civic tradition was spawned in Mexico City after the 1985 earthquake, when the government appeared paralyzed. Since then, Mexico's economic opening has accelerated cultural exchange, particularly with the United States. That has reinforced the idea of organizing to influence government, and weakened the tradition of waiting for the government to organize you and hoping something good comes of it.

The result has been a proliferation of civic groups, from human rights, pro-democracy, anti-corruption, and environmental organizations, to neighborhood associations, women's groups and urban squatter movements. The former rulers of Eastern Europe know well that democratic culture undermines authoritarian systems. That's why they tried to keep it out. Salinas, in effect, has invited it in. While the implementation of NAFTA may help Salina's successor in the 1994 election, his successor will discover that NAFTA will only strengthen the democratic momentum already evident in Mexican society. Mexico's next president will surely confront challenges no less daunting than those Salinas faced in 1988. □

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[1]The naming of the PRI presidential candidate is the exclusive prerogative of the outgoing president. The *destape*, or unveiling, is preceded by months of speculation about who it will be and what kind of president he will make. In 1993, four of Salinas's close associates emerged as the most likely to be selected to carry the PRI banner in 1994: Pedro Aspe Armella, the patrician finance minister closely identified with Salinas's economic reforms. Manuel Camacho Solís, an astute politician who has been Salinas's appointee as Mayor of Mexico City. Luis Donaldo Colosio, the politically experienced but somewhat staid Solidarity and Social Welfare Minister. And Ernesto Zedillo Ponce de León, the education minster. PRI officials suggested that the ritual unveiling of *el tapado*, or chosen one, would be postponed until after the fate of NAFTA had been decided. On November 28, the PRI announced that Colosio had been selected as the candidate.

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Yeltsin: Shadow of a Doubt

David Satter

THE RIPPLED WATERS of the Moscow River flowed under the Borodino Bridge as crowds of spectators lined up along its banks to take pictures of the blackened facade of the former Russian Parliament building. In the distance, crows circled the devastated building and the golden hands of the Parliament building clock were stopped at 10:05.

The street was filled with traffic and passers-by hurried to their destinations. To all appearances, the Russian capital had slipped back into its usual mood of frantic indolence. But a month after the events of October 3-4 when a pitched battle took place in the streets to decide the fate of Russia, there is an uneasiness in the air, borne of fear for the future and unanswered questions. On November 4, the headline in the newspaper *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, for example, read "A month after the Moscow tragedy, we don't know the number of dead or their names. Without this truth, it is, of course, possible to live but it's hard to feel like a human being."

Other questions concern Yeltsin. Amid unconfirmed rumors that the number of dead might have been as high as 1,500, many Russians are wondering whether it was right for him to risk civil war by dissolving Parliament, and, although few persons sympathize with the defenders of the "White House," many believe that they were deliberately provoked. On October 4, Yeltsin said, "we did not prepare for war" but he raised the salaries of all members of the armed forces 1.8 times effective September 1, and, in August, promised a "hot autumn." On the morning of Sunday, October 3, a Russian writer left his home on Nezhdannoi Street and felt that there was something missing. He finally realized that in the center of the city which was usually well patrolled there were no police. It occurred to him that someone was organizing a provocation....

The outline of events is known. On September 21, Yeltsin dissolved Parliament and the deputies barricaded themselves in the White House. On October 3, supporters of the Parliament broke through police lines, attacked first the Moscow mayoralty, and then the Ostankino television headquarters. In response, military units attacked the White House and Parliament's resistance was crushed.

The logic of events, however, is puzzling. Yeltsin insisted that he wanted to avoid bloodshed yet many of the government's actions seemed intended to assure that it took place.

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In the negotiations held under the auspices of the Russian Orthodox Patriarch Alexei II, Parliament was ready to agree to new elections of both the president and Parliament, which could have left the future shape of Russia to the people to decide, but Yeltsin refused. Yeltsin also ordered that the phones, electricity, and water of the White House be cut off, steps nearly certain to push the defenders to a frenzied rage.

At the same time, the supporters of Parliament were given every reason to believe that a resort to force might be a success. Despite trouble at a demonstration on October 2, on the following day there was no show of resistance by the police. This seemed like many to be an invitation to violence. At 3 p.m., the crowd broke through police lines at the Krimsky Bridge and then, thirty minutes later, broke through the police line outside the White House. The demonstrators, quickly joined by trained fighters, seized the Moscow mayoralty in a little over four minutes. Urged on by Rutskoi, the crowd then left the mayoralty for the Ostankino television tower and, for the next two hours, marched unhindered through the center of the city to Ostankino.

At 7:30 p.m. the demonstrators attacked Ostankino with armored vehicles and grenade launchers. In fact, the attackers were outnumbered. According to official figures, the television tower was attacked by 4,000 unarmed persons and a hundred armed men using armored vehicles and grenade launchers. They were faced by 400 armed interior ministry troops and six armored personnel carriers. As the building came under attack, however, the defenders were nowhere in evidence. Once the battle was finally joined, they dispersed the attackers easily, but not before the impression had been created of a deadly danger.

There are reports of panic and uncertainty in the Kremlin on the night of October 3-4 but the upshot of the attack on Ostankino was that Parliament's cause was lost. The armed forces agreed to storm the White House and the resistance of Parliament was crushed.

Gray October

IN THE WEST, the events of October 3-4 have been depicted as a struggle between democracy and communist reaction. The verdict of history, however, may be more subtle. In fact, there were elements of democracy and communist reaction on both sides of the barbed wire.

In August, 1991, Yeltsin, Rutskoi, and Khasbulatov were allies. Although it is now all but forgotten, it was the Russian Parliament which, following the failed coup, voted in August 1991 to ban the Communist Party. The Parliament also voted by a two-thirds majority to give Yeltsin special powers to carry out economic reforms, ratified the Belovezhsky Agreement dissolving the Soviet Union and approved the radical reform program of Vice-Premier Yegor Gaidar.

From the beginning, however, Yeltsin made no effort to cooperate with the Parliament. He did not lobby legislators or explain his policies and he ignored the Parliament's debates. Nearly seventy deputies who supported him were given jobs in the executive and presidential structures, undermining the separation of powers. Yeltsin created new structures to deal with economic reform specifically to avoid the participation of Parliament.

At the same time, the members of Parliament began to be angered by executive branch corruption. Since the president ruled by decree and government agencies ruled by regulations, the members of the executive branch were able to create benefits for selected businesses which had the force of law. The

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Parliament had to legislate in a more universally applicable manner and, as the months passed, the deputies became outraged at being denied a share of the spoils. It was this situation which turned former allies into members of warring clans fighting not for principle but for power.

On January 2, 1992, Gaidar introduced reforms which made it possible for Russian enterprises to set prices and choose their own suppliers, effectively destroying the centralized planning system. Money supply growth was limited to 10 percent a month in the hope that this would lead to bankruptcies and the beginning of economic restructuring. These reforms led to the first conflicts between the executive branch and the Parliament which, in this sense, had some basis in principle.

In introducing his program, Gaidar predicted that prices would rise three to five times and, in the autumn, begin to fall. The enterprises, however, continued to be state owned and, instead of cutting prices in response to falling demand, they ran up huge debts to each other, waiting to be bailed out by the state. By fall 1992, prices had risen not four to five times but 300 to 400 times, wiping out the savings of Soviet citizens and causing the sharpest drop in Russian living standards in modern times.

One night in March 1992, there was a knock on the door of my Moscow apartment. "Anna Sergeievna has died," said a wrinkled old woman when I opened the door, "we're collecting money for her funeral."

Stunned, I reached into my pocket and pulled out a few hundred ruble notes. The inflation had not even left people with enough money to be buried.

In this situation, both Khasbulatov and Rutskoi found themselves excluded from the decision-making process. They began attacking the government for the impoverishment of the people. Yeltsin, for his part, ignored them. They were joined by the directors of military factories who formed a group called the "Civic Union," under the leadership of Arkady Volsky, a former member of the Communist Party Central Committee. By the end of June, Yeltsin, who had been supported by two-thirds of the members of Parliament only a short time earlier, faced a situation in which two-thirds of the Parliament now opposed him.

By mid-1992, inter-enterprise debt stood at 3 trillion rubles or half the value of industrial production. Production itself fell more than 20 percent against the same period of the previous year. The government turned its attention to the process of privatization. But this did nothing to lower the tension between the executive branch and the legislative.

What was contemplated was the largest peaceful transfer of property in history. In light of this, the question in both the legislative and executive branches became not whether to carry out privatization but who would carry it out and have the opportunity to distribute buildings, land, factories, and endless privileges and exceptions. At first, both the executive branch and the Parliament appeared to be involved in the process. As the months passed, however it became clear that the Supreme Soviet's control over the state property funds meant nothing more than the right to keep records, and this confirmed the deputies in their political opposition.

By the end of 1992, the conflict between the President and the Parliament had become irreconcilable. Khasbulatov began to describe Yeltsin as "mentally ill" and a "drunkard" and projects began to circulate in the executive branch for either changing the constitution or abolishing Parliament. For the most part, popular sympathy was on Yeltsin's side. Khasbulatov has an oleaginous quality that most Russians found disagreeable and

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they were appalled by a Parliament in which a deputy could vote for 10 or 15 absentees, Khasbulatov interrupted speakers, and persons opposing the majority had to fight their way to the microphone. At the same time, despite the economic hardship, most Russians believe that reform was the only hope for a better future.

At the seventh session of the Congress of Peoples' Deputies, the Parliament tried to reclaim the powers that it had given Yeltsin a year earlier. It fell short of the needed votes, but under pressure from the Parliamentary opposition, Yeltsin agreed to replace Gaidar.

There was a brief lull in January and then the conflict erupted with renewed fury. In March, another session of the Congress was called and it voted to eliminate Yeltsin's power to enact reforms by decree. Yeltsin responded by announcing a "special rule" giving himself the right to nullify acts of Parliament. Yeltsin later withdrew the claim to nullify legislative acts but the Parliamentary forces nonetheless tried to impeach him.

On April 15, a referendum was held on confidence in the government. The voters expressed support for both Yeltsin and his economic policies while calling for the re-election of Parliament. The Parliament, however, refused to recognize the results of the referendum.

On three separate occasions, the Supreme Soviet, which was not even asked to approve the privatization program for 1993, froze privatization, the only part of the reform program that was reporting some progress, and all three times Yeltsin issued decrees which canceled the Parliament's actions.

Finally, in July, Parliament approved a budget with a deficit of 28 trillion rubles or 25 percent of the total national product. The budget in its enacted form was certain to wreck the entire reform process and shortly afterward, Yeltsin decided to finish with the Parliament once and for all.

Force vs. Consensus

THE WORLD CAN be glad that it was Yeltsin who prevailed in the October confrontation and not Rutskoi and Khasbulatov. Had the latter been victorious, power would have quickly passed to the heavily armed communists and fascists who supported them, and Moscow would have been swept by an immediate although possibly short-lived reign of terror.

Yeltsin's victory was essential given the situation which he created, but the crisis which began with Yeltsin's decree dissolving the Parliament, did not work to the long term benefit of Russia.

The most important result of the October events was the loss of the possibility to lay the basis for an enduring constitution and with it, the rule of law.

It is, of course, true that the old constitution was absolutely inadequate. What is often disregarded, however, is that the President and the Parliament had agreed to abide by it, and the only alternative to it was rule by force.

Work on a new Russian constitution began in 1990 when a constitutional commission of the Russian Supreme Soviet was formed under the chairmanship of Yeltsin. In May of this year, however, Yeltsin convened a constitutional assembly, which was supposed to contain representatives of the executive and legislative branches, to work out an alternative draft.

In July, a project for a new constitution was released by the assembly and included a sharp expansion of the role of the president. With the abolition by Yeltsin of the Supreme Soviet, however, the procedure for accepting a new constitution was changed. Not only was one of the parties to the constitutional assembly unceremoniously eliminated, but in keep-

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ing with the Yeltsin decree of October 15, so was a constituent assembly which should have produced a final draft.

A month before the elections, the new constitution had still not been published, leaving no time for voters to study its contents, and a rule was established by Yeltsin whereby only 25 percent of all eligible voters had to vote yes in the referendum for the constitution to become the new basic law.

Unsurprisingly, the final draft of the constitution minimizes the possibility of a new Parliamentary challenge to Yeltsin. Yeltsin is free to appoint his own ministers, with the exception of the prime minister who must be confirmed by the Parliament. He has control over the budget, and nominates the director of the central bank and the justices of the constitutional court. He has the power to dissolve Parliament and to issue decrees. No law takes effect without his signature and a presidential veto can only be overridden by a vote of two-thirds of both houses, a near impossibility in what is expected to be a fractionated Parliament.

This constitution, however, is unlikely to have legitimacy, which is a serious shortcoming in light of Russia's massive social problems. In a situation where the struggle for political power has spread to every locality in the country, and organized mafias control everything from the sale of liquor in street kiosks to the trade in body parts for transplants and research in the Moscow morgues, what is needed is the uniform enforcement of a coherent body of enacted law. This, however, is nearly impossible without general recognition of the legitimacy of society's basic law.

Besides undermining the rule of law, the October events greatly increased the political weight in Russia of the armed forces. In the previous two years, the army did not aspire to political power because of its lack of political experience and the desperate material condition of the army after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Having decided the struggle for political power in October, however, the army may in the future become an independent political force.

After the crushing of the Parliamentary resistance, the army received the principal role in deciding on Russia's new military doctrine which provides a basis for unilateral Russian intervention in the former Soviet republics, "the near abroad." The doctrine, all but a small part of which was published on November 17, identifies as an external threat to Russia, the suppression of the "rights" and "legitimate interests" of Russian citizens living abroad. There are more than 25 million Russians living in fourteen former Soviet republics who are candidates for Russian protection under this clause and, as interwar European experience demonstrates, the attempt of an external power to guarantee the security of its co-nationals in another state immediately undermines their position in the nation in which they are citizens.

In fact, a pattern of intervention by the Russian army in the former republics has existed for some time. Russian army units have intervened in Georgia, Moldova, and Tadjikistan and this tendency can be expected to increase. The loosening of political control over the army, in turn, is very dangerous. The result of a crisis provoked by an activist military policy in the near abroad could easily be a shift in the support of the army to fascist and nationalist forces in Russia itself.

As the victory of the Russian President over the Russian Parliament recedes into history, it may seem that Yeltsin has simply stabilized his position following a necessary but regrettable loss of life. Such victories, however, do not come free. Yeltsin triumphed over Rutskoi and Khasbulatov but in doing so, he strengthened the Russian tradition of con-

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tempt for compromise and reliance on force which in the long run can only be antithetical to the progress of all democratic forces.

The problem facing anyone who wants a better future for Russia is how to restructure the economy without provoking massive social unrest. The complicated nature of this problem led the two sides to take opposite positions, but it was the struggle for power and the lust for a share of the spoils that transformed political disagreement into outright war.

What Russia needs is a civil consensus, the importance of which actually transcends the value of any particular economic policy. Without social peace, reform policies which generate mass unemployment cannot be successful, and even policies that reinforce industry at the price of a gradual economic decline will inspire unrest.

With social peace and a political consensus, Russia may be able to weather the economic crisis which lies ahead of her, but social peace is only possible if there is a willingness on the part of leaders to seek compromise with all elements of society. It was this possibility which was too lightly squandered in the life and death struggle between the President and the former legislative branch.

During the recent crisis, Yeltsin had no better friend than the United States. Our support for him, even when he acted illegally, was timely and emphatic.

Did it really make sense, however, for us to identify so closely with the fate of one man?

Secretary of State Warren Christopher, in a speech before the Academy of the National Economy in Moscow, October 23, quoted the well-known (in Russia), lines of the Russian poet, Fyodor Tyutchev "Russia is understood not by the mind...In Russia one can only believe." Christopher then continued, "We believe that the new Russia...will prevail. And we believe the new generation of democrats here today will seize the opportunities and secure the gains made possible by reform."

It is possible to share Christopher's sentiments and still point out that faith in Russia's capacity and economic reform is not the kind of "belief" that Tyutchev had in mind. When Tyutchev said it was necessary to believe in Russia he meant believe in Russia's unique spiritual mission and its duty to save the whole world. This is the significance of the line, "Russia is understood not by the mind..."

In evaluating Yeltsin, as in reading Tyutchev, it is important to understand the context of Russian society. Russia is not the United States where it is possible to choose sides secure in the knowledge of the existence of a stable democratic context. In Russia, the psychological structure of religious-based morality was destroyed. She can best be helped not by uncritical support of one or another Russian political figure but with humanitarian aid and the careful articulation of transcendent democratic principles. The failure to think in terms of transcendent principles characterizes our policy toward Russia and is the much discussed "missing element" in post-Cold War American foreign policy as a whole.

To return to Tyutchev, the poet writes, "she [Russia] has a special stature of her own." Because of the truth of Tyutchev's vision, we must deal with Russia, not as a Eurasian version of the United States, but as a nation emerging from seventy years of atheism and forced collectivism and, by grasping the intellectual challenge presented by a unique country, both honor ourselves and treat her with deserved respect. □

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The Visible Hand

William R. Hawkins

A HUNDRED YEARS ago, Great Britain, then the world's premier power, went into a long-term decline. Annual economic growth 1871-1913 averaged only 1.6 percent and historians have labeled this era "the Great Depression." During this period, the U.S. and Germany both passed England as an industrial power. After the adoption of free trade in the 1840s, a quarter century of economic dominance continued, but by 1873 observers such as Lord Penzance were warning :

> The advance of other nations into those regions of manufacture in which we used to stand either alone or supreme, should make us alive to the possible future. Where we used to find customers, we now find rivals....Prudence is not alarm, and prudence demands a dispassionate inquiry into the course we are pursuing, in place of a blind adhesion to a discredited theory.

Still, nothing was done. The landslide victory of the Liberal Party in 1906 won the debate for *laissez-faire* and free trade. It was not until the 1920s, after the shock of World War I, that the British government under a revived Conservative Party began to directly manage trade and promote industrial policies to foster growth. By then, however, it was too late. England had already lost too much ground. Soon it found great power status too heavy a "burden" to bear and began its long retreat.

A century after Britain's decline began, in the 1970s, the U.S. went into what some have termed a "Silent Depression." From a technical standpoint, depression is too strong a term as the economy has continued to grow, though at a diminishing rate. From 1950 to 1973, the real rate of American economic growth averaged 3.6 percent. But from 1973 to 1991 this fell to only 2.0 percent. Even the best period since 1973, President Ronald Reagan's second term, did not match the 1950-1973 average. The dramatic slowing of the growth rate has not only heightened social problems at home, but has degraded the nation's ability to sustain its preeminent position in world affairs despite its victory in the Cold War.

England after 1846 and the U.S. after 1945 embraced the free-trade philosophy at times when their economic leadership was unchallenged. The mercantilist principles on which that leadership, in each case, had been built were abandoned. It took a generation for major economic rivals to materialize; when they did, *laissez-faire* provided no defense against their assault. The British and U.S. experiences are uncanny in their parallel development separated as they are by almost exactly 100 years. Now, despite being the only superpower, U.S. budgets have been

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drawn up in recent years on the assumption (apparently shared by leaders in both parties) that the United States can no longer afford the military establishment, overseas presence, and foreign aid programs that were created and carried forward with relative ease in past decades. Will American geopolitical decline, following American economic decay, make the parallel with British decline exact?

For decades, Washington has been dominated by politicians and analysts on both the left and the right who reject the idea that the nation-state has legitimate economic interests of its own, apart from the short-term interests of consumers in general or the influential interest groups favored by one party or the other. The nation, in this view, is less than the sum of its parts. It is this neglect of national interest in economic policymaking that is the greatest threat to the long-term security and prosperity of the United States—as it was the source of the failure of the recent experiment in *laissez-faire*.

The Invisible Hand

THE SUPPLY-SIDE theorists and free traders who dominated the Reagan and Bush Administrations were fully committed to the same *laissez-faire* notions that paralyzed England during its decline. Among these are the belief that the government should not bias decisions by individuals between savings and consumption or between domestic and foreign purchases, and the conviction that economic activity is in some autonomous sector detached from other national concerns.

In fiscal policy supply-side theory led to a misguided focus on the household rather than on the production (business) side of the economy. Tax rates were reduced, but a host of deductions, credits, and exemptions were also removed. What others saw as incentives, the reformers regarded as distortions. The expectation was that lower taxes would increase capital formation (savings) as the after-tax return increased, thus promoting growth and higher productivity. This is a basic Keynesian concept. But while Keynes applied it to business only, the supply-siders as "individualists" tried in vain to apply it to households trusting in "the market" to do the rest. Their mistake was soon evident: the savings rate fell in the 1980s from just over 8 percent at the start of the decade to about 5 percent at the end despite the curbing of inflation. The tax cuts went to support consumer demand, not savings. Much of this demand was satisfied by imports since domestic producers did not have the capital needed to rapidly expand to meet the demand.

It didn't start out this way. The 1981 Economic Recovery Tax Act (ERTA) contained many useful provisions aimed at the capital formation and production side. The investment tax credit was extended and depreciation liberalized. Eligibility for Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs) were extended to all working households. The top rate for capital gains was reduced to 20 percent. Unfortunately, movement started away from such provisions immediately. The 1982 Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act (TEFRA) scaled back the investment tax credit and canceled planned accelerations in the depreciation schedule. The Alternative Minimum Tax (AMT), which limits the value of incentives by disallowing their full use, was strengthened. The Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 again made depreciation schedules less favorable.

The 1986 Tax Reform Act (TRA) eliminated the investment tax credit entirely. Also eliminated were IRAs for people with employee-provided plans. Depreciation rules were made still less favorable and the AMT was increased. The capital gains tax rate was upped to 28 percent. William A. Niskanen, a member of Reagan's Council of Economic Advisors and now president of the libertarian Cato Institute wrote in his book *Reaganomics* (1988) that even though "Total investments by Americans is likely to decline about 3 percent...and domestic investment by corpora-

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tions may decline as much as 8 percent" due to the "increase in the effective marginal tax rate on new investment in the corporate sector from 37.2 percent to 42.1 percent," the TRA will still have a "small positive effect" because "the reduction in the variance in effective marginal tax rates on corporate investments will improve the allocation of economic activity." In other words, for ideological reasons, it was better to have investment fall than to have the government distort markets by stimulating it. This was supply-side/*laissez-faire* fiscal policy taken to a *reductio ad absurdum*.

Unfortunately the "free market" did not satisfy the requirements for domestic economic growth. Between 1986 and 1991, business sector output per hour, a key measure of productivity growth, rose at only a 0.1 percent annual rate. Productivity growth, the main cause of higher living standards, was lower after 1986 than during the 1973-81 period despite the oil shocks and inflation of the Ford and Carter Administrations and much worse than during the 1982-85 period when annual productivity gains made it up to 1.7 percent. [1]

In addition to serving as a poor guide for domestic policy, the free-market model proved to be disastrous in trade policy. The Reagan and Bush administrations moved toward freer trade and away from industrial policy just as commercial rivals in both Asia and Europe made their push. The U.S. merchandise trade balance had gone into deficit in the 1970s (after a century of surpluses) due to the rise in oil imports. In 1983 the trade balance in manufactured goods turned negative and stayed there, resulting in a transfer of wealth overseas approaching $1 trillion by 1993.

A lengthy 1991 study by the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) entitled *Competing Economies: America, Europe and the Pacific Rim* noted that

> Most advanced countries do lend policy support to certain industries, and the criteria for selection are generally the same; they favor industries that are knowledge intensive....that have good prospects for growing markets, and that are built on versatile core technologies with spillovers to other industries.

The OTA concluded that "the United States will lag behind its major competitors, especially Japan, if current trends continue." Though this study had been commissioned by the late Republican Senator John Heinz, the Bush Administration would have none of it. Michael Boskin, Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors, repeatedly rejected measures to advance American high-tech industries as "silly attempts at industrial policy." Boskin is also known for his much quoted opinion that from an economic policy perspective there is no difference between "potato chips and computer chips."

Equally dogmatic was the attitude taken by Treasury Secretary James Baker who under Reagan opted for dollar devaluation as a free-market solution to the problem of America's burgeoning manufacturing trade deficit with Japan. That policy failed to reduce the trade deficit, as Japanese firms responded by altering their prices for the American market. However, a weaker dollar dramatically (and unintentionally) increased the cost of projecting American power overseas. A proper policy would have sought to eliminate the trade deficit while maintaining

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[1] The overall economy was starting to slow even as President Bush took his oath of office. John A. Tatom of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, writing in the bank's newsletter, is clear where the blame should be placed: "Stagnant productivity growth followed the 1986 Tax Reform Act, which substantially raised taxes on capital income...investment fell rapidly; real nonresidential fixed investment fell from a record high of 12.2 percent of real GDP in 1985 to 11.1 percent at the business cycle peak in III/1990 and declined further during the recent recession, reaching 10.2 percent by the end of 1991."

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the strength of the dollar as a strategic asset.

Another side effect of the devaluation strategy, combined with a *laissez-faire* attitude toward international economic activity, was that American productive assets were suddenly available at bargain prices. In testimony before the House Armed Services Sub-Committee on Investigations in August 1992, Linda M. Spencer of the Economic Strategy Institute presented a list of over 700 proposed foreign acquisitions of American high-tech companies between October 1988 and April 1992. Spencer's list included 608 consummated deals involving aerospace, advanced materials, chemicals, computers, electronics, semiconductors, biotechnology, and telecommunications. Most had Pentagon or other U.S. government contracts. In two out of three cases, the foreign party became the majority owner. Of the 608 cases, Japanese interests accounted for 399 acquisitions. Japan's six largest *keiretsu* industrial combines (Fuyo, Sumitomo, Mitsui, Mitsubishi, DKB, and Sanwa) alone grabbed up 244 American high-tech companies. Hard-pressed American firms strapped for capital make easy prey for the Japanese who have earned hundreds of billions from their trade surplus with the U.S. The Bush administration's interagency Committee on Foreign Investment in the U.S. investigated only fourteen of these proposed deals and recommended against approval only once (in a case involving China after Tiananmen Square).

All of these deals have been in fields identified as "strategic" by the Office of Technology Assessment. They are at the center of the world-wide struggle to dominate the twenty-first century economy. Buying entire organizations is more than just eliminating a rival. Many of today's technological advances are incremental, based on learning curves and proprietary knowledge. The organization is part of the technology. The future flow of ideas can be redirected overseas to aid commercial rivals, which may be military rivals tomorrow. Japan's industrial priority list, for example, includes steel, shipbuilding, machinery, electronics, nuclear power, automobiles, computers and aerospace—an industrial core that can be readily converted to military production.

The unwillingness of America's economic rivals to behave as *laissez-faire* theory claims they should has also plagued the U.S. in the Uruguay Round of the GATT. American efforts to strengthen rules against predatory trade practices such as dumping have been rejected by the Europeans and the Japanese who routinely use these tactics to displace American firms. This tactic is supported by foreign governments who subsidize their export industries. In regard to both dumping and subsidies, GATT wants to move dispute settlement procedures to a supranational body which could require the U.S. to rewrite its trade laws to conform to the wishes of its rivals. Policies to expand the U.S. economy could be declared illegal by a foreign tribunal without appeal. Unlike the United Nations where the U.S. is a permanent member of the Security Council, at GATT the U.S. does not have a veto. Once it signs a GATT accord, it will only have one vote among those of over a hundred other countries on how the new rules will be implemented.

The Uruguay Round has been in session since 1986. Not even such trusting free traders as Reagan and Bush could accept the terms that have been proposed. Perhaps it is time to question the dogma that multilateral liberalization should be a goal in itself. For twenty years the open U.S. market has been the "engine of growth" for the rest of the world. During this same period, America's own growth rate has slowed significantly. In light of this historical experience, it is increasingly difficult to take seriously the arguments by free-trade ideologues that an economic golden age can result from further liberalization under the auspices of GATT. While GATT reduced tariffs, the most visible policy tool, non-tariff measures appeared in

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their place which were not so transparent. Not only are these measures harder to identify and negotiate over, but they allow governments plausible deniability to the extent that they seek to manage trade in the interests of their national industrial policies. The manipulation of exchange rates, agreements to control exports, and the creation of trade blocs add further proof to the argument that genuinely free trade is impossible because it poses an unacceptable threat to national economic objectives.

All too often the importance of free trade for domestic economic growth is grossly exaggerated. Astute national leaders know that while there are gains to be made from trade, they are small compared to the gains that can be realized by advances in domestic productivity. It remains a fundamental fact that no people can, in the long run, live beyond their own ability to produce and generate wealth. Trade can impact this process, but not always or automatically in a positive fashion. Proponents of *laissez-faire* underestimate how difficult it is to progress, whether as a single company or as a major nation. The notion that one only has to "get out of the way" as progress storms ahead is terribly romantic and terribly misleading. If progress were that easy, the world would be a far better place than it is. Instead, progress is the result of hard work, sustained effort, and a little luck. Every effort must be mustered to support it, including effort by government which is the largest single actor in the economy.

The strategic reasons for government intervention in the economy are even more compelling than the domestic reasons. A government's concern for the industrial composition of its national economy must go beyond the problem of stagnation in output or income. The basic insecurity of a nation-state in an unstable global system compels an alert government to foster and maintain strategic heavy and high-tech industries. The major source of international trade rivalry, since the dawn of the industrial revolution, has been the military power base provided by modern industry and technology. More than factories and inventions is involved. National security depends on raw materials and energy supplies; on links of military industries with other industries and associated services; on improved transportation and communications; and on the organized support of education and basic research. The advantage in world politics goes to those states that can effectively unify all key sectors under one national or imperial authority.

It is a mistake to believe that "the military-industrial complex" can be neatly separated from a larger economy in which global market forces, not national strategic decisions, are of ultimate importance. Military demands long ago outgrew the capacities of state-owned arsenals and shipyards, while private enterprise demonstrated its superior ability to organize and innovate. Dual-use technology, applicable to either the commercial or military sectors, has been important throughout the industrial era, from the Bessemer process for steel-making (used in the manufacture of heavy artillery) to the DSP computer chip, which is reviving the U.S. electronics industry (and is a critical component of guidance systems). The close connection between civilian and military industry means that the government must cultivate peacetime markets to keep private industry healthy, operating, and ready to mobilize.

The claim that government cannot or should not pick winners and losers is a phony issue. Not only is government influence on economic decisions unavoidable in the case of a government with a $1.5 trillion budget, but it is an essential responsibility of government to formulate policies to advance the nation's comparative economic standing. The success of Cold War programs in military-industrial sectors in which the U.S. leads the world attests to the ability of government and business to work closely together. It is no accident that America's top export industry is the area of

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greatest government investment—aerospace.

These considerations suggest that the original ideal of GATT, the creation of a world of harmonious free trade, was never tenable. Economic independence, the ability of a country to shape its own destiny and be free to choose when and where to act, is a central concern of nation-states in an anarchic world. Samuel P. Huntington notes that "economic activity is a source of power as well as well-being. It is, indeed, probably the most important source of power...increasingly important in determining the primacy or subordination of states."

Clintonomics

THREE OF THE four presidents who have served since the break in American economic growth in 1973 have been denied re-election to a second term. That a lagging economy means political doom should have been impressed on Clinton's mind given the tone of the campaign which elected him. The 1992 election indicates that the American people will not accept a passive economic policy. They want faster economic growth with more and better paying jobs. This was the meaning of the flight of formerly Republican voters from George Bush to Ross Perot (and to a lesser extent, Bill Clinton). The American people expect the government to act.

What is needed are policies that will not only restore a bias toward savings and investment, but promote the development of high-tech industries and the winning back of overseas and domestic markets. Not only a return to incentives for the private sector, but increased direct government action to upgrade education, rebuild the nation's infrastructure, manage trade to the advantage of American firms and workers, and support research and development programs to advance living standards.

President Clinton's naming of Laura D'Andrea Tyson to chair the Council of Economic Advisors could not mark a greater change from the Boskin era. At the time of her appointment Tyson directed the Berkeley Roundtable on the International Economy, a group that has been in the forefront of work on a new trade and industrial paradigm. In *Politics and Productivity* (1989) Tyson stated that "the world is at the beginning of something akin to a third industrial revolution...and that Japan is at the forefront." Tyson believes that Japan owes its position to government strategies that "guided Japan's industrial structure" and that U.S. policy must break with the outmoded idea that America can maintain its position without a determined effort. A more activist partnership between government and business is needed, or the U.S. risks becoming one of the "weaker" economies subject to greater instability, a falling dollar, and a decline in relative living standards.

Others in the Clinton administration subscribe to this view. Treasury Secretary Lloyd Bentsen has long favored targeted tax incentives for business rather than across-the-board rate reductions for individuals. In the 1980s, Bentsen also became a "trade hawk" calling for tougher negotiations with Japan and others. Bentsen represents the view that the volume and composition of trade in key industries will have to be managed in some cases rather than left to the market.

Unfortunately, Clinton's plan so far is more talk than action. His vaunted investment tax credit is paltry and permanent only for very small firms ($5 million or less in annual revenues). The same charge of parsimony applies to his R&D credit and his cut in capital gains taxes for new, small ventures. These measures will not be of much help to those medium and large American firms that are locked in mortal combat with foreign combines for control of strategic and high-tech industries. Firms do not have to be gargantuan to be leaders in industrial expansion,

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but they do have to be substantial.[3]

One hopes that the Clinton administration will free itself from the conservative obsession with small enterprises. Only larger firms can afford the pay and benefits Americans have come to identify with middle class life. Small business did provide the bulk of the new jobs of the 1980s, but that was part of the problem. It marked a tendency of American entrepreneurs to seek niches away from foreign competition. Often these new businesses were dedicated to selling or servicing products manufactured overseas. There was a mood of resignation and defeatism at the center of government, only lamely covered by brave talk about the "spirit of enterprise." In the 1980s it became popular to denounce American corporations being pushed back by overseas rivals as "dinosaurs" properly headed for extinction even though their advancing rivals were also behemoths. This was part of the "sour grapes" mentality adopted by officials who were constantly looking for excuses not to act. The country would take what its rivals left it and learn to like it.

America's industrial decline is not inevitable. Firms across the spectrum are "reinventing" themselves; changing their organization, adopting innovative technology, and boosting productivity. Increased productivity, however, results in job losses as it takes fewer people to produce a given amount of goods. To generate net new jobs at the high end of the wage scale, increases in productivity must be coupled with expansion of the market. This is why trade strategy that aims to secure through political action large markets (both at home and within carefully defined trade blocs) will take on an ever more important role in the nation's overall economic policy. American firms, with the active support of the U.S. government, must take back markets lost in the 1980s as well as carve out new ones.

The United States, as the most affluent continental nation-state, has the advantage in this struggle for markets. This advantage could have been expanded if the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) had been managed so as to create a true trade bloc that can be dominated by American firms while the opportunities for the firms of rival overseas industrial states are curtailed. However, since the Bush administration explicitly rejected this approach while negotiating NAFTA, and because none of Clinton's side agreements address it, the national strategic economic case for NAFTA is unconvincing. Indeed, it may even be harmful, if U.S. firms relocate to Mexico, using it, along with other low-wage Third World nations, as an export platform to manufacture goods for the American market. Free traders who cite lower prices as gains to consumers from this strategy forget that people must first work and earn income before becoming consumers, something that becomes more difficult as jobs are exported and real wages driven down in the U.S. in the name of "competitiveness."

The Lessons of History

Historian Robert L. Reynolds, writing of the era when Europe was starting the expansion that would bring the entire world under its influence, argued that

> It was a great asset to the Europeans in commerce that European governments put their whole strength behind mercantile enterprise, and considered the devising of ways and means

[3]Confirmation of the power of medium-sized firms comes from Germany. Hermann Simon, a professor of business administration at Johannes Gutenberg University in Mainz, surveyed thirty-nine manufacturing firms that had become world leaders in their fields. The typical firm had annual revenues of $303 million and 2,904 employees. It controlled 22.6 percent of the world market in its field and contributed a $100 million trade surplus to Germany. This success generated a five-year job growth rate of 9.8 percent.

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for making their merchants richer and strong a valid activity....Those governments had a theory that if their merchants were strong and rich, the governments themselves would carry greater weight in war and diplomacy.

Today, as in the past, the classical liberal view of harmonious trade holds only where trade is trivial in value or impact. Where trade really matters, it becomes inseparable from the general struggle for wealth, power, and security. When a zero-sum trade war is being fought to control key economic sectors, surrendering strategic industries in accordance with the classical theory of specialization and division of labor is unacceptable. It becomes the responsibility of governments to manage trade in the national interest as it manages other aspects of international relations.

The post-World War II liberal internationalist era, like the mid-19th century, was an atypical period resulting from special circumstances that could not last. Princeton political economist Robert Gilpin describes the instability of an open trading system that depended so heavily on the willingness of a single "hegemon" to bear a disproportionate share of the costs in *The Political Economy of International Relations* (1987):

> The hegemon grows weary and frustrated with the free riders and the fact that its economic partners are gaining more from liberalized trade than it is....In time, the hegemon becomes less willing and able to manage and stabilize the economic system.

After World War II, the United States played the role of benevolent hegemon, accepting the costs of maintaining an open world trading system. Since American productivity growth began its long decline in the 1970s, the U.S. has tried to shift the burden from itself to multilateral coordination through the G-7, but the clash of national and regional interests has prevented any consensus forming other than a desire by the other six members to keep the U.S. passive in the face of the predatory policies of its trading "partners."

Free traders have greeted Clinton's appointments and talk of a tough new trade policy with fear that the liberal world order they have embraced with ideological fervor is coming to an end. If true, this would not be an unexpected or unusual event. The modern world trading system has been in existence for some five centuries. For most of this time, it has not been conducted under cover of a self-sacrificing, liberal hegemon. World trade will simply revert to its more traditional pattern: what the seventeenth century French mercantilist statesman Jean-Baptist Colbert called "a perpetual and peaceable war of wit and energy among the nations." This has been the norm all along. Today, as in the past, no statesman can afford to wait for the "invisible hand" of the free market to do his job for him. The invisible hand does not hold aloft any particular national flag; the hands of a statesman must. □

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The Pacifist and the General

Melvin J. Lasky

THEIR BODIES WERE found in their little terraced house in Bonn just a year ago, on October 1, 1992, when the neighbors—who had been puzzled that they had seen nothing of them, none of the usual rushing in and out, for a train, for a plane, in almost three weeks—used their spare keys to get in and take a look. The scene and the smell were nauseating. When the police arrived they had some difficulties identifying the bodies which were in an advanced state of decomposition. Petra Kelly lay in her bed, the bullet having pierced both temples and lodged itself in the mattress. Gert Bastian, the former *Panzergeneral* in the German *Bundeswehr*, was crumpled on the floor in the hall, having killed himself with the second cartridge in his double-barreled Derringer 38, the bullet entering his skull from above, high on the forehead, leaving him unrecognizable.

The autopsy was quickly done, and it was pronounced officially to be a "double suicide," although this was not literally true. No farewell note, no direct evidence of a "pact" was ever found. Petra Kelly had been killed in her sleep. The General had then left the bedroom, grasped his weapon with both hands ("like a professional," an expert noted), and did what he had told many friends he would do when the time came to "make an end of it" for both of them (how often had she said she could not live without him...) She was forty-four when she died; he was sixty-nine.

The whole Left went into mourning. Petra had been "Queen of the Greens"; the most famous voice in the Peace movement; the most familiar face in the Feminist campaign; the most fervent figure in a hundred operations against Nuclear Energy, Poverty in the Third World, American War-Mongering; and, always in the first row of banner-carriers, in a thousand engagements on behalf of the Rain Forests, the Ozone layer, the Whales, and Undernourished Children everywhere. Gert Bastian was the most prominent European defector from the NATO military establishment, a three-star German general who had commanded an armored division. He took leave of his 10,000 troops and 700 tanks when, on his "road to Damascus," he abjured the Cold War, dismissed the threat of communism and Soviet expansionism, refused to go along with Chancellor Helmut Schmidt's decision to modernize Western forces with Pershing and cruise missiles, and joined forces with Petra Kelly to make peace (and love) not war.

It was an unlikely alliance, and they were an odd couple: she the *Friedensengel*, the Angel of Peace, with an elderly, taciturn aide-de-camp at her side. Born Petra Lehmann, she had been adopted and taken to the United States by her mother's new husband, a

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Lieutenant John Kelly; and her "Americanism," combined with the "Prussian" soldierliness of her live-in companion, was enough to win them star billing on the global circuit. When, in March 1983, the Greens succeeded in winning some twenty-eight seats in the *Bundestag* (ten of them women, with Petra in the lead), there was in every new protest strike and mass demonstration a special triumphalist note.

There was a whole world to win, and they were on their way. I saw them in Frankfurt, sitting down and blockading the new runway of the old airport and calling for an end to insidious noise in the endangered countryside. Petra and the General were in Hiroshima, demanding compensation for the third generation of radiation victims. They attended the fiftieth anniversary in Spain of the bombing of Guernica; the tenth anniversary in Paris of the '68 student seizure of the Sorbonne. They collected a million signatures to help the Peace campaign against "the Bomb," and organized 100,000 personally written letters to be posted to their East German friends (though they never arrived, for the *Stasi* were ordered "to intercept and destroy.") They met Gorbachev in Moscow and chatted with him about human rights, and confronted Honecker in East Berlin with Petra provocatively clad in her thin, white T-shirt, flashing the cunning biblical message to convert swords into ploughshares. They turned up in Stockholm for the meeting of the Green International, and in Los Angeles where she rang out the message in her fluent English. He turned up by himself in Lyons to give military testimony in the trial of Klaus Barbie, but they were united in East Berlin for protests against the 750th anniversary of the old Prussian capital. He, with his German General Staff experience, was coming along just fine as the impresario of a world-wide movement which began as a utopian crusade and was fast turning into political tourism. Her diary records her as having been, in that same year, in The Hague, Geneva, Helsinki, Munich, Tokyo; and with every invitation there had to be two air-tickets and a double-room hotel reservation.

Their final conference was in the last days of September 1992, in the Berlin Hotel Kempinski; it was devoted to the "Victims of Radiation," and she was putting forward a Chernobyl doctor named Vladimir Chernosenko as a candidate for the "Alternative Nobel Prize." Robert Jungk, a conferencier in his own right, said, "She always had a cause," as if he had ever run short of urgent campaigns; they all thrived on pieces of the action. The week before they had all been crowding each other in Salzburg for the "World Uranium Hearing." Jungk now regrets that a depressed Petra had not been called on to speak at her last appearance.

They checked out early from the Hotel Kempinski and drove homewards to the Rhine in their little VW Golf, making a detour for the old concentration camp at Sachsenhausen, where they placed bouquets of flowers. It was their last signature. The next morning Bastian broke off an unfinished letter, stopped in the middle of a word, and, leaving the typewriter running, reached for the Derringer which he kept in the desk, wrapped in one of his old General Staff suede-leather gloves, and signed off what the first biographer calls "*eine tödliche Liebe*"—a deathly love, a deadly affair.[1]

In the days and weeks that followed—marked by memorial meetings to praise the martyrs, marred by lingering police investigations for additional clues—the emotional

[1]Alice Schwarzer: *Eine tödliche Liebe, Petra Kelly and Gert Bastian* (Kiepenheuer and Witsch, Köln, 1993). The book was extensively excerpted in *Der Spiegel*, (Hamburg, June 26-28/July 5, 1993). Its authenticity was challenged by both friends and Kelly-Bastian family members on grounds of "sloppy research...fake quotations...etc," in an angry open letter (*Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, August 11); and was energetically defended by Ms. Schwarzer a few days later (*FAZ*, August 14) (continued on following page).

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shock intermingled with the political scandal. For her comrades and friends there were bitter personal questions: How could she leave us? Why not so much as a farewell note or a political testament? Resentment turned against her lover, the gunman. What could it have been other than his egoism, the old *macho* Adam in an ailing soldier, which made him take her along with him? Others went further, allowing themselves the suspicion that he had been hiding something, mortally afraid of some sinister secret, and that he had been about to be exposed (as a KGB agent, or an East German spy, or a *Stasi* informer).

The accounts in the press and in the popular magazines and supplements varied wildly in accent, from "pure Le Carré" to "sheer Shakespeare." The last act in the Tannenbusch house was likened to the bedroom scene between Othello and Desdemona, and the double death of Romeo and Juliet. The *feuilletonistes*, that huge army of literati deployed on the commanding heights of the German media, rushed forward irresistibly with bookish ironies and allegedly eerie similarities. The romantic desperation of the double-suicide of Heinrich von Kleist. The bullets that killed all of Petra Kelly's heroes: Rosa Luxemburg; Gandhi; President Kennedy (and his brother); Rudi Dutschke; John Lennon. The charred unrecognizability of poet Ingeborg Bachmann's corpse (but it was smoking cigarettes in bed that killed her). Where the literary parallels wobbled a bit, the psychoanalysts slithered to the rescue, and one doctor in Munich came up with a post-mortem on the basis of a book he had written on "The Killing of Intimate Partners" (*Die Tötung der Intim-Partner*). Little or no evidence came to light to support either the theses of political conspiracy or to lend substance to the psycho-babble.

Valentine Queen to Green Queen

THERE ARE GREAT and classic fault-lines in the life and death of Petra Kelly. For one thing, I find it difficult to make out what was "American" in her spirit and style, and what was "German." I first started following her career some twenty-odd years ago, when she was a bit of a girl in Washington, DC—the popular student leader at American University who cheered on Bobby Kennedy, Hubert Humphrey, and Martin Luther King, and who commanded a full-page feature in the *Washington Post* (March 30, 1969) for so doing. She struck me as "very German" on the American scene. Her intense foreign aspect, with such rare campus talents as utter seriousness and day-to-day discipline, may have predestined her for greater things than did the lives of Mario Savio of Berkeley and Mark Rudd of Columbia. Yet when she returned to Germany and became the ill-starred Joan of Arc of the collective antinomian movement to save the world from war and assorted other evils, she appeared on the old-world stage to be "very American" indeed. Petra herself once said (but then on this, and much else, she was not a very reliable witness) that "I live in two worlds—Germany has given me my principles, my philosophy, and formed my views...But here in the States I have to a certain extent 'found myself'..."

What could that "self" have been? Surely, at the outset, a certain lively girlishness. In her American high school in Columbus, Georgia, she became a Valentine queen, a majorette, and an honor student. "I want to let everyone know," she wrote in 1963, aged sixteen, "how

(cont.) Ms. Schwarzer was not spared another onslaught from the sharp pen of Till Bastian, the General's son, who listed errors of glaring omission and indefensible commission. Dr. Bastian's defense of his father's "honor," while conceding all the lapses and failings, was not to be confounded with filial piety; the "honor" involved was only his father's "complexity" as a human being. He was being defamed by the "primitive journalism" of "terrible know-it-all simplifiers." They were out, as he put it (in English), to "give him a fair trial and hang him..." (*Die Zeit*, September 10, 1993).

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much I love the U.S.A....America has fulfilled all my dreams." Her step-father, Lt. Col. Kelly, was serving in nearby Fort Benning, and she wanted, if they would have her, to join the ROTC. But within a few years Hiroshima became for her the image of a nightmarish USA which had mass murder behind it, military genocide before it, and was afflicted forever by a political paranoia. Love (if that is what it was) turned easily into hate, and America became the symbol of Evil, of an infernal enemy in which she believed totally, as befitted a transplanted convent girl who once wanted to become a Dominican nun in the African jungle.

The bitter teen-age disappointments of the late 1960s came bit by bit, on the installment plan. She could hardly cope with her "emotional involvement" in the murders of the two Kennedys whom she worshiped, so much so that "I can hardly look at the PT-109 pen, my dear possession...." Hubert Humphrey was one of her last hopes. She corresponded with the Vice-President, followed him on his campaign tour, greeted him at airports. But then he lost. She sobbed at Nixon's electoral victory, and angrily withdrew her application papers for U.S. citizenship.

But it was LBJ, almost personally, who had delivered the unkindest cut of all. I once heard her tell the story (one of the stories with which she sketched her hagiography, marking all the stations-of-the-way); it was on a television talk-show, and it sounded as if she was intent on becoming a legend in her own prime time. In her Washington college days she had become acquainted with the Walt and Elspeth Rostows. Walt had once spoken to her class at the School for International Service (where she was awarded a B.A. *cum laude*). Petra had as always asked provocative questions and he had as always given eloquent answers; she became an occasional guest at the Rostow house on Lowell Street. One night she had been holed up there, since the street turbulence had become alarming, and she slept in the Rostow library. She was awakened, she said, around midnight by Professor Walt Whitman Rostow himself, coming in to answer the "red telephone" on his desk; President Lyndon Baines Johnson wanted to consult with his chief security adviser on the next day's bombing agenda for Vietnam. As Petra told it, she lay under her covers on the library couch and was chilled to hear the "cold and cynical" tabulation of targets—Vietnamese towns and villages—for destruction by the U.S. Air Force. She was shocked, outraged, and humiliated by a feeling of impotence— "I felt the nearness of that red button...and I was so helpless." Yet now she knew what it was that she was called upon to do—to help end this "dirty little war" and then to banish the prospect of any other manic U.S. president going on to "nuke" the world.

Now as I have it from Mrs. Elspeth Rostow, who had put her up for the night (and who was her seminar director at the university), there was no desk in the library and no "red telephone." There was a direct line to the President but it was white, and it was located on the floor above. "At no point," the Rostows assure me, "did LBJ discuss such matters as 'bombing agendas' over that wire. The entire question is absurd."[2] One of Petra's biographers has observed: "It was a scene of such unreality, this phone-chat about War, for the horror-chilled girl, that she questioned for a long time whether she had really experienced it or only dreamt it..."[3] Small matter. For Petra Kelly and kindred illuminated spirits, dreams (and night-

[2]Personal letter to MJL from Elspeth Rostow (University of Texas, September 2, 1993) and Walt W. Rostow (LBJ Library, September 7). Professor Rostow adds, "The Washington riot-Georgetown-LBJ tale is news to me; and I spent a good deal of that night in the White House, our trip to Honolulu being canceled...."

[3]Monika Sperr, *Petra Karin Kelly: Politikerin aus Betroffenheit* (Bertelsmann Verlag, 1983, p. 74).

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mares) are where realities always begin.

When she finally decided to re-cross the Atlantic it almost seemed to be a perverse repatriation of some lost Henry James heroine: a Daisy Miller who preferred to save something in the old world; an Isobel Archer who has diffuse ideas about illegitimacy and loyalty; an Olive Chancellor who was incandescent with "the only sacred cause...the great, the just revolution...sweeping everything before it...the greatest change the world had seen..."

The Jamesian ambivalence was endemic. Where was innocence, where guilt? Philosophy came from Europe, personality was born in America. Or it could be the other way round. Once back in Germany she once told a reporter in Bonn that "I didn't get my ideas here—I got them there and brought them back with me." The lady from the *Wall Street Journal* was so convinced that she wrote summarily: "Miss Kelly is a product of America itself." The front-page headline argued: "Armed with Ideas Acquired in U.S., She Articulates Unease of Many Germans" (January 24, 1984).

What ideas could they have been talking about? In her academic success story on both sides of the Atlantic—scholarships, stipendia, prizes—all of her mentors were quick to praise her alertness, engagement, tirelessness, volubility, etc., but no one mentioned what she had read, where her attitudes had come from, why her mind developed in certain directions.[4] She was no intellectual. She simply mixed and mingled with abstractions, and was on speaking terms with every idea around. She stumbled across Emma Goldman, ignored her anti-Soviet animus, and became convinced that "women in marriage are like prostitutes." She read a few pamphlets by Karl Marx, became for a season a Marxist, but then learned to dismiss the old man as "a typical male theoretician." Her favorite writer, she confessed, was somebody called Kahlil Gibran; and among women she listed, strangely enough, Anne Morrow Lindbergh (whose World War II reputation as a sentimental wave-of-the-future fascist-sympathizer hadn't quite reached her.)

To be sure, she brought the playful twist of ironies on to herself by being so "Proustian" when she replied to the questionnaire (based on Marcel Proust's own questions) submitted to her by a Frankfurt newspaper (*Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, July 7, 1983). Among her heroes in real life? Gert Bastian. How would she prefer to die? "Not alone—in the closeness of those who are close to me."

The Old Soldier

TWO YEARS later Gert Bastian completed the same questionnaire (February 15, 1985), and with, inevitably, the same temptations to bluff a little and pretend a bit (and in the end to reveal what you most want to conceal). The former *Panzergeneral*

[4]Most of her teachers of the day would have been sympathetic enthusiasts. Elspeth Rostow, in a more mature judgment, writes: "Petra Kelly was enrolled in at least two of my undergraduate seminars in the mid- and late-sixties. Petra came first to my attention because of her compulsive questioning during class and her habit of turning up during most of my office hours—usually for no apparent reason...Petra tended to become hysterical when faced with any problem—and she was problem prone...An engaging and imaginative young person with little gift for rational discourse but a great talent for story telling, as long as the tale cast her in a heroic role. She annoyed her classmates by constantly personalizing issues and skittering across the subject of discussion as a bug scoots across the surface of a pond at the end of summer. Did I like her? Yes. Was she aggravating? Incredibly so. Was she emblematic of the German green movement as a whole? They can't all have been so narcissistic...", Personal letter to MJL from Elspeth Rostow (University of Texas, September 2, 1993) and Walt W. Rostow (LBJ Library, September 7).

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replied, naturally, that the "greatest misfortunes" were War and Violence, and that he had "the greatest contempt" for "every species of brutality." How did he want to die? "Quickly and without pain." His dream of happiness? The abolition of all the world's injustices. He liked to think of himself as exemplifying his "favorite virtues," namely, reliability, dependability. Although he himself was a loyal soldier in the service of the Third Reich, he recorded his dissident admiration for General Seydlitz's wartime defection to the Soviets after Stalingrad. Was it only bizarre coincidence that he spoke of Joseph Conrad's *Lord Jim* as a "favorite hero in fiction?" Or was it a paradox, born of a lurking moral contradiction, for the military officer who prided himself in his old perseverance and new gentility to choose a figure who deserted his post, failed to do his duty, and escaped into a mock-heroic cowardice?

Neither before nor after he met Petra Kelly—leaving his wife and two children, and moving into a small house in Bonn where, as newly elected members of the *Bundestag*, they would establish the headquarters of their abolitionist practice—would Gert Bastian define himself any more precisely.

At nineteen he had volunteered for Hitler's *Wehrmacht*, was wounded on the Eastern front, taking a Russian bullet in his right arm and a piece of grenade in his skull. On the Western front he was scarred by a burst of American machine-gun fire. As a peace fighter in mufti he was now erect, taciturn, and composed, his steely appearance making him look stalwart and unshakable. As a military expert he proved useful in the Bundestag when the Green-pacifist faction had to act as if it had an alternative defense policy.

Nothing seemed to become the General as much as his early retirement. Old soldiers don't like to fade away, and now he was self-redeployed into what purported to be the center of a worldwide struggle, organizing little victories, planning huge campaigns and counteroffensives. One day he was lunching with Havel in Prague, the next he was having a night out with Jane Fonda. (Petra didn't like her or her aerobics: "She's got a lot of capitalistic input.") He must have enjoyed the big time, although on the circuit he had to be careful and watch his language—as his son has reported, the General was always fond of homely old-fashioned sayings like "Weakness must be eliminated." An old family-album photo shows him, hands clasped nicely, sitting on the living-room sofa, next to his mother, under a mounted rifle on the wall. How the *Waffennarr*, the gun-buff, loved his weapons! At home he used to indulge himself in target practice, and always had a hand-weapon close by, in his desk drawer, in a glove compartment—all kinds of pistols and revolvers, all properly licensed.

And how did Petra take to living in the shadow of a gun? She had homely sayings of her own, the most famous of which was *Frieden schaffen ohne Waffen!* It was a jingle about making peace without weapons, and she had worn out innumerable T-shirts with the message emblazoned on her trim figure. Ideology apart, she had anxieties about weapons, a panicky fear that they could and would hurt people, or her. But evidently not every sword needed to be converted into a ploughshare, and Petra Kelly tried to make her peace with the General's hobby. Or was she just making an exception for deadly weapons that could contribute to her personal protection? Some see it as Petra's private pragmatism; others as hypocrisy, an example of the fearful pacifist's double-think.

Bastian conceded to a *Playboy* interviewer that he had been "happy, very happy to be a soldier." And now he was as pleased to be the armed adjutant, always living on the alert, an embattled role which he softened with a related devotion to gallantry, for he was in the oft-repeated German phrase, "*ein Kavalier der alten Schule* (a cavalier-of-the-old-school)." The dismal prospect of being a retired old-age pensioner in a little Bavarian house had apparently been put definitively behind him; he was now a world-traveller,

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being interviewed and photographed, talking at press conferences, presenting petitions, crying out for the world to be set right, helping to save the mankind he had once been committed to destroy.

Occasionally it became even too much for a disciplined old man, addicted to service and sacrifice. Petra was often—some say most of the time—nerve-wracking to be with: temperamental and hysterical, prone to fevers and chills, obsessive and impulsive, plagued by recurrent kidney ailments and metabolic palpitations, wild in her dietary eccentricities, childish in her sudden whims and fancies, blithe about her sexual adventures. Being impresario of the peace movement didn't always sanctify all his staff-sergeant burdens, the endless boring administrative details of getting tickets, hailing taxis, organizing box-lunches, checking in and checking out of hotels in time to make overnight trains and intercontinental planes. They had been together for a marvelous decade now, but at times it was too much. Their American friends referred to it as "togetherness," the Germans as a "symbiotic relationship," in sickness and in health, with or without sex, in euphoria and in despair.[5] He wanted her to have psychotherapy; but she had no free time. He wanted some mornings to sit down for breakfast in the kitchen; but her papers, in her very own hectic way, were spread out on every available surface. And still they wrote love letters to each other, left affectionate memos, scribbled endearing notes: "I adore you, my happiness, my sun, my rock...."

To one of Petra's intimate friends, a Tibetan doctor called Palden Tawo (he furthered Petra's enchantment with the Dalai Lama, although the cause of the restoration of an old Tibet theocracy sat rather uneasily in the Green theology), General Bastian wrote one of the most remarkably forlorn letters between two lovers of a shared mistress. The General grimly concluded that the triangle was just not holding up and indicated that he was thinking of breaking out, of leaving: "*besser gehen als zugrunde gehen* (better to go than to go under)."

Could he, then, muster the strength to retire again, to withdraw from Peace as he did from War? For if playing at war was hell, fighting for peace was becoming increasingly difficult. The "bourgeois West" had taken up the burden of environmental concerns while the socialist East continued its record of ecological ravages. The Greens, who had concentrated on Western deficiencies and not on Eastern failures, declined in popularity. By 1989 it had become clear that Adenauer and Kohl, Reagan and Bush had won the Cold War—peace had broken out, and rendered pacifism superfluous. Petra Kelly was not even chosen to run again for the *Bundestag* on the alternative party ticket; and General Bastian, who had been sitting in his last parliamentary session as an "independent," a maverick loner, was also unemployed and became a slightly ridiculous figure with his dire peace-loving prophecies of an American-instigated nuclear disaster. The crusade to prevent World War III had petered out, and much else with it. They had little income and no longer enjoyed the official services without which in our time no state-subsidized revolutionary movement can conceivably operate. The well-equipped *Bundestag* offices, to which the rump Green fractions still had access, were rudely closed by her comrades to Petra Kelly, who had been used to faxing and xeroxing her messages to the world. She began doing a TV program, moderated a few shows and then the series was abruptly canceled. As the producer said, "We wanted a program, and she was too programmatic" (*zu sendungsbewusst für unsere Sendung*).

[5]Even the General's son succumbed to a deep-psychological reading of the affair by writing about "the symbiotic entanglement of Petra Kelly and Gert Bastian and their mounting self-confusion and mutual dependency in a private world devoid of realities...." (*Die Zeit*, September 10, 1993).

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The General had two new post-Cold War ideas, both seriously marred by his characteristic lack of political sensitivity. They both came to naught, leaving him—and he was already troubled by dark medical reports from his doctors—facing oblivion.

The first idea was to recoup their losses by joining forces with the ex-Communist Party, now called the "Party of Democratic Socialism" and led by Gregor Gysi, the slightly heretical son of an Ulbricht henchman. It has been confirmed that Bastian talked to Gysi, was offered a certain electoral place and a sure seat—the PDS did win eighteen seats in the current *Bundestag*—without even having to join the party officially. As Gysi explained, "It would have been useful to have on our side two such charismatic figures...brainy characters who knew their way around the West..."

Petra was uncertain, reluctant, and their friends in the old dissident movement in the DDR, those hardy souls who had protested and demonstrated in 1989 against the old rickety regime, were horrified to think that their Western friends would now think of helping to camouflage and refurbish the survivors of the old guard. Bärbel Bohley, a protagonist of the East-German anticommunist opposition, was sensible and vehement enough to deflect the duo from the PDS option. Bastian regretted the lost opportunity to maneuver themselves to center-stage again and he is quoted as saying, "If only I had taken Gysi's offer I'd be a *Bundestag* member and we wouldn't have these worries...." The pair remained dejected, rejected, desperate.[6]

The General's second idea was even more short lived and hare brained. In the Left's panic and disarray in the wake of the end of communism and the Cold War, a number of prominent German intellectuals (Wolf Biermann, Hans-Magnus Enzensberger, Martin Walser, Botho Strauss) moved away from the left, even defected to the "American" cause of defending Kuwait (and protecting Israel) and punishing Saddam Hussein's Iraq. But Petra and her General, still trapped in the old world disorder, remained "anti-War," and against "the Bomb," in the spirit of down-with-Pentagon militarism. General Bastian came up (according to a Green friend) with the splendid twilit Wagnerian notion of protesting the Gulf War by flying down to Iraq, placing themselves into the bombing area amongst the innocent victims, and accepting the risk of getting hit. Was this the last exit to martyrdom, a final chance of dying heroically together for the common cause? Petra vetoed it, though whether she actually said, "I'm too young to die," as reported, is doubtful.

In March 1992 a near-fatal accident happened. It was in Munich, and Petra together with Gert Bastian had been late checking into the Hotel Eden Wolff at the *Hauptbahnhof*. He was on edge, for they were hours off schedule, and he had an appointment with Frau Bastian, his separated but still-devoted wife. It was to take place at their

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[6]But the whole incident was based on, and illuminates, a profound misunderstanding that afflicted the relationship between the *peaceniks* of the West and the *dissentniks* of the East. Petra Kelly fraternized with the lonely opposition voices behind the Iron Curtain, and they were beholden to her. But *they* wanted to destroy the tyrannies that oppressed them; *she* feared such Cold War tensions would lead directly to a hundred million corpses in the nuclear holocaust. Thus, Adam Michnik was drawn to the likes of Danny Cohn-Bendit, and for a moment of historic delusion misidentified forces that were marching in the streets against General Jaruzelsky in Warsaw with those that had marched in Paris against General de Gaulle in 1968. Sakharov in Moscow was more perceptive and wiser. He openly encouraged the West to be strong, even unto the latest missile and indeed "Star Wars," for he believed (quite prophetically) that ultimately under this pressure and resolve the East would crumble.

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Bavarian house, and his son and daughter would also be there, waiting. One damned thing after another prevented him from getting away. Finally, when it seemed possible for him to leave, Petra requested (with the studied urgency which came softly and naturally to her) a bowl of fruit. She had a prejudice against room-service, and knew that fresh apples and oranges would be available in the market across from their hotel. The General was always glad to run errands for her, even when under hectic pressure. He ran out of the lobby and on to the Station Square where he was promptly hit by a passing taxi, crumpled on to the road, and after a seven-hour operation in a Munich clinic (on what happened to be his 69th birthday) he was confined to a wheel-chair and could never walk properly again. For ordinary pedestrians (as a reporter wrote), *schlimm genug*, bad enough, but for a professional soldier, a German general! He was a wreck: looked it, felt it, with pills in his pocket against his terminal fears, and a newspaper-clipping in his wallet giving first-aid advice on what to do in a cardio-vascular emergency.[7]

Stasi's Toy

THE LAST TIME I caught a glimpse of Petra Kelly and Gert Bastian was in the spring of last year, a short time before their deaths, when they came, to a meeting in Berlin. I nodded a distant greeting to the limping General but he turned stiffly away. Petra was scurrying behind him to her place on the platform. Dr. Rainer Hildebrandt, the director and the guru of the "Checkpoint Charlie" Museum, (just on the old Berlin Wall frontier), had called another of his East-West encounters, trying to confront for whatever political, moral, or even religious results might emerge, *Opfer und Täter*, victims and culprits. The cast usually comprised ex-*Stasi* officers and ex-political prisoners, coming together for an appalling several hours in a dramatic exercise of "mastering the past." In part confessional, in part mock trial, these occasions were charged with penitence and reproach, recrimination and relapse.

This time there was a *Stasi* scandal involving the Greens. Historical researchers leafing through the miles of underground Eastern archives, had discovered that a prominent member of the Greens had been a political spy for the Honecker-Mielke intelligence service. He had been particularly close to Petra Kelly, and there were a hundred confidential reports, transmitted with weekly regularity, detailing her political plans and gossipy intrigues. In some compelling cases the *Stasi* were informed only minutes after Petra Kelly had returned from a Berlin Wall crossing and promptly briefed her friends on what the Eastern dissidents told her. The revelation had thrown a shadow over the integrity of the whole movement. In the cat-and-mouse game between Petra and the DDR, she had thought she was playing with them; but it was now clear that they had been toying with her.

Above the platform on this occasion there hung a huge blown-up photograph of the classic Green moment when Petra in East Berlin had famously out-foxed President Eric Honecker in 1983; or so she had thought. Once in the presidential palace and in the august Bolshevik presence she had slipped out of her jacket—a stratagem she had picked up from naughty Oriana Fallaci, who once disrobed in an interview with the Ayatollah Khomeini—and stood there in her T-shirt, sporting the usual pacifist slogan, one calculated to irritate the hell out of the Stalinist leader who had been denouncing all such sentiments as a mortal danger to the Soviet bloc. Also in the photograph were General Bastian, looking somewhat out of

[7] I am indebted for many facts and insights here to my conversations with Birgit Lahann who researched and wrote four articles on "*Petra Kelly und Gert Bastian: Katastrophe einer Liebe*," in the magazine *Stern* (July 1-22, 1993).

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place, and, to the right, the grinning Green M.P., *Stasi* agent, and Kelly confidant, Dirk Schneider who had in point of fact recommended the meeting to his East German masters and helped set it up. In the middle stood the nattily attired Prime Minister; another snapshot shows him with a sly smile on his face.

For Petra Kelly the exposure of an informer in her intimate circle was more than a political embarrassment, it was a personal catastrophe. It not only cast her into a deep depression, but unsettled basic certainties about her role and mission, as if Joan of Arc had discovered that the French were delivering the kindling-wood for her stake in Rouen. I watched her at close quarters for almost two hours. She confessed her shock and bewilderment, spoke of her "pain" and "spiritual paralysis," turned to argue and plead with the villain, Schneider, who now sat several chairs away on the platform. How could comrades do that to each other? But it is difficult to sound indignant or outraged when, in the German language's familiar tense, you are still on an intimate "*per Du*" with your friendly neighborhood spy. (The General was more to the point and asked, as if he were conducting a court martial, how much money had the scoundrel been given for betraying his friends.)

When Petra spoke she was unusually breathless and agitated; when she was quiet she sat sullenly, holding her head low, rarely lifting her eyes to her "Checkpoint Charlie" audience, trying to control her shaking hands. The sordid betrayal which had wounded her was, to be sure, only one of a hundred, even a thousand, similar routine-exercises which had in their time entrapped Chancellor Willy Brandt, every Ministry in Bonn (including the highest keepers of NATO secrets), and almost every major newspaper and magazine publisher in Western Germany. General Mischa Wolf (son of the famous communist writer, Friedrich Wolf) had run a network of such ingenious operations.

As Petra Kelly told the story of the fateful meeting, she, the General, and Schneider were to rendezvous at the Cafe Möhring on the Kurfürstendamn before taking their hired Mercedes-Benz limousine through the Honecker-approved Berlin Wall crossing. But Dirk Schneider had been incensed at such a decadent, *de luxe* mode of transport and had insisted that they go by bicycle and on foot. Petra at the time credited the objection as sincere, but now she knew that Kirk had only wanted to prevent her delivering the Mercedes' trunk-full of "dissident literature" to the courageous Havemann family in their East Berlin isolation. Or had this been the only reason? She had, after all, just come out of the hospital and was barely recovered from a kidney operation. The day had been cold and pouring rain. Hadn't she been right in trying to protect herself? And what had *they* been trying to do—*kill her*? She casts a withering glance at the traitor, the would-be murderer, a few chairs away to her left.

Dirk Schneider—fortyish, a handsome, bearded, bull of a man—spoke in his turn, referring to his duties as a loyal secret-intelligence employee of a sovereign German state, and explained that his behavior was all in the service of peace and progress. He affected to wonder at what the excitement was all about; he had never "spied" but only reported what he had experienced, like some free-lance stringer doing some harmless leg-work for the home office. He had always been "honest" and "above-board"—except, he conceded after a gale of laughter, except for this one deviation; but then nobody was perfect. (Dirk Schneider has subsequently re-joined his old comrades as a member of the re-named SED, now the PDS, and has adjusted to the rhetoric of "democratic socialism." He continues to dismiss the "moral" problem of "remorse" as utterly irrelevant—and anyway, he snaps, the sums that he was paid for his services were so inconsiderable as not be worth mentioning.)

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The Political Tourist

WILL HISTORY remember Petra Kelly? In the long run, hardly, though some Germans, may continue to give her a sentimental little place in the pantheon of "heroic characters" who gave some much needed relief in the dull, worthy landscape of the post-war Bonn republic. For all that, she was memorable, unforgettable. She was a flamboyant melange of the reasonable and the absurd, the clever and the obtuse; and one could never know, in a conversation or an interview, whether she would score with her charm, or quickness, or modesty ("after all we don't have all the answers to every question"), or girlishly give the whole show away with her homemade, helter-skelter utopianism.

Once, at the height of her fame and self-confidence, I heard her say (to the dismay and despair of her more thoughtful sympathizers) that her electoral successes wouldn't change anything in the Green strategy and tactics, which were rooted in an utter contempt for parliamentarianism and a devotion to the Street, *die Strasse*, where the "real action" was. Suppose the growth of the Greens would undermine the social democrats and help the hated Enemy on the Right into power? Wouldn't that be short-sighted?

Petra remained indifferent to the question of power, its responsibilities, and corruption. She could not be bothered to take such tactical factors into consideration. She would keep her eyes focused on the main issues which remained War-and-Peace, the poisonous Atom, the American Bomb, Third-World poverty, etc. etc. The prospect of the ruin of the Bonn republic moved her as little as the destruction of Weimar did to the militant Left spirits in 1933, when they refused to compromise with the social-democratic "social-fascist" bosses or the "bourgeois-Bruenings," even at the risk of allowing the Nazis to come to power. After all, as they said, *"Nach Hitler, uns!"*—after Adolf it'll be our turn. For a few fleeting moments, in the fearful tumult and shouting of the 1970s and 1980s which the Ulrike Meinhofs and Petra Kellys had instigated, Bonn seemed to some to be in some danger of going the way of Weimar.

Not to worry. Petra Kelly felt very comfortable and secure in the grab-bag of ideas and ideals which she said constituted "my dream...my utopia." It had a little bit of Marx (socialism); of Thoreau and Tolstoy (civil disobedience); of Gandhi and Martin Luther King (peaceful non-violent resistance); of Rachel Carson (DDT); of Baader-Meinhof and the IRA (hunger strikes); of Germaine Greer, Simone de Beauvoir, and Bella Abzug (feminism); of Willy Muenzenberg (total agit-prop); of Albert Schweitzer (save the sickly); of Billy Graham (save the world)...

Occasionally she would concede the doubts that troubled her and threw shadows over the movement that entertained a hundred slogans and a thousand on-going campaigns. She was alarmed at the demonstrators who went into battle with the police, armed with stones, knives, and baseball-bats. She disapproved of the egotistical Green parliamentarians who didn't want to give up their seats and yield to the principle of "rotation" (until it dispossessed her). She was caught between her "anti-Party's" warring factions—*Realos*, who were prepared to make pragmatic concessions in order to get their hands on more governmental power (and funds) and the "*Fundis*" (fundamentalists), angrily eager to expel and anathemize anybody who departed an iota from fundamental doctrine.

What, then, was essential? What constituted the sacred principle, the holy writ? The "dream" is hard to formulate, for it was something beyond capitalism and communism, neither East nor West, nor left nor right, but an eternally elusive "Third Way." She was hurt when accusations flew (from the *Realos*) that Moscow was getting a hand in, and (from the *Fundis*) that "bourgeois reactionaries" were infiltrating. She was intellectually naive—or vain—enough to be convinced that her haphazard collection of

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"emancipatory" ideals would do service as a coherent and convincing ideology. She was always warning against "opportunistic pseudo-reformism" and, equally, against "demagogic pseudo-revolutionism."

Her mind was simply not made for ideas. Her small, frail body, afflicted by ailments and anxieties, was made for accelerated bursts of nervous energy, and she was never so happily stable as when she was *doing* something and crying for the world to hear that *so much more* was waiting to be done. She had been seduced by the old anarchist catchword of "the propaganda of the deed," and she knew—she had it from her media-cunning friends in '68 Paris and her street-wise fellow-marchers in the U.S. civil rights campaign—how to make the main item in the evening TV news. But her analytical powers didn't hold out very much longer than a sound-bite.

As an activist she was compulsively restless, and in the jet-set world of political tourism she had (as the old phrase goes) an infinite capacity for taking planes. As a speaker she was not naturally eloquent, but what is usually mistaken for "charisma" always emerged in and out of the mumble-jumble of apocalyptic injunctions: her intensity, personality, deep commitment, vaguely tragic aspect. In her anti-NATO tirades in which she would denounce the American "containment" policy by pronouncing the standard German word for it, *Abschreckung*, in such a way that you could see the *Schreck*, the fright. And indeed she almost looked terrified on such occasions, so much so that the dark shadows under her eyes turned even blacker.

Her tiny dolorous figure and her handsome head, pert rather than pretty, with her sharp features softened by a toothsome smile and darkened by a pale melancholy mien: all of these together made up her most persuasive argument. It was a face that launched a hundred causes, and when *Time-Life* was compiling its list of the world's worthies of the whole twentieth century, it gained for her a photogenic place of honor. Everybody talked in those days of "body language"; Petra Kelly spoke it.

The Gun in the Suede Glove

AMONG THE MOURNERS was every *groupuscule* that had ever raised its voice for a better world: Russian dissidents, American vietniks, French veterans of '68-in-the-Sorbonne, assorted feminists, ecologists, and pacifists. All joined together to pay their last respects to the true martyrs of their collective cause. "Why did you leave us so soon?" one woman wailed at Petra's bier. "*Leave*?" muttered another, "She had her bloody head blown off!"

The police stayed with their official conclusion that it was an open-and-shut case, with no hint of any kind of foul play involved. But for some Greens (among them, a leading figure named Lukas Berkman, one of Petra's lovers and her first mentor into the brave new world of German ideology) the suspicion of some *Stasi* influence, or even involvement by some remnant of the KGB, was not to be dismissed out of hand. Who else, except possibly the CIA and/or the Pentagon (and they haven't been heard much from lately), would want to cut short such rich and valuable lives? Gert had been busily working for Petra to get the Andrei Sakharov Prize (from a Los Angeles foundation) and to win a seat for her in the European Parliament; she had been offered academic chairs by the universities of Hawaii and Washington; she had a series worked out for the BBC; and her diary had more than 300 full-up entries for the next year... Indeed she was too busy to die.

Her feminist comrades took it all rather more personally, and knew that it was gender and not intrigue that was at the root of the tragedy. They conceded that she must have been a difficult, nerve-wracking person to live with—but since when did that call for capital punishment? In her book, the very first on the subject, Alice Schwarzer—editor

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of *Emma*, the house-organ of radical feminism—fiercely over-interprets every tiny *double-entendre* which might link masculinity and murder. Petra writes a harmless post-card and scribbles a last message: "For a Future without Violence," and Alice asks, like a ponderous prosecuting attorney: "Whose future free of violence? What violence is she afraid of? Those of the super-powers? Or that of her live-in lover?"

To a pride of feminist lionesses and frustrated ideologues were added a flock of psychiatrists, avid to substitute analysis on the mortuary table for therapy on the couch. One reiterated the expertise of his authoritative scientific study of "the killing of intimate partners." Others offered: the General as a masculine protector or the idealization of the disappeared father; the child-girl traumatized by loss and early separation.

A Hamburg psychiatrist even came up with a supernatural vision of Petra and Gert meeting in heaven and discussing their end. Few paid attention to the *Schadenfreude* of the "monstrous regiment" or to the psycho-babble of the therapists and the paranoia of the "homeless Left."

The whole dossier on the "double suicide" was closed with the medical affadavit submitted by the General's son, Dr. Till Bastian, who was outraged by the absurd murder theories. The General was a sick man. The 1st of October 1992 began as an ordinary day in the life of Petra Kelly. She had gone asleep at five, just as General Bastian was getting up to go about his duties as the household major-domo. He wrote some letters, and posted them. He began another, and then, Dr. Bastian hypothesizes, the attack came, the terminal myocardial infarction. He interrupted the last letter, left the typewriter running, and reached for the Derringer inside his suede glove in the desk drawer. Hadn't Petra always said she could not live without him? Hadn't he promised to protect her in a cruel world she never made? Dr. Till Bastian assumes that the first "ischaemic attack" quickly intensified and, in finishing his double duty, the General stumbled, knocking books off the shelf in the hall. But still, "like a professional," he managed to control the aim of the second cartridge. Three weeks later they were found in their little home, once the frenzied provisional headquarters of a world-wide utopian revolution, and were officially pronounced dead and gone.

When the police opened the General's black synthetic-leather attaché case it included a whole file of clippings about Petra Kelly, some going back five and ten years, all part of his heroic period. There was also his passport and a copy of a letter which requested the extension of the official permission to carry a weapon, i.e. the Derringer 38 (#L290). One further item, a dagger (made in Lapland), turned investigative reporters of the feminist persuasion ecstatic, for here was the true insignia of the General, a man of war who could never turn his back on the sword by which he lived and would die. One waxed eloquent: "The thought of killing must have accompanied him all his life...And the loving Petra allowed herself to be companioned by an ex-soldier armed to the teeth!"

When the coroner removed Petra Kelly's body from the bed-room, he noted on her night-table several books in which she had been reading. One was an edition of Goethe's classic letters to his most famous mistress, Frau von Stein (and they were not without their bitter-sweet tensions of jealousy and betrayal). The other was a popular paperback of do-it-yourself psychology, "Anxiety Out of the Blue—Attacks of Panic and How to Conquer them." The police investigators, with their possibly prim and formal rules of evidence, thought the clippings, and the dagger, and the books, and the passport number (which the General had been delinquent in submitting to the Green/*Stasi* inquiry), to be quite irrelevant. Perhaps they were. □

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Turkish Journey

Herb Greer

FOR THE WESTERNER in Trabzon the problem is orientation. This ancient Black Sea port, where Xenophon rested after the Anabasis, has nothing classical about it now. Except for the Turkish and Russian signs, you might be in a flyblown French provincial town. And where are the Asiatic Turks? So many passers-by have blond or red hair and blue eyes, with features that are more European than Levantine. You are in an Islamic country and yet you are not. The local mosques are obscured, indeed all but buried, in the profusion of tacky new breeze-block construction. These unfaced red boxes even scar the inland villages, up among the peaks and valleys.

Only a few tourists gather outside the Hotel Usta but they have not come to see Trabzon; buses will take them up into rocky foothills behind the coast where the ruined Byzantine monastery of Sumela clings to a cliffside in the mist. As for the port itself, there is a boom-town air about the place, currents of bustle and dust. People hurry along, preoccupied, mostly ignoring the thin scattering of foreigners.

Meydan Square in the center of town is a concrete expanse with trees, the usual cafe, and a statue of Atatürk. Here the locals relax, do business, and make assignations with the prostitutes who have come down route 20 from Georgia to make money on the fringe of the Western world. Recently *Time* magazine featured these women in a report on international sex; they are called *Natasha Yatasha*, from the Turkish *yatak*, which means bed. (Every Turk I speak to in Trabzon seems to know about this Western spurt of notoriety. Most are sarcastic about it.)

"The real story for you," says my new acquaintance Serdar Bey, a jeweler, "should be the Rus Bazaar." This is a market on Trabzon's waterfront where dirty, desperate travelers from beyond what used to be the Iron Curtain come with loads of junk, fake booze and toiletries, tools, cameras, textiles, or stolen hospital and school supplies, hoping to make a profit that will keep body and soul together in the political and economic chaos beyond the frontier. The Georgian mafia preys on these travelers and then comes west to spend its protection money on Western goods and women in Trabzon.

Serdar Bey is not fully occupied with the gold and silver trade. With the Turkish economy in trouble and inflation high, investors prefer to speculate in building; hence all those ticky tacky boxes. This means bricks and mortar, brought in cheaply across the Black Sea from Sochi, where Serdar Bey keeps an office and a villa. I ask him about the drug trade and he waves the question away. "That's further South, on the border with Iran," he says. "The PKK controls it." He means the Marxist Kurdish Workers' Party, which likes to kidnap tourists and has just massacred more than thirty Turkish civilians in the streets of Van in Southeast Turkey.

There is the other question of fundamentalist influence in Turkey. Serdar Bey shakes his head. "It is true," he says, "that they have managed, more or less, to unite the

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Shiites with the Sunni in Turkey. That is only possible because religion is not as important in Turkey as it is to Iranians and Arabs. Turkey is not the Ottoman Empire. Turkey is a nation now, a secular nation. Atatürk took us away from Islam. Do the journalists know that in the West? Do they care?"

Erzerum has the same breeze-block buildings and a bright new hotel rising up amongst the tacky provincial streets. But in the back alleys old Ottoman houses stand sagging among the ruins of others, and Islam is on view in the *Tchifte Minareli Medrese*, the twin minaret Muslim seminary. This is a stunning thirteenth-century Seljuk building in brick and blue tile, beside the *Ulu Djamii*, the twelfth-century Great Mosque. To be honest though, we are more interested in the *rüstem pasha* market and its galleries of *dükkanlar* selling hand-sized strings of black *oltutashı* prayer beads. In one of these tiny shops we encounter a stray group of starving and unshaven Georgian refugees who are trying to sell an old Russian velvet and solid silver belt for dollars. They bargain feverishly with my wife, and we get it for a good price. As the last call to prayer sounds we return to our lodging. At five the next morning we are awakened suddenly by the accumulated braying of muezzins all over Erzerum. Perhaps Eastern Turkey is not quite as secular as Serdar Bey insisted.

The road to Sivas is dusty and hot, rolling through dry but magnificent quasi-Biblical scenery, like the background of a Holman Hunt painting. The company around us on the big Mercedes bus is convivial. A jolly, heavy-set clerk and a doctor just behind us have heard me compliment a village woman across the aisle on her beautiful child—a little boy, dark, shy. They are surprised at my Turkish and eagerly strike up a conversation. (This happens everywhere we go: a Turkish-speaking *yabandji*—foreigner—and especially an American, is a pleasant curiosity for Turks.) The doctor, who knows a bit of English, asks to see our guide-book. For several minutes he and the clerk joke about mistakes in the text, and they make recommendations, mostly focused on Southeast Turkey where we do not intend to go because of the PKK.

The woman with the child across the aisle is striking: a Byzantine face the color of polished oak, with bright intelligent gray eyes. She is, my wife whispers, clearly dying to chat. I offer her child some of the black cherries we bought in Erzerum, and make small talk. Her husband is waiting with their other two boys at a village up ahead. The conversation lasts until she looks out the window and begins to wrap herself in a black yashmak. Isn't that hot? I ask. Yes, she says, but it has to be worn because of the men. In the towns like Erzerum and Trabzon things are more *atchık* (open), but not out here. We shake hands in farewell. Her fingers are like a laborer's, brown and leathery.

Sivas is noisy and dusty, provincial-urban and vaguely worrying. A couple of weeks ago Islamic fundamentalists here burned down one of the hotels on our tourist list and killed several people in a demonstration over Salman Rushdie. But they were arrested and now the town seems calm. We stroll to view a Seljuk ruin and back to a garden cafe in the town center for a cool glass of delicious, tart morello cherry juice. The next morning we board another huge Mercedes rolling palace, taking the road across the high plateau to Kayseri. Bus travel is agreeable in Turkey. A steward patrols the aisle with a bottle of lemon cologne; you rub it on your hands and face: very refreshing in the heat. The landscape outside is rolling, golden, blasted with the sun.

In Kayseri a pleasant young Turk with a badly smashed nose picks us up, shows us through a local mosque, and steers us to his uncle's carpet shop. The uncle is chatty, and we talk politics, especially about the West and America. He repeats something I have heard several times: the Turks do not trust the Americans. We have, he says, used Turkey as it suits us, and look down on the

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Turks as primitive, Asian, brutal. This is bad enough in a strong country, but America looks weak now. Europe is telling Clinton what to do in the Balkans, and that means do nothing, and he accepts it. He leaves the Moslems to be killed like dogs. A weak man! Who will respect a weak man? But Ahmet Bey is less interested in politics than in selling us a carpet. And indeed the quality of his stock is tempting. We are careful because we have to carry what we buy. But four small *djedjim*, light embroidered rugs, make a good portable bundle.

Leaving Kayseri in late afternoon, two and a half hours later we disembark at Ürgüp, and find a small hotel. This used to be Greek country, Kappadokia, and the local temper is different: more gentle, brighter, and well organized for tourism. Several of the young Turkish guides speak fluent Japanese. Kappadokia was a great center of Byzantine civilization, and the site of one of the surviving wonders of the ancient world —the vast underground cities. We join a tour of one of these, and are stunned: it *is* literally a city, a complex of rooms, halls, chapels, dwellings, schools, chambers for making wine, all engineered with cross-ventilation from the surface so that cooking fires could be used underground. We are ten floors down, and there are another eight below us. All this was dug out with simple hand tools, and no one knows how it was engineered. Such marvels are scattered all over Kappadokia, refuges for whole villages in troubled times.

If Ürgüp is pleasant, Konya is not. This old Seljuk capital is the fundamentalist heart of Turkey, a shrine for Dervishes, and you can feel hostility in the air. For the first time we are insulted by teenagers in the street. But one friendly boy takes us to visit the Mevlana Museum, where the power and dignity of Islam at its height can be seen in the gold and velvet-shrouded Seljuk tombs of Rumi, founder of the Dervish sect, and his followers; we are astonished at a room of beautifully illuminated Korans and other texts, and a huge glass-cased string of ninety-nine prayer-beads as big as eggs. The Dervishes were almost but not quite suppressed by Atatürk, and this museum is very impressive; but Konya is not an ideal resort for foreigners. In a mosque not far away from the museum I speak to a Mullah who is watching us with narrow eyes. "*Salaam aleikum, Amdjah!*" (Peace be upon you, Uncle!) He starts, roars with laughter, and regards me keenly. "*Ingiliz*?" I say yes. He nods, but his smile is not friendly and we do not stay.

AS OUR VACATION approaches its end, we follow the coast south of Troy up to Ayvalık, a pretty little town where old friends have invited us for our last week. About twenty minutes out of town, they have a summer-house near the beach.

Our hosts, a Turkish professor and his wife, who teaches English, have studied in Britain and worked in America. Their young daughter with her American English might have stepped out of a middle Western junior high school. On the beach, at dinner in the evening, on the terrace over a beer, we discuss our Turkish journey. Our friends too are disgusted with Clinton and Europe and the Balkans. But they do not ascribe the inaction to weakness. The brother-in-law reckons that neither Americans nor Europeans waste much thought or sympathy or aid on Turkey, and naturally thinks that this is a mistake. Fundamentalists mean to take advantage of Turkey's economic problems, with wild promises; Western indifference makes those promises more attractive. The fundamentalists are now damning Atatürk's anti-Islamic reforms as the work of Satan, and intend to force Turkey back into the world of Middle Eastern Islam if they can. "Surely," I argue, "they can't, not after all this time?" Will the Turks find another secular leader like Atatürk, maybe from the Army, to get through today's troubles? The brother-in-law shakes his head. "No. Whatever the West thinks, we want a demo-

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cratic country. We need a team, not a leader."

We move on to talk of lighter and happier things, but pessimism returns when the conversation again touches on America and the Balkans. "Turkey and Israel have been allies of the Americans. That means strong American influence in this region which the Europeans, especially France and Germany, want to remove. And Mr. Clinton is helping them with his flabby leadership. The Americans don't care about Turkey since the end of the Cold War. We provide a convenience now and then, like the base at Incirlik." Then, with some irritation, "We are not treated like a modern country but like some remnant of the Ottoman Empire." Everything now, my friend believes, depends on the economy. "We need trade, we need to be closer to Europe. But they do not want to be closer to us, not until the Americans are gone and the Europeans can do what they like here."

"If the fundamentalists won" he goes on, "there would be nothing here for us, or for America or for Europe either. I would take my family and come to the West. For seventy years, Turkey has been looking to the West...In the 'fifties, you know, we worshiped America. That has changed now. We don't quite trust you. The Cold War is over, and other things are changing. Many things." □

Fields of Dreams

Mario Vargas Llosa

A MOBILIZATION OF intellectual, business, and political figures, with socialists, communists, fascists, Gaullists, and democrats marching side by side, is taking place these days in France. Their demand is that cultural products, especially cinema and television products, be excluded from the GATT agreements. Because if markets are opened indiscriminately in these fields, the mighty audiovisual industry of the United States will crush its European rivals, dealing a "mortal blow" to "French culture."

Writers sign manifestos, cinema directors appear on TV, alerting public opinion to the danger that the pestilential vulgarity of "canned" Yankee programming will flood the screens of their homes, smothering the creativity of native artists, heirs to one of humanity's richest cultural traditions. Actors and actresses come out on the street to defend their jobs, and also the language, the sensibility, imagination, and arts of France, under threat of invasion by the dinosaurs of Jurassic Park.

The central argument of these adversaries of the total opening of markets is that "culture" is a matter apart, and that products of the artistic spirit and fantasy of a nation cannot be put in the same bag with washbasins, computers, automobiles, and other manufactured products. Unlike these other wares, artistic and cultural creations must be protected, shielded against a competition in which they might disappear, thus depriving the nation that created them of its tradition, its idiosyncrasy, its spiritual identity. The nation that produced Ronsard and Molière, Proust, and Baudelaire, cannot permit its young people's future audiovisual diet to consist of Dallas, Robocop, and similar trash.

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How to prevent the consummation of this catastrophe, which some impassioned voices do not hesitate to compare to the medieval destruction of Latin civilization by the savagery of the Germanic tribes? With protectionist barriers, of course. Such barriers would set limits on the importation of American audiovisual products. Also, there would be minimum quotas for the showing of French works in the cinema distribution networks and TV channels. There are various points of view as to how far these prohibitions and impositions should extend: but no doubt a majority of the GATT opponents consider that to leave unsheltered more than about 50 percent of the cultural audiovisual market would be a treason against France. The honor of the nation and the survival of its culture require that, at the very least, half of the films the French see in the cinemas and half the programming they watch on the box be produced in France.

The first question is whether, to fulfill this last condition, such programs or films, produced in France, must also be conceived and directed by persons of authentic Frenchness? Suppose the Yankee capitalists, with their total lack of scruples and spurred on by their insatiable, predatory greed, were to find a way around the protectionist barriers? What would stop them setting up companies in France and starting to grind out their audiovisual dog food there, under cover of a few native Frenchmen as figureheads, of course...? *Alors*...would there then have to be strict quotas of Frenchmen (third, fourth, fifth generation Frenchmen?) among the scriptwriters, technicians, actors, directors and cameramen who participate in the creation of each audiovisual product, to guarantee its French origin?

My second question is this: who is going to assume the heavy responsibility of determining what is authentically French, and what is spurious or adulterated, among these cultural products, whose purity is the bulwark and spiritual safeguard of the nation? Civil servants in the ministry of culture? The minister of culture, in person? An academy of artists, writers, scientists, and businessmen, universally recognized as prototypical exponents of the spiritual essence of France?

If so, these exponents of Frenchness are going to have their work cut out for them. To start with, will their mission be to sniff out manifestations of Yankee subcultural barbarism only, or will the taboo extend to everything foreign, without exception? It is true that many of the moving spirits behind the present campaign profess they are defending, not just France, but all the other cultures of Europe. Does this mean that French cultural purity will be less threatened if it has merely to face the commercial onslaught of, say, Italian spaghetti-westerns, German porno-musicals, or Venezuelan soap-operas? To be consistent, they have no choice but to reject these things, to abhor as mortal poison everything that proceeds from other languages and cultures, everything that is not an embodiment and manifestation of "Frenchness."

At this point, even greater difficulties begin to arise. For, when we propose to define "Frenchness," there are many theories as to what this is. Numerous Frenchmen, for example, entertain a somewhat restricted and, to tell the truth, racist view of the matter, and do not admit that a Jew, an Arab, an African, a Muslim can be representative of "Frenchness" in any way whatsoever, although such persons may have been born in France, lived there all their lives, and speak and write the tongue of Descartes to perfection.

We could go on ad infinitum, spelling out laboriously what is obvious: to define "Frenchness" is inevitably an absurd undertaking. It can be performed only by means of a reduction which mutilates and denatures the very idea of culture, twisting it in the direction of caricature. Even more

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serious is the way the nationalist criterion generates a lunatic distortion in the grid of aesthetic values, in the critical judgment. If the "Frenchness" of any cultural product is, ipso facto, a value to be counted in judging it vis-à-vis a foreign product, what are we to conclude? That the abundant banality and rubbish which the French cinema and television industries also produce exercises a less dulling effect on the viewers' sensibilities, than do imported products?

The truth is that those who have come out waving French banners and speaking of Patriotism, Culture, and Art in this movement are, whether they know it or not, defending a vested interest: the interest of a group of audiovisual impresarios who are shivering in panic at the idea of the French market being totally open to competition. First, like all businessmen in the world, they preach free trade for others while aspiring to a captive market for themselves. Second, they consider it unjust that the powerful American audiovisual industry should find the door to the French market even halfway open, while it holds the door to the American market open only a tiny crack. To the first of these aspirations they have no right at all, because what they are demanding is an inadmissible privilege, a sinecure, a guaranteed income. In the second question, however, they are completely in the right, and deserve the most energetic support.

But for the cinema and television producers of France, the real question is not how to encyst themselves in an impregnable shell of protectionism, but rather how to go out and conquer other publics, and in particular, how to reach the vast American public. Why can the films that come from France not do what French wines and cheeses, or clothes or automobiles, or helicopters, or a considerable list of other French products have done—that is, penetrate the American market? Once the audiovisual market, thanks to the GATT accords, becomes open to international competition, the conquest of that market will depend only on the audacity and inventiveness of French producers. And to accomplish this they enjoy, indeed, a comparative advantage of the first order; they are the exponents of an exceedingly rich and diverse culture whose central characteristic is that it is not provincial but universal—that is, it is accessible to persons of other languages and traditions.

When their mouths are not full of patriotic rhetoric, these producers tend to bring out the sentimental and ethical argument of Little Jack in unequal fight against the Giant. How can they, with their feeble budgets, compete against the behemoths of Hollywood, who keep their own distribution circuits stonewall shut against anything not produced in America? Well, they could set up their own circuits there, in co-operation with Italian, German, and other producers, allowing European films to reach viewers in America, and fight for a share of the market. This, we may mention, is the supposed *raison d'être* for an economically united Europe: to allow the Little Jacks a fighting chance against the massive corporations that exist in other parts of the world.

But perhaps the most absurd aspect of the campaign in France in favor of "the cultural exception" is that its adherents do not seem to have noticed that what they fear is already an irreversible reality. I mean, the denationalization of the audiovisual industry, as much in France as in America. What is the extent of French capital invested in the production, direction, and marketing of cinema, video, and television outside France, and particularly in America? Certainly, enormous sums; which, owing to the globalization of the financial and business market, would be as difficult to detect as would the amount of capital of American origin now functioning in the audiovisual industry of France.

Thus, it is not impossible that this

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most notable campaign, starring Gérard Depardieu with a cast of thousands, might well have been designed by publicists in Manhattan, in the pay of investors in Chicago, owners of "French" films ready to take a juicy bite of the captive market that protectionism would guarantee them. They might even now be preparing some Americanoid rubbish of a suitable nature, a travesty of Villon or the Princesse de Clèves...something with a patent of French culture, to inflict on the captive viewers of Gaul. The internationalization of the world economy is an unstoppable process; to hold out against it, in a modern, advanced country, is a chimerical proposition. Only primitive, backward societies can withhold or withdraw themselves from it, at the price of remaining in their present state forever.

Artistic products are also merchandise—be they books, pictures, symphonies, or films—and there is no reason whatsoever to think that they are thereby impoverished or degraded. Their commercial value, it is true, rarely coincides with their artistic value, and this is a problem. In an ideal, an optimum state, these values would approach each other, and when people went to buy a book or a picture, or went to the cinema or turned on the TV, they would always choose the best. This is not the way things happen, not in America, nor in France; it is a deficiency that can only be corrected (if indeed it is possible or even desirable to correct it) by education and culture. But this is a cultural problem, not an economic or industrial one. Enlightened despotism—censorship, prohibition, monopoly, the prerogative of certain bureaucrats or politicians or academics to decide for themselves what it is that others must read or hear or see—does not resolve the problem, but aggravates it.

For there is nothing that corrupts, vitiates, mediocratizes creative work as much as state parasitism does. There is abundant proof of this in the audiovisual field. If not, then what about the staggering volume of films produced at immense cost by states bent on defending their "natural culture"? Not one in a thousand of such films is remembered today, or salvageable from the rubbish dump of oblivion on account of its artistic value.

I doubt that there is any "foreigner" who has greater respect and devotion to French culture than I have. I learned a great deal reading what they wrote, hearing what they composed, seeing what they painted or built; yes, I owe a lot to the French. And the most admirable lesson I received is that culture does not need to be protected by bureaucrats or police, nor confined behind bars, nor isolated by customs barriers, in order to remain alive and vigorous.

Because these things tend rather to folklorize them and fade them. They need to live in the open, exposed to continuous comparison with differing cultures, thanks to which they are renewed and enriched, and can evolve and adapt themselves to the continuous flow of life. It is not the dinosaurs of Jurassic Park that threaten the cultural honor of the land that produced Flaubert and Lumière, Debussy and Cézanne, Rodin and Marcel Carné, but rather the band of petty demagogues and chauvinists who speak of French culture as if it were a mummy that cannot be brought out of its sealed chamber, because the open air would cause it to disintegrate. □

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An Idea of Britain

Jeane J. Kirkpatrick

Margaret Thatcher, *The Downing Street Years* (New York: HarperCollins, 1993), 914 pp., $30.00.

MARGARET THATCHER'S memoir, *The Downing Street Years*, is an absorbing account which faithfully reflects its author and subject. Its style is her style: lucid, decisive, self-confident, and engaging. Its story is her story: what she intended and planned, what she did, whom she appointed and fired, how she was finally brought down as leader of the Conservative Party and Prime Minister of Great Britain.

We knew already that Margaret Thatcher was no Hamlet endlessly pondering difficult decisions, no Coriolanus too proud to state her case. From this memoir we learn just how confident she is in her understanding of Britain's problems and her ability to find solutions. She knows her strengths.

Of then-president George Bush, she writes that he was decent, honest, courageous and patriotic, but he

> never had to think through his beliefs and fight for them when they were hopelessly unfashionable as Ronald Reagan and I had to do. This meant that much of his time was now taken up with reaching for answers to problems which to me came quite spontaneously because they sprang from my basic conviction.

Like most of the very small company of political leaders who actually change their time and place, Margaret Thatcher had a unifying vision of what Britain could be and should be. That vision *was* unfashionable, out of step with dominant opinion. But her vision of a more bold, successful, entrepreneurial, free Great Britain guided Thatcher as she guided Britain for over eleven years, much as Charles de Gaulle's "idea" of France guided him through decades of effort to create the stronger, more united, more effective, more independent France that already existed in his mind. Like de Gaulle and her great predecessor, Winston Churchill, Thatcher sought not only to revive Britain, but to strengthen and reinvigorate the British. Like de Gaulle, Thatcher felt herself destined to accomplish this task.

Recalling the claim of Chatham, an eighteenth century predecessor, "I know that I can save this country and that no one else can," Thatcher says of her state of mind on becoming prime minister, "It would have been presumptuous of me to have compared myself to Chatham. But if I am honest, I must admit that my exhilaration came from a similar inner conviction." Grandiose? Self-important? Merely correct? The fact is that with purpose and power Margaret Thatcher, a most unlikely candidate for prime minister, proved the most effective incumbent of that office after Churchill, and established herself as one of the all time greats among Britain's prime ministers.

She promises us a second volume on the first fifty years of her life. It will presumably tell us more about how and when she came to care so much about public issues, how she came to run for office, and

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how she dealt with the psychological, social and political obstacles that have blocked the rise of other women in democratic politics. Presumably the next volume will tell us how she acquired the necessary political skills during her twenty years in the House of Commons before she burst onto the global scene as Prime Minister. For now we must accept her assurances that, though unconventional for a Conservative prime minister, her background had fitted her "curiously well" to lead Britain out of stagnation and decline.

From Consensus to Conviction

THOUGH SHE called herself a Conservative, and was leader of the Conservative Party, Thatcher was committed to sweeping, decisive change in the goals and the methods of British government. Between 1947 and 1979 Labour and Conservative governments agreed on the fundamentals of the welfare state: government should ensure a decent standard of living to all, including a job with livable wages, adequate housing, medical care, education through the university level, pensions for the elderly and the disabled. To provide these entitlements, government, it was believed, should play a central role in planning and managing the economy, in harmonizing relations among interest groups, and generally deciding who should get what. Competition between the Labour and Conservative parties took place within this broad consensus on the role of government in a managed economy. Conservatives advocated somewhat less government, somewhat lower taxes and a somewhat larger "private sector." Labour, favoring economic and social equality, advocated higher taxes, more nationalization, and further reduction of inequalities.

Differences between the parties stayed within the bounds of consensus on the social welfare state. As one analyst observed, policy differences between Tories and Labour in those years were not a case of Karl Marx versus Adam Smith, but of Beverage versus Keynes. The result was an ever larger state, a progressively stagnant economy, and a continuing deterioration in Britain's capacity to compete. Slowly a culture of dependence had developed and spread.

Margaret Thatcher did not create the critique of socialist Britain, or invent the case for restoring individualism and markets, but she recognized the symptoms of the "English Disease" and she understood that to try "to cure the British disease with socialism was like trying to cure leukemia with leeches."

By the time she became Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher had become convinced that collectivism, with its "centralizing, managerial bureaucratic, interventionist style of government" must be rejected, reversed and replaced with a policy of privatization, de-regulation, de-centralization and supply-side economics. She tells us that she was not the first Conservative Prime Minister to arrive at 10 Downing Street speaking of free markets, free enterprise, and lower taxes. She believes she was the first to actually target the policies against which the party campaigned. Thatcherism fractured the cozy consensus and challenged the essential premises and policies of socialist, corporatist Britain. She led a peaceful revolution.

Thatcher brought to this task a powerful sense of mission. The "inner conviction" that she was uniquely endowed to solve a nation's problems provided the confidence needed to contradict conventional approaches. It is moreover characteristic of the person and the memoir that she is willing to share with the reader her confidence in her ability to carry out the needed revolution. Her candor gives this memoir its authenticity, its conviction and its drama.

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The Downing Street Years is an account of Thatcher's efforts to dismantle Socialist Britain, end economic decline, restore British morale and preserve the British nation from all dangers—including the European Union. Although bits of information are provided concerning her clothes, family, and feelings about strictly personal matters, they are fundamentally extraneous asides. Since Thatcher is a thoroughly going political person, her thoughts and feelings mainly concern her political plans and actions. Other persons—Geoffrey Howe, Nigel Lawson, John Major, François Mitterrand and the like—enter the account as they figure in the political story line which invariably concerns her efforts to achieve a public goal.

In his own bitter review of this memoir, Geoffrey Howe comments that "For Margaret Thatcher in the final years there was no distinction to be drawn between person, government, party and nation." The memoir seems to me to bear this out, but its way of doing so suggests not that Thatcher's ego had grown to encompass the nation, but that her identification with the nation was so great it had obliterated the person—and also other persons, except as allies or obstacles to the pursuit of the goal at hand.

I suspect this fusion of the personal and the public purpose is typical not of politicians, but of authentic political leaders, and explains why such leaders so often disappoint their collaborators. The leader's overriding focus is on the public purpose. In the process to pursuing it, a leader typically subordinates personal loyalties to collective goals, disappointing old friends, acquiring new collaborators. Thatcher's repeated shuffling of colleagues without regard to their preferences or egos calls to mind Charles de Gaulle's habit of dumping loyal prime ministers.

However common such behavior may be in political leaders, it can become a fatal flaw when the leader is dependent on the continuing support of colleagues—as in the British system. Thatcher tells us that in the end "what grieved me most was the desertion of those I had always considered friends and allies..." She had been too preoccupied with the pursuit of public goals to notice the extent to which friendships and alliances had soured, and grown fewer. The price for careless treatment of colleagues was political downfall. It was dramatically appropriate that Geoffrey Howe, one of her closest associates, who had been most carelessly treated, should have played the crucial role in bringing her down.

Here, too, convictions probably played a greater role than personal pique and wounded ego. Britain's relationship with Europe was very important to Thatcher's problems with Howe, with Nigel Lawson and with a crucial number of backbenchers who withheld their timely support when she needed it most.

It is not difficult to account for her careless unconcern about her power base. No sitting prime minister had ever been brought down by his party. At the heart of the revolt against Margaret Thatcher was a momentous public issue: Britain's relations with Europe.

An Idea of Europe

THIS MEMOIR puts "Europe" in the context of Thatcher's broader program and, I believe, explains how this issue became so central for Margaret Thatcher that she was ready to oppose the dominant opinion of virtually all of Western Europe, and also of the leadership of the Conservative Party.

Her goal, as I have said, was to restore the vitality of Great Britain. That fundamental purpose, stated with special clarity in her speech on the "spirit of the Falklands," explains far more than what still seems to me an anachronistic war:

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> We have ceased to be a nation in retreat. We have instead a newfound confidence—born in the economic battles at home and tested and found true 8000 miles away...We rejoice that Britain has rekindled the spirit which has fired her for generations...Britain found herself again in the South Atlantic and will not look back from the victory she has won.

Margaret Thatcher's "idea" of Britain turns out to be remarkably similar to Charles de Gaulle's "idea" of France. What Thatcher sought for Britain was what Machiavelli called *virtú*. It is to nations what life force is to persons. She opposed British socialism because it did not work and moreover weakened Britain, sapped its vitality, and levelled its potential heroes.

This purpose—more fundamental than her economic program—links Thatcher to other great leaders of her party and country, and guaranteed her hostility to the Europe of Jacques Delors and the Maastricht Treaty, which in her view proposed to emulsify the identities and traditions of Europe's peoples. The Europe of Delors she emphasized is not to be confused with de Gaulle's *Europe des patries* or with a common market. "I am enthusiastically pro-European," Thatcher declared in a long, thoughtful interview in *Paris Match*. "But for me, European civilization existed long before the signing of the Treaty of Rome and the founding of the European Community."

On the question of Europe's future, Thatcher's most deeply held concerns and convictions about economic and foreign policies merge. She has two criticisms of the EC as foreseen in Brussels: First, it excludes too much of Europe. Europe is larger than the Community. "It includes Warsaw, Prague, Budapest, Moscow." And: "In this Europe I include the Europe of the other side of the Atlantic, which is the United States." Second, the Europe of Brussels would be *dirigiste*, socialist. It reminded her of the long struggle against socialism in Britain. It raised for her the danger that socialism would return by the back door. "We did not lead this victorious struggle in favor of freedom only to be ruined by a new bureaucratic Socialism," she quotes herself from Bruges. "Under Socialism, while the state grows richer, the people grow poorer in their living standards and in their liberties." "It is not governments which create wealth. They never have. Under a statist, Socialist system people work as little as possible. That is what happened in the Soviet Union. It is why I will resist with all my strength the arrival of socialism in Europe—with its soft words and hard realities."

As plans for greater integration of Europe developed, Thatcher's reservations turned to outright opposition: "I was opposed root and branch to the whole approach of the Delors report," she wrote. The concept of a "social market," a corporatist, highly collectivized consensus-based system was utterly repugnant. Submitting Britain's currency to a European Monetary System and losing control was anathema. This is how Thatcher felt; but Geoffrey Howe, she tells us, "laboured with an almost romantic longing for Britain to become part of some grandiose European consensus." A "misty Europeanism" became Howe's "touchstone" in foreign affairs. Europe became a "cause to guide him." It was one on "which the two of us were far apart."

In Thatcher's relations with Nigel Lawson as well, Europe played a crucial role. Lawson, she says, then the Chancellor of the Exchequer, had a "passionate" desire to take the British pound into the European Monetary System; Howe and Lawson were thus allied in what Thatcher believed to be an ill-conceived scheme, that was, moreover, doomed to fail.

"The belief that the laws of economics and the judgements of the markets can be suspended by clever people is a perpetual temptation to folly," she notes.

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We can readily see why she ardently opposed EC control of British monetary, social, and economic policy. It is not so easy to see how it happened that Thatcher found herself with so many "Europeans" in her cabinet, and so few loyalists on whom she could count when challenged. But, of course, she had not taken this issue much into account in appointing the Cabinet.

Differences on Europe spread, exacerbating other irritations. Howe, Thatcher reports, had "developed an insatiable appetite for compromise." Thatcher, Howe charges, declined even to discuss issues with her principal ministers, and so it went until the end.

It should not surprise us that these relationships which were based on shared convictions would unravel as the issues changed. There was little chance that personal relations could survive substantive differences with this conviction politician.

The successes of the Thatcher government had diminished the salience of the issues that brought her to power: The "malign, if unspoken, compact between state-ownership and monopoly trade unionism" (Howe's words) had been broken. Privatization and decentralization had diminished the state. Decreased taxes and de-regulation were underway. Paralyzing burdens on investment and entrepreneurship had been lifted, inflation was under control. The British economy was growing. The British political class was free to think about other possibilities. Once that happened, the consensus vital to the acceptance of this remarkable woman by her male colleagues evaporated and left her no adequate base on which to stand. And so Thatcher went as she came, on the most important issue confronting Britain.

It is a Shakespearian tale of such richness it cannot be described without being oversimplified. That Margaret Thatcher was willing to tell it with such candor puts us once more in her debt.

I HAVE NEARLY completed these comments—without even a mention of Ronald Reagan. Obviously, the fact that these two pursued such similar goals strengthened the impact of both. Both came to power deeply concerned with the growing power of the state and the loss of control by persons over their lives. Ronald Reagan was already saying in 1964 what Thatcher might have said, "The government has laid its hand on health, housing, farming, industry, commerce, education, and to an ever-increasing degree, interferes with people's right to know. The truth is that outside its legitimate functions, government does nothing as well and as economically as the private sector of the economy." And he too believed in the vitality of free people.

Years before Ronald Reagan achieved national attention, he was telling audiences across the country that it is individuals who create wealth and growth, not governments, that raising taxes would encourage more government spending and less private investment, that it would slow economic growth, reduce production, destroy future jobs, making it more difficult for those without jobs to find them, taxes would more likely make those who now have jobs lose them. In 1981, he observed,

> The economic ills we suffer have come upon us over several decades. They will not go away in days, weeks, or months, but they will go away. They will go away because we as Americans have the capacity now, as we've had in the past, to do whatever needs to be done to preserve this last and greatest bastion of freedom. It is my intention to curb the size and influence of the federal [government].

Critics who insist that Thatcher and Reagan had no new ideas are in a sense correct. Their ideas were not original. Aristotle had proposed them, and Adam Smith, and James Madison. But both

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understood the relations of old ideas to new leadership. "The presidency is preeminently a place of moral leadership," said Franklin Roosevelt. "All our great presidents were leaders at times when certain historic ideas in the life of the nation had to be clarified. This is what the office is, a superb opportunity for reapplying and applying in new conditions the simple rules of human conduct to which we always go back."

Not all the simple rules are equally important. But the ideas that guided Thatcher and Reagan—two very different conviction politicians—were basic to the experience and identity of both Britain and America. That is what accounted for the unusual success of each. □

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1849—The Morning After

Norman Stone

David Remnick, *Lenin's Tomb: The Last Days of the Soviet Empire* (New York: Random House, 1993), 575 pp., $25.00.

John B. Dunlop, *The Rise of Russia and the Fall of the Soviet Empire* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), 360 pp., $29.95.

Anatol Lieven, *The Baltic Revolution: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and the Path to Independence* (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1993), 454 pp., $30.95.

Andrew Nagorski, *The Birth of Freedom: Shaping Lives and Societies in the New Eastern Europe* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1993), 319 pp., $23.00.

SOME TIME IN early 1988, Zbigniew Brzezinski came to London and lectured on "the spring-time of peoples." On the evidence of pamphlets and "feel," he said that communism would soon be over. There would be rebellion everywhere, and the nations would claim freedom. By his title, "Spring-time of Peoples," he was evoking 1848. In that year, the buds leafed in February, there was a revolt in Paris, and revolt followed, nearly everywhere else in Central Europe, within weeks. The old men of the old order slunk away, and for a time there was a carnival atmosphere.

Sovietskaya Estonia, for November 18, 1988, proclaimed "The Estonian people on the shores of the Baltic Sea has been cultivating the land and developing its own culture for more than five thousand years." The Estonian declaration of sovereignty, a fantastic-seeming piece of impudence was the start of a chain reaction that brought down the Soviet Union. Within a year, the Wall was down, and the world got an extra Christmas present, with the fall of Ceausescu. Then came the end of totalitarianism in the Soviet Union itself. Tiny Estonia became formally independent, and so too did Russia, under Yeltsin. Brzezinski proved quite right.

But the trouble with 1848 is that it led

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nowhere. The spring-time of peoples turned out to be a collection of buds that withered before they could ripen. The old order had kept the levers of power, the church, and the army. The new order fell apart. Nations, proudly declared, went for each other's throats. Urban riots developed as market economies went wrong: by June, even a stalwart radical such as Victor Hugo, seeing the rebellious proletarians, could say that "you must shoot them down, while respecting them." Worst of all, the peasants backed up the old order. They had been emancipated by the revolutionaries, but, with property or the chance of it, they lost interest in revolution. Garibaldi later complained that he could get help from every class of Italian in his fight with the Papacy and the Austrian Empire, except for the peasants. So the old order came back. But it was an old order that had been forced to learn, and was now intelligent, energetic, adaptable. Prince Felix zu Schwarzenberg, appealed to for clemency in victory, agreed, but insisted, "First a little hanging." The revolutionaries had made silly mistakes, and deserved all the contempt that the serious writers of the epoch—Flaubert and Tocqueville—poured upon them. But in the end, it was the synthesis of revolution and reaction that was interesting. The administrative techniques and the economic practices of classical liberalism were adopted by re-energized *ancien regimes*, and this synthesis quite soon produced Bismarck and Cavour. And there is at least the suspicion that it is 1849, rather than 1848, that now applies as presiding spirit in post-communism. I should like to hear Dr. Brzezinski lecture, now, on 1849.

Here, however, are four *Quarantottesco* books, all Liberty on the Barricades, beards striking poses, *Étude revolutionnaire* throbbing away. With the exception of Anatol Lieven's book, which is vaguely elegiac, they are euphoric in tone. Of course this is entirely understandable: who could fail to cheer, in August 1991, as Uncle Ebenezer Kryutchkov was led off the stage in handcuffs, to hissing? Books on the Eastern European and Russian liberation thus have a goodies-and-baddies momentum, and make for a story with excellent characters; it is not surprising that every journalist worth his salt feels that he ought to write a book. Bliss it was to be alive, and to be CNN was heaven; but it was no bad thing either to be Messrs. Nagorski and Remnick.

Andrew Nagorski knew the old Soviet Union and wrote one of the very few good journalistic books about it—*Reluctant Farewell*, which contained a certain measure of old-fashioned Polish contempt for Russian brutality and sloth. Now, with *The Birth of Freedom*, he describes emancipated Eastern Europe, and he nods approvingly all the way. Civil society recovers, the free market works its miracles (they do seem miraculous in Poland, with her booming stock exchange), new democratic parties come into existence, and serious efforts are made to repair the ecological and other damages of the past. The book is quite valuable, in that it gives a blow-by-blow account of political life since 1989, and so deserves a shelf-life. However, there are times when I am tempted to conclude that Poles are best in misfortune, because, unlike *Reluctant Farewell*, this is rather a bland, smug book. It has come out too early. The very recent election, with its extraordinary neo-communist majority, makes you wonder about what is going to happen next, as does the refusal of NATO to take in Poles, Czechs, and Hungarians, or the refusal of the European Community to take up free trade with them. A lot is going to depend upon what happens in Russia.

Much the same applies with the Baltic states. Anatol Lieven—part of whose family is of Baltic-German-Russian origin (he does rather overdo the elegiac note in places)—has written a valuable book, summarizing much intractable information. It

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is rather self-indulgent and repetitive: all authors of first books ought to be made to write them in pen and ink, because in that way, proper chapter-shape and economy of detail would be observed, as they are not always by Lieven. However, his is *the* important book about a surprisingly important subject, and it is worth ploughing through the excess pages about "the frog monster" of Baltic folklore to get to the center of the subject.

The three Baltic peoples were "peoples without history"—the very name "Tallinn," for Estonia's capital, means "Danish Town." At least the Lithuanians could look back on a great past: their Grand Duchy, the last pagan state in Europe, ruled a huge tract of territory between Poland and Muscovy, though even then the language of court was Byelorussian, and Lithuanian remained mainly a peasant language. Unlike the Lithuanians, the other two peoples were firmly Protestant, slightly in the manner of "Main Street." Even the Lithuanians had once experienced the Reformation, and the main mover of their new independence, Vitautas Landsbergis, was originally a Protestant.

There were surviving Latvian Catholics, in an area called Lettgallen, next to Lithuania, and in 1900 they were, like Catholics in nearly all of the mixed communities of the world, poorer than the Protestants. Latvians got a bad name for supplying more than their due share of blood-thirsty Bolsheviks and for producing enthusiastic Nazi collaborators. Even now, it makes a very bad impression for Latvian soldiers to be wearing what look extremely like SS uniforms, and brandishing a swastika-like "Fire Cross," in evocation (as with the Nazis) of their Aryan, or Indo-Germanic, as distinct from Slavic, origin. The Russian minority in Latvia is more worried, and with better grounds, than is that in Estonia.

These peoples became independent after the Bolshevik Revolution. Malcolm Muggeridge, returning from his "Winter in Moscow" in 1931 (the title of one of the few *other* good journalistic books about the Soviet Union), stood up in the train and cheered like mad, along with the other passengers, when they finally left Soviet territory and entered Latvia, with its bright lights and decent station buffets; then he realized that the inhabitants of Riga were just pasty-faced bourgeois counting out their money. It was unfair, however, to dismiss them as a petty-bourgeois Munchkinland. With some political turbulence, these little countries did not do a bad job in pulling themselves up by their boot-straps. Estonians today reflect, ruefully, that in those days they were better off than the Finns. Then the Hitler-Stalin night descended.

One thing that is truly astonishing about the sequel is how history lived on. Communism was *about* abolishing the past, except as folklore: Marx hated "the idiocy of rural life," Trotsky hated "the Russia of icons and cockroaches," and Stalin hated everything, except perhaps Hitler. It comes as a vast surprise that, throughout Eastern Europe, the historical character of peoples comes alive again. Today, the Poles' constitution and politics, as Nagorski shows, provide for the sort of chaos that caused Lloyd George to remark in 1919 that giving them independence was like handing a clock to a monkey. The Hungarians are back to having, as in the old days, a governing party tempered by back-stabbing, and the Czechs are back to their old cabinet of officials, austerely applying the rule of law. The Baltic states are also very different in character, to the extent that, as in the 1920s and 1930s, they do not easily cooperate. The Estonians deserve endless plaudits, because, in a cunning small-time way, they made the best of an extremely difficult hand. They made themselves indispensable in Moscow, being too competent at essential modern

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activities to be dispensed with, while being too few in number to be a serious threat. They "Finlandized" themselves, and, like the Finns, they know exactly when to stop and start as regards independence. In November 1988, the pebble of their declaration of sovereignty launched the avalanche.

Then, in 1990, it was the Lithuanians, under Landsbergis, who managed the essential next step: a challenge to Soviet force. Here they were following their own history and the example of Polish-Lithuanian revolts in the past. In January 1991, as part of the run-up to the August putsch, Soviet troops went into Lithuania, were challenged at the television station and the parliament, and, under the glare of Western (and Russian) cameras, slunk away. The Latvians bided their time, divided between these two examples—again, a reflection of their history. There is less to be said about their role, and since independence they have been clumsier and more provocative towards the Russian minority than they should have been, as the SS uniforms and swastikas demonstrate. The Estonians are turning themselves into a little Finland; the Lithuanians—again a reflection of their past—have rather fallen apart, have elected one-time senior Communists to govern them, and, underneath nationalist rhetoric, seem close to re-attaching themselves to Russia in some form or other. For their part, the Russians are becoming Russian again. It is the old Russia once more, a country of Westernizers, Old Believers going up in smoke, rival boyars manipulating mobs. The return of the repressed in Russia is not very good for democracy.

THE TURN towards democracy was never going to be easy, but from John Dunlop's book—on a second reading it is the most serious of those on offer here—we can see just how difficult it is going to be. Dunlop, an academic who does not have Remnick's journalistic immediacy or pace, nevertheless looks from above on a twisting and turning that makes the formation of proper democratic parties impossible. However, he also sees—as Remnick does not—that Russian nationalism, the motor behind Yeltsin, really was about something, not just about liberation from the endless tiresome inconveniences (and sometimes worse) of Soviet life. Here, after all, was an empire in which the imperialists were much poorer than the colonies; you could plausibly say that it was the Russians themselves who suffered most. Yeltsin's adoption of Russian nationalism—the liberation of Russians from their millstone colonies—would give Russia the chance to become a normal country. But, in Dunlop's account, the old Russian Adam appears again: decentralize, and you get anarchy; centralize, and you get tyranny.

This happened also in the days of the czar's *Duma*. For a time, Nicholas II promoted universal suffrage, and then found that the parties themselves behaved in such a way as to make a universal-suffrage parliament unworkable. This was not a uniquely Russian experience—the same happened in Austria-Hungary and, to a large extent, in Germany. Reading Dunlop, and his catalog (rather *too* catalog-like) of democratic figures such as Nikolai Travkin, forming alliances with Garri Kasparov and Yuri Astanaviev, then falling out with them, is quite depressing. Besides, Dunlop foresees, at the end of his book, that the contest between Yeltsin and the (more or less) democratic parliament that had once supported him is quite serious. He cannot have been too surprised at what happened to the White House, under the guns of the revived KGB and cameras of CNN, this time operating in alliance.

LIKE LIEVEN'S study, David Remnick's book *Lenin's Tomb* appears too early. Remnick has been the

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best kind of journalist. He has lived in Moscow at a very fortunate time—Gorbachev's last years, the putsch, and the rise of Yeltsin within Russia. With the language and a knowledge of the history, you can get around, and Remnick has done so with energy. His is the kind of book that I could not put down, and as a day-to-day description of the "spring-time of Russia" I do not know a better. The story of the putsch, especially, comes across very well; you cheer along with the author as those tanks rumble off back down the *Leningradskoye Shosse* towards their barracks, with the soldiers and the people waving ecstatically to each other. However, Dunlop sees more than Remnick; he could sense that there would be a great clash in Moscow between Yeltsin and the very same parliament that had elected him in the first place, though his book ends some time before these dramatic events in the White House.

These, really, matter rather more than the putsch of August 1991, the high-point of Remnick's long book. About it, there always was an air of farce. Remnick describes it very well indeed, often with acid humor, but I rather suspect that the present crisis is rather more serious. Yanayev, Kryutchkov, and Co. were essentially "useful idiots"—the phrase that Lenin had once applied to the gaggle of pacifists, feminists, vegetarians, anti-smoking freaks, etc. whom the West produced, early on, as Bolshevik sympathizers. Yanayev and the putschists looked fearsomely Stalinist, and of course they could be used to terrify the West as an alternative to Gorbachev. They slipped control, maybe misunderstood what Gorbachev was trying to do, and staged a farce—tanks in Moscow stopping at the traffic-lights, for instance.

1848 was also a very good time for ecstatic journalists, watching people romantically expiring in push-over victories that led nowhere. (There *was* a journalist who looked upon it all with unblinking cynicism, who wrote for an early edition of the *New York Times*, and produced the best dismissive one-liners about it all; his name was Karl Marx.) The "spring-time of peoples" in Russia is turning rapidly into an 1849, with troops on the streets, censorship of the press, a massaged election in which the now-emancipated peasants will vote a revived old order. We have also seen parts of the old Soviet Union come back into line as part of a revived Russian system. Ukraine, not long ago, came to terms, entering the ruble zone, and abandoning claims to nuclear weaponry and ships; this will, quite possibly, mean the end of her independence altogether. The Central Asian republics are still dominated by Moscow—in Tajikistan, to the extent of several score thousand dead—and events in the Caucasus tell their own story, symbolized by the return of Aliev as boss of Azerbaidjan.

Remnick sees pop music as a liberating force. I doubt this: in *1984*, the proles were fobbed off with a version of it, as well as "Victory Gin," and it made them low-level hedonistic, stupid, and apolitical. When, as I suspect is now happening, the old order comes marching back in an updated, energized form, pop musicians will figure among its useful idiots. At the very moment of the bombardment of the Moscow parliament by Yeltsin's section of the Security Apparatus, Michael Jackson was in the Hotel Metropol. □

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Eastern Question, Western Answer

James Kurth

William Pfaff, *The Wrath of Nations: Civilization and the Fury of Nationalism* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1993), 256 pp., $21.50

WILLIAM PFAFF is an American who has lived for years in France, regularly writing for the *New Yorker* and the *International Herald Tribune* and periodically publishing books that provide perceptive and sophisticated interpretations of the large issues of the day in international affairs. His new book, *The Wrath of Nations*, is probably his best. It is also the one that most conveys the sensibility and understanding of a European.

Pfaff's observations on nationalism will seem original to many Americans, but conventional, almost commonplace, to Europeans. Likewise, his critiques of the American version of nationalism and of liberal internationalism will offend many Americans, but Europeans will find them sensible and realistic. Some Americans may think that they need not learn anything from a European perspective. After all, Europe has hardly been distinguished by its wisdom in international affairs in this century. But since the problem of nationalism is once again a European one, and the way Europeans think about it is once again an important reality, an American will be wiser after reading this book.

Pfaff presents a grand review of the vast variety of nations and nationalisms. His survey ranges from Europe to American to Asia to Africa. What he has to say about Asia and Africa is sound enough but also familiar and unremarkable. What he has to say about America is also sound but, since he views America from a European perspective, insightful and unconventional. But it has not been the recent events in Asia, Africa, and America that have caused political commentators like Pfaff to focus on "the wrath of nations." It has been the events in the continent where nations and nationalism were first invented and where they seem to be returning with a vengeance, Europe itself. It is in his account of Europe that Pfaff is most eloquent and most relevant.

Western and Eastern Nationalisms

PFAFF FOCUSES on a distinction—one which in the last three years has again become important and salient—between the nations and nationalisms of Western Europe and those of Eastern Europe (and also much of Central Europe). In the West, the state existed before the nation, and it brought the nation into being over the course of several centuries. This meant that the state combined several pre-national ethnic communities into one national society based upon some common denominator (and dominator). In the East, the nation existed before the state, and it brought the state into being largely in the course of one century, the nineteenth. This meant that the state was the creature of one newly-national ethnic community. The Western conception of nationality is civic—defined by legal status and citizenship conferred by

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the state. The Eastern conception of nationality is ethnic—defined by genealogical history and membership inherited at birth.

Since in the East the nation that created the state was a particular ethnic community, the state was created in the image of that ethnic group. Any state would fit very well the particular community which created it (as interwar Yugoslavia fit the Serbs and interwar Czechoslovakia fit the Czechs), but it would fit very imperfectly some other ethnic community that happened to be contained with the state (e.g. the Croats and the Slovenes in Yugoslavia and the Slovaks and the Germans in Czechoslovakia).

These Eastern conceptions of nations and nationalism did not just characterize the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in the region, however. They are present there even today. Indeed, they have reappeared with particular strength in the ruins of communist internationalism.

Pfaff knows and shows that nationalism has always been in tension with internationalism. His book is as much a review of the various—and now failed—internationalisms of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries as it is of the various—and now resurgent—nationalisms.

Two of these were what Pfaff calls Habsburg internationalism and Ottoman internationalism. Although the conflict between the Habsburgs and the Ottomans was the central reality of Central and Eastern Europe for almost five centuries, these two great multinational empires had much in common. Their long decline in the nineteenth century and their final collapse in the First World War brought into being more than a dozen new states to correspond to the multiplicity of nations that had recently developed within the empires and that had made them truly multinational.

Almost all of these new states claimed to be genuine nation-states, like those of Western Europe. In fact, almost all were as multinational as the empires that they replaced (most obviously, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and Iraq). Indeed, the only true nation-states to emerge from the ruins of the Habsburg and Ottoman empires were those of the once-dominant and central but now-defeated and truncated nations of the old empires—Austria, Hungary, and Turkey. By the cunning of history (as well as the hypocrisy of Woodrow Wilson), it turned out that the only true examples of self-determination were the victims of it, while the beneficiaries of self-determination were the violators of it.

Pfaff also presents a review of the two great internationalisms of the mid-twentieth century, communism and Nazism. His account of the temporary strengths and ultimate weaknesses of communism is sound and convincing but familiar and conventional, all the more so given the events since 1989. His account of Nazism is rather more controversial. National Socialism was actually neither nationalist or socialist, but rather was another great and terrible internationalism. Pfaff reminds us that for a brief-but-intense moment (say 1938-1943) Nazism captured the imagination of many young Europeans, who were tired of the petty politics of the weak states of their small nations and who were seeking a distinctively European (and un-Soviet and un-American) way to go beyond the nation-state.

Liberal Internationalism

IN HIS MOST sober and somber chapter, Pfaff presents an account of the dominant internationalism of our own half-century (the American half-century)—liberal internationalism. During the Cold War and probably because of it, liberal internationalism produced two great

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achievements. One was the European Community. The other was a broader "commonwealth of democratic states," composed of a series of functional international organizations, such as the United Nations, the World Bank, the IMF, the GATT, the OECD, NATO, and other institutions as well.

These international institutions were highly successful in meeting the challenges of the Cold War era. They have been disappointing failures, however, in meeting those of the post-Cold War era. The European Community in particular has failed to address the problems of the ex-communist and newly independent states of Eastern Europe.

The European Community, in Pfaff's view, is really a creation of Western Europe. It has become evident that it cannot deal with the problems of Eastern Europe or even of Central Europe. The Community's reluctance to open its markets to the cheap products of Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary (nations which are European by any definition) is in some ways the most revealing result of the narrow vision of the Western nations. But the Community's inability to bring an end to the Yugoslav civil war is clearly the most disastrous result of the failure of the Western institutions. Much of Pfaff's chapter on liberal internationalism is actually an elegy on the war in Yugoslavia.

The war in Yugoslavia has represented a return of the repressed. Milosevic's Serbia is a state that combines an old communist structure with an even older nationalist content. It is the return, after fifty years, of totalitarian nationalism, indeed of national socialism (albeit in the lower, rather than the upper, case). In carrying out its nationalist project of Greater Serbia, it has accordingly recreated the horrors that occurred during the Second World War, not only in Central Europe but in Yugoslavia itself.

In dealing with this second coming of the Second World War, the European Community and the United Nations—the two leading liberal internationalist institutions—have been worse than impotent. They have provided a political cover of diplomatic negotiations and "humanitarian aid" in order to hide a continuing reality of hunger and horror.

Pfaff shows that in the Yugoslav war each of the European powers acted in the spirit of its earlier, pre-World War II diplomatic traditions. Germany supported Croatia and Slovenia (while largely writing-off Bosnia). France and Britain, conversely, accommodated Serbia (while also writing off Bosnia). Together, the European powers stalemated each other and thus stalemated the European Community (which in this first truly-European security challenge revealed that it was no community at all). In so doing, they also prolonged the war. As for the United States, it too was about as feckless and vacillating as it was before the Second World War. Its oscillating policies alternatively encouraged the Bosnian Muslims or the Bosnian Serbs to continue fighting. In doing so, it also prolonged the war. Pfaff concludes his account of liberal internationalism's record in the Yugoslav war with the judgment that it represents a "moral debacle" of historic proportions.

The energizing hope, but also the fatal flaw, of liberal internationalism is its conception of the human condition. Liberal internationalism believes that there is a progressive movement toward the elimination of primordial and communal ties and their replacement with rational and contractual exchanges. For much of the past half-century, with the United States assuming the burden of leadership of liberal internationalist institutions, this progressive movement seemed to be a self-evident reality, even a self-fulfilling prophecy. But the very success of liberal internationalism in defeating its communist internationalist adversary has provided

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the opportunity, even the necessity, for the resurrection of its communal nationalist adversary, or rather of many communal nationalist adversaries.

The first of these has been Serbia, which lies on the other side of the great frontier between Eastern Europe and Central Europe, a frontier that corresponds to the great schism between Orthodox Christianity and Roman Catholicism or even between the Greek and the Latin halves of the Roman empire. This frontier provides the basis for one of those "clashes of civilization," of which Samuel Huntington has recently written. But of course there are even larger nations on the other side of that frontier, who are likely candidates to develop or redevelop communal nationalisms of their own, i.e., Romania, Ukraine, and, of course most significantly, Russia.

The "wrath of nations" is thus one way to define the central feature of the next era of what will be the post-post-Cold War era and what must eventually have a defining name of its own. It clearly seems that it will be the central feature of that vast realm stretching from Central Europe to Central Asia and from the Baltics to the Balkans, which is strewn with the ruins of European communism and which is still awkwardly termed the former Soviet Union and the former Yugoslavia.

Yet as Pfaff's analysis moves on to other regions and continents, it becomes less compelling and more prosaic. This is because it is not the wrath of nations that we really notice when we turn our attention to these other regions.

The Weakness of Nations

CONSIDER, FOR example, the first and feckless year of the Clinton administration. Its foreign policy debacles were summed up in the trilogy of Bosnia, Somalia, and Haiti. The first, it is true, represented the wrath of nations. The second and the third, however, represented something quite different, even the opposite. It is not the wrath of nations but the weakness of nations that characterizes Africa, Latin America, and also much of the Middle East and South Asia. It is not nationalism but mere anarchy that is loosed upon much of the former Third World.

The idea of the nation has never fit the reality of most of the world outside of Europe. The Western European concept of the nation underwent an awesome and often awful mutation when it arrived in Eastern Europe, but at least there were national realities and real nations created there. When the concept of the nation arrived in the Middle East, Latin America, and Africa, however, it had almost no reality at all, but merely a brief period of excited rhetoric (Nasser and Arab nationalism; Peron and Argentine nationalism; Nkrumah and African nationalism), and that period came to an end more than a generation ago. The golden age, such as it was, of nationalism in these regions (the former Third World) has come and gone.

There is indeed wrath in the Middle East, and it is indeed primordial and communal. But it is the wrath not of nationalism but of Islamic fundamentalism. (A better term is Islamism, which better connotes its synthesis of theology and ideology, of tradition and innovation.) There is wrath in South Asia, and it too is primordial and communal. But it is the wrath not of nationalism but of religious communities (of communalism in the most literal sense). There is wrath in Africa, and it too is primordial and communal. But it is not nationalism but tribalism (or, as in Somalia, subtribalism). And there is wrath in Latin America, and it too is primordial (but less frequently communal). But it is not nationalism but something like nihilism.

As for East Asia, it seems to be not the wrath of nations but (as in the title of a

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recent book by Robert Reich) the work of nations that is the central feature of the region and also the most significant challenge to the United States.

The Return of the Eastern Question

THE WRATH OF nations, then, is a central feature of the new era. It is not, however, a universal or even general one. It is a reality largely confined to that region where it was a reality a century ago, i.e., Eastern Europe, and when it was known as "the Eastern Question." At one level the Eastern question was about the role that the competing great powers would play in the region. At a more fundamental level, however, it was about the nature of the local states that would develop there.

The basic problem in Eastern Europe has always been a Western concept that did not fit an Eastern reality well enough to turn the East into the West, but that did fit it well enough to tempt the East to create its own version of the West. The combination of Western ideology (rooted in the Enlightenment) and Eastern ethnicity (rooted in Orthodox Christianity) produced a distinctive Eastern kind of nationality, and "a terrible beauty was born."

In the more than a century since it was first posed, there has been no final solution to the Eastern question, and so, when the question has been posed again in the past four years, there is again no obvious solution. There have been, however, three historical (and hysterical) answers.

The Eastern question was first raised at the end of the nineteenth century by the exhaustion and failure of the original answers—the Habsburg and the Ottoman multinational empires or internationalisms.

The first of the new answers of the twentieth century was given at the end of the First World War. This was said to be the self-determination of nations. But in the checkerboard of Eastern European nationalities, it was impossible to really line-up the self part (the nation) with the determinational part (the state) to fit the Western synthesis and ideal (the nation-state). The result, as we have seen, was not a series of nation states but rather a series of new, albeit smaller, multinational empires, which were known as Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Romania. This was not self-determination, but merely determined self-assertion.

The second answer of the twentieth century was given at the end of the Second World War. The Soviet Army became "the great simplifier" of the Eastern European checkerboard. Ten million people (principally Germans) were driven westward out of Poland and Czechoslovakia, and Poland and Czechoslovakia were themselves moved westward out of Ukrainian-populated territories. Sometimes called "an exchange of populations," this was really ethnic cleansing on a colossal scale, but no one in the West complained about it then. The result was a sort of final solution to the Polish question (Poland became a state composed almost exclusively of Poles rather than one including Germans and Ukrainians as well). There was also a demi-solution to the Czechoslovak question (Czechoslovakia became a state composed only of Czechs and Slovaks rather than one including Germans and Ukrainians as well). It was this wrathful and terrible answer in the aftermath of the Second World War that established the ethnic conditions that, fifty years later, permitted a peaceful approach to the national questions in Poland and Czechoslovakia in the aftermath of the Cold War.

In Balkan Europe and in the Soviet Union, however, the ethnic outcome of the Second World War was different. There was plenty of ethnic carnage in these areas in 1945, but it did not reach the point of complete ethnic cleansing. Hungarian and even German minorities remained in Romania. Yugoslavia was resurrected as a

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multinational state much like it was before the war. And of course the Soviet Union become an even greater multinational empire, and prisonhouse of nations, than before.

The third answer of the twentieth century to the Eastern question was thus provided at the beginning of the Cold War. This was the communist version of the original Habsburg and Ottoman answers. The Soviet, Yugoslav, and Romanian communist parties served much the same function as the Habsburg and Ottoman dynasties, but being faced with nationalities that were more organized and articulate than their ethnic predecessors, they too had to be more organized and more brutal than their dynastic predecessors. The Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and Romania were prisonhouses of nations, not just multinational empires. For many years, they managed to keep their subject peoples contained, to prevent both a jail-break out of the prison or a prison riot among the inmates.

The twentieth century thus has given three answers to the Eastern question: (1) self-determination of nations, which is really the determined self-assertion of one nation over others (e.g., Greater Serbia); (2) exchange of populations, which is really ethnic cleansing (e.g., Bosnia); and (3) communist internationalism, which is really the highest stage of multinational empire (e.g., Tito's Yugoslavia). It is not surprising that, with the failure of the third answer, we should see the reassertion of the first and the second.

These three outcomes can also be seen as respectively the Western, the local, and the Eastern answers to the Eastern question.

The Western answer to the Eastern question has always been some version of liberal internationalism. But liberalism fails where people define themselves in communal, rather than individual, terms. Internationalism fails where every nation has a memory of domination by neighboring ones. It also fails when the leading liberal internationalist powers do not have the national interest and national will to impose order among the quarreling nations. One can see this failure as a moral debacle, as Pfaff does in the Yugoslav case. But, as much of Pfaff's own analysis suggests, once can also see it as the inherent insufficiency of the Western answer to the Eastern question.

The Eastern answer to the Eastern question has always been some version of multinational empire. At times, this answer has been relatively crude, as with the Ottomans and with the Soviets. At times, it has been relatively civilized, as with the Habsburgs and with the later years of the Tito regime. Multinational empires have been far more successful in answering the Eastern question than has liberal internationalism, i.e., the Eastern answer to the Eastern question makes far more sense than the Western one. But eventually the multinational empires also fail, as they also lose the interest and will to impose order.

The local answer to the Eastern question has always been some version of ethnic cleansing, i.e., killing, raping, or torturing enough of your neighbors so that the others will run away and never return. Years may pass when no one is asserting the local answer, but that is only because the Eastern answer is being asserted with conviction, or at least with firmness. When the Eastern answer falls silent (and the Western answer has not even been heard), the moment for the local answer has arrived. It is then spoken loudly, and it is heard clearly. And, as the terrible history of Eastern Europe has demonstrated and as the future of Bosnia will demonstrate again, for its own particular locality, the local answer does indeed provide the final solution to the Eastern question. □

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Geo-Economics 101

Raymond Vernon

Edward N. Luttwak, *The Endangered American Dream* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1993), 365 pages, $24.

WITH THE USSR acronym already fading out of memory, governments are turning to the dangerous, dirty, and unglamorous task of pulling apart their nukes and reprocessing the components. But that is not the only adjustment that marks the passage of the Soviet empire. Geo-politicians, having for so long occupied center stage among the foreign affairs elite, find their audiences dissipated, their status challenged.

But all is not yet lost. Nation states are still the principal players in the international game and show no signs of relinquishing that role. And geo-politicians can count on one basic verity as they face the future: In the words of Edward Luttwak, "states are relentlessly adversarial." So we can expect the continuation of warfare, even if it takes the form of economic rivalry. In such a world, the state that wishes to emerge triumphant needs the services of the geo-economist. And where best to find the well-prepared geo-economist than from the ranks of the underemployed geo-politicians?

One thing is certain: National economic security is the growth subject of the Washington think tanks. The Soviet Union is no more, revealed in the end as a paper tiger; but Asia is fast developing new menaces, whose armaments take an economic form. The status of national economic security as the subject of the moment is now confirmed from many directions, including the reports of congressional committees and the addresses of leaders in the executive branch.

To be sure, the demand for national economic security has had nothing like the compelling clarity that more old-fashioned concepts of national security can command. National economic security conjures up no simple image of a Cuban missiles crisis or a Berlin wall or 30,000 threatening warheads spread across twelve time zones. The geo-economist must content himself instead with the threat emerging from an insignificant string of islands, devoid of natural resources, and crowded beyond bearing with rapidly aging workaholics. The economic security threat, therefore, cries out for definition.

In the search for definition, history is no great help. Although there have been clauses in international agreements on traffic in implements of war and in the things that support a warmaking potential, the idea of national economic security has never been the subject of an international treaty. Indeed, most U.S. economists, being devoted to such antediluvian propositions as the virtues of free trade, have had some difficulty even understanding what the phrase purports to represent. Hence the compelling need, Luttwak tells us, for a breed of thinkers, honed by the realities of geo-politics, to guide America in a world of economic rivalry.

WHAT, THEN, is this geo-economic threat? In some ways, Luttwak's message is gratifyingly reassuring. Bullets will not fly nor bombs be dropped by geo-economic predators;

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countries such as Japan have too much at stake in maintaining their foreign markets to think of destroying them. Indeed, Luttwak assures us, trade is not a zero-sum game; the victims of geo-economic warfare can even see themselves gaining from their exchanges with the victors in the short run. There is something to be said, after all, for having Japanese buyers acquire overpriced Los Angeles real estate from American sellers at the top of a boom. The sleepless nights that Japanese engineers create for their rivals at Ford cannot be all bad. And there is a case for the American computer maker who buys Japan's memory chips so that American PCs can hold their competitive position in international markets. But those gains, Luttwak assures us, are largely illusory, especially when measured by the standards of geo-economics.

For the goal of nations in geo-economic warfare is not simply to add to the profits of the investor or the pleasures of the consumer but to hold the high ground in a world of technological rivalry. This is the new form of warfare among states, at least for that small subset of states that hope to rate as Number One in the international pecking order.

We need not be told what country Luttwak regards as the world leader in this form of state rivalry, nor what country he regards as the world laggard. But at this point in the unfolding argument, the reader is in for a few small surprises. The true nature of the leader, according to Luttwak, is more complicated than we suppose. Not nearly as unequivocal as Karel van Wolferen or Clyde Prestowitz, Luttwak's portrait of Japan is bound to leave the reader a little puzzled. Following familiar lines, he sees Japan as a country jerked around by a willful little band of bureaucrats, centered in MITI and abetted by the *Gaimusho* and the *Boecho*. (A tip to the uninitiated: These are the Japanese Foreign Office and Defense Ministry respectively, always identified by their Japanese names in communications among seasoned geopoliticians).

But then Luttwak's account becomes a bit bewildering. Japan, he observes, is " a thoroughly confused society now undergoing frenetic change." Japanese in considerable numbers see themselves as the victims of the bureaucratic drive for technological superiority, exploited by greedy politicians, industrial combines, and power-hungry bureaucrats. To be sure, despite its confusion, Japan is engaged in a determined drive for geo-economic superiority. But on the other hand, according to Luttwak, "It is plain that the 'Japan, Inc' myth of a bureaucratic big-business conspiracy to conquer the world economy is nothing but a sinister fantasy, distinctly evocative of antiSemitic libels."

If the reader is a bit unsure where Mr. Luttwak stands, he is entitled to his confusion. And his uncertainty will not be reduced as he studies Mr. Luttwak's discussion of the instruments that states employ in the pursuit of their technological warfare.

Among those weapons, Mr. Luttwak rates state-owned enterprises high on the list. But Luttwak, like any reader of the *Financial Times* and *The Economist*, is aware that governments all over the world are selling off such enterprises wholesale; such sales in the past decade have involved more than sixty countries disposing of assets worth several hundred billions of dollars. Well then, he observes, it must be that state-owned enterprises are powerful weapons in the hands of only some governments, while being liabilities for others. And there the analysis stops. We shall never know if he thinks that state-owned enterprises in American hands would be assets or liabilities.

So who is the enemy? What does he want? How does he propose to get it? And what are the consequences for Americans?

We get a hint of Luttwak's answer to the last question as he turns to the other

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protagonist in his book, the United States. Here, his account runs on more familiar lines, amply elaborated by relevant statistics and interesting anecdotes. The U.S. social structure is being rendered by schisms never previously encountered in this country: by the greed of business leaders and lawyers, by the destruction of the middle class, by the decline in education, health, and economic opportunity for large segments of the population. Concurrently, the U.S. economy is headed for hell in a hand basket. Structural deficits, a pitiful level of savings, and persistent underinvestment are turning it into a third-world country, with an underclass of poorly paid, badly prepared workers. "We are," says Luttwak as he observes the new Mercedes plant establishing itself in Alabama, "thus becoming Europe's own Mexico."

Economists may say that the economic causes for this sorry condition lie mainly within the United States; that the United States as a nation has never lacked for resources to mitigate the palpable problems of miserable education and crumbling infrastructure that are found in many of its old cities and rural communities. But as geo-economist Luttwak looks beyond these surface observations; he sees the aggressive efforts of Europe and Japan to capture the commanding heights of the technological frontiers as contributors to this sorry state.

A favorite target of the geo-economist, it seems, is the mainstream economist, whose outdated dogmas prevent the United States from framing an effective response. But the savaging that mainstream economists take in Luttwak's running commentary is not likely to give them much concern. Economists, like physicians, are notorious for their inability to hear the ideas that emanate from outside the temple; and geo-economics is not destined soon to be recognized as a branch of economics. It matters little to most economists, therefore, that Luttwak's complaints often hit the mark. He is, for instance, right when he says that mainstream economics today lives by one principal scorecard, GDP, slighting other less pliable measures of considerable significance. He is on target again when he says that most economists cannot imagine that the Japanese capital market may have been more efficient than the American, or that the guidance of the Japanese government may have had something to do with the impressive growth of the Japanese economy.

But the complex geo-economic lens through which the Luttwak views the world's events has a strong tendency to generate distorted images and create oversized blind spots, rendering him a pushover for those inside the temple. He seems not to be aware, for instance, that the current crop of young economists, epitomized by Paul Krugman, have finally come to accept—a century or two after Alexander Hamilton and Friedrich List—that governments could play an effective role in improving the competitive position of their national industries. What gives Krugman and others pause over using protection and subsidy to implement any such policy, however, is the expectation that everybody suffers when all nations play the game.

Luttwak's blind spots, however, are often much more egregious. "GATT," he says, "was clearly meant to be the commercial counterpart of the pan-Western alliance against the Soviet Union." For anyone who knows GATT's parlous past, this of course is unrestrained fantasy, fully compatible with geo-history but unrelated to reality.

Luttwak's world needs to be redrawn in other dimensions as well. Viewing the world through geo-economic lenses, the Martian visitor would never know that the manufacturing structure of the world is undergoing a metamorphosis that blurs state boundaries and confounds state inter-

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ests. Our Martian would eventually learn, for instance, that the telecommunications systems of the world, pillars in any scheme for national security, are being swiftly reconfigured by international consortia that are intertwining the interests of national companies. He would eventually discover that manufacturing firms with their home base in the United States control so large a group of foreign affiliates that the total employment of the affiliates comes to 40 percent of U.S. employment of these firms. He would puzzle over the fact that firms based in the European Community now report cross-border mergers in such large numbers as to exceed the number of mergers involving firms from the same country.

Our Martian would also encounter some other odd facts about the quarrelsome, contentious states he had come to observe. He would be bound to note that ancient rivals in Europe, growling and grumbling at every step, have been burying their blood-stained hatchets in an unprecedented partnership represented by the European Union; that rivalrous governments, despairing of their ability to protect their financial markets without the cooperation of other financial centers, have been building a network of cooperative arrangements among their supervisory agencies; that reluctant governments, responding to the persistent pressures of their own nationals, are getting down to the business of banning dangerous chemicals from the world's air and water. There has never been a time, in fact, in which the international agenda has been as crowded in efforts to shape cooperative economic arrangements among governments.

There is no joy in Mudville, no sense of shaping a brave, new world. Governments are not giving up their claims to sovereignty, nor their itch for power, least of all the United States. Their newly forged cooperative arrangements are repeatedly coming apart at the seams, exposing the bare spots, and demanding emergency repairs. But the simple geo-economic idea of the relentlessly adversarial state is a threadbare concept, badly in need of overhauling. And Luttwak's book is not the first step in that process. □

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They Can't All Be Wrong Can They?

Conor Cruise O'Brien on "The Future of the West"; **Martin Feldstein** on "Why Maastricht Will Fail"; **Robin Fox** on "War and Human Nature"; **Gertrude Himmelfarb** on "Religion and Nationalism"; **Francis Fukuyama** on "The End of History?"; **Edward Luttwak** on "From Geopolitics to Geoeconomics"; **Robert Bork** on "Kidnapping Foreign Nationals"; **Zbigniew Brzezinski** on "The Great Transformation"; **Seymour Martin Lipset** on "The Death of the Third Way"...

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Russian Culture:

IT WAS AMAZING to read Hugh Ragsdale's essay "The Constraints of Russian Culture" in which he argues that Russians are culturally unsuited for capitalism. If he is going to continue to believe this, it is important that he never walk down a street in Moscow, at least with his eyes open. On any Moscow street, he would see dozens of kiosks, brightly lit and clean, selling an amazing array of foreign and domestic goods. That line of people heading into the doorway is a group of small investors hoping to join one of the country's new mutual funds. Further down the block, past the commodities exchange, is a string of new commercial banks, staffed by former Komsomol opportunists, who are now among the country's most sophisticated economic players.

Mr. Ragsdale cites a wide array of cultural documents, stretching back through the centuries, and he even includes one bit of evidence from the twentieth century, a 1991 *New York Times* poll in which a minority said they supported German- or American- style capitalism. One would have thought that this spring's referendum, in which the majority of Russians endorsed the Gaidar reforms, would have been worth mentioning. In fact—like everyone else—Russians have responded quickly to market incentives. When interest rates became negative (lower than inflation) they sensibly went on borrowing binges. When banks cut their loan terms to two months, Russians intelligently went into six or seven lines of work so that they would have revenue coming in from one endeavor to pay off the loans used for the start-up of another.

As for the old saw that Russians would rather kill their neighbor's horse than have one of their own, Russia now possesses the most unequal distribution of wealth anywhere in the northern hemisphere. People grumble, but for the most part it is not about inequality, but about those who make millions through "uncivilized methods." There is little hostility toward honest businessmen, especially among the young people who talk in terms that are unabashedly Social Darwinian.

All of this is not to say that Russian culture is irrelevant toward life there, merely that the past cannot be imposed on the future in the crude way Mr. Ragsdale attempts. On the Russian landscape one finds Speranskys, from "War and Peace," drunks from Dostoevsky, and Lizas from "Home of the Gentry." (The BBC hired Russians to write a soap opera to teach Western business practices, but they found the Russian writers kept ending each show with the hero falling into ruin and then bearing it stoically.)

To the extent that generalizations can be made, it is fair to say that Russian businessmen do not communicate easily, but store grievances inside until there is an explosion. Their management styles tend toward command and control: either there is one absolute dictator in an enterprise or everybody considers himself one. They protest against the sober rationalism of Western counterparts. The rule for visiting Moscow is that if you want to feel the country is doomed, visit intellectuals; if you want merely to be depressed, visit politicians; but if you want to come away thinking they might muddle through, visit the growing class of businessmen. They are complex but sensible, and they will eventually impose rough order on the place.

As for the inflexibility of Russians, the directors of the Russian Commodities Exchange realized the traders were using the word comrade on the trading floor. To get rid of this residue of classlessness, they issued

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a 200-ruble fine to any person who used the word. Within two months it was gone.

David Brooks
Deputy Editorial Page Editor
Wall Street Journal Europe
Brussels

The author responds:

IT IS UNDENIABLE that unleashed commerce and emancipated enterprise are making giant strides in Russia. In the midst of the collapse of the whole of the Soviet institutional infrastructure and much of the Soviet ethos, the new style of Russian economy is the only one that at present fairly functions. Hustling for oneself is the only way to survive and the imperatives of survival are compelling teachers. In the chaos and confusion of post-Soviet Russia, inchoate proto-capitalism is the decidedly uncivil economy of a kind of Hobbesian state of nature. It is as forceful as it is because it is less unsatisfactory than all currently feasible alternatives.

At the moment, the population has no means of effectively registering its discontent with the present state of affairs because it can find no institutional channels through which to insist on its views. The people are scrambling to find sustenance. They lack the luxury of leisure to concern themselves with the question of desirable forms of new political and economic institutions. When the population does eventually assert itself, it will agree with the perception on which the ethos of old Russia and the ethos of Soviet Russia agreed: profit, especially extravagant profit, is exploitation.

At that point will begin another of those fantastic searches for a third way, for some kind of economic and political regimen that differs from both socialism and capitalism. If present trends in capitalism continue, then the West may well join in the search. As Kishore Mahbubani asks in the September issue of *Foreign Affairs*, does it not embarrass the West to trumpet abroad its democratic decadence as the standard of the world? Is there a Singapore/Beijing model in the future for all of us?

Hugh Ragsdale
Tuscaloosa, AL

Why Maastricht Will Fail:

MARTIN FELDSTEIN'S article on the Maastricht treaty ["Why Maastricht Will Fail," Summer, 1993] was thought provoking, persuasive, and very instructive, but not without one serious flaw. In his discussion of subsidiarity ("the division of authority between the European central government and the national and local governments"), he offered the failure of "our Constitution's seemingly unambiguous Tenth Amendment" as an example of the difficulty of restraining the power of central government.

The Constitution was brought into being to replace the Articles of Confederation, which had established not a central government but rather "a league of friendship" in which "each state retains its sovereignty...and every power, jurisdiction and right, which is not by this confederation expressly delegated to the United States, in Congress assembled." During the ratification deliberations, promises were made that amendments would be added to address the concerns of citizens who, like Professor Feldstein, were uneasy about the extent of the powers of the new government. One of them was the Tenth Amendment, which reads, "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people."

Professor Feldstein describes this sentence as "straightforward constitutional

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language," but seems unaware, as members of the First Congress were not, that the word "expressly," as in the Articles of Confederation, was deliberately deleted. Repeated efforts were made in the First Congress to restore it, but they were defeated decisively every time, both in the House and in the Senate.

Both sides understood the significance of the deletion. James Madison argued successfully that "expressly" would restrict too severely the discretionary powers of the new government; it had to be accepted that the delegation of powers included implied and inherent powers, powers more extensive than could be enumerated. The result has been as one would expect.

Professor Feldstein thinks the Tenth Amendment "reserves to the individual states all powers not specifically vested...in the central government," but of course that was true only when the sovereign states were part of a "league of friendship" under the Articles of Confederation. The "shift of power to the central government" in the United States, was not, as Professor Feldstein contends, "despite the apparently explicit prohibition of the Tenth Amendment," but rather *because* no word like "explicit" or "specifically" is part of the prohibition.

Instead, the shift was possible because the authors, avoiding the phrase "powers not expressly delegated," fully understood the requirements and the consequences of the advance they were making from an incompetent alliance of petty sovereignties to an energetic, and eventually powerful, federal government. □

Robert Goldwin
American Enterprise Institute
Washington, DC

JFK Sighted in Brazil

The future is unknown, the past obscure, the present a bore. Fernando Collor de Mello is a man lost in time. At 44, he is without a profession [Collor resigned as President of Brazil in December 1992, after being impeached on charges of promoting a bribe-taking scheme organized by his financial advisor Paulo César "P.C." Farias]. The former President says, "I do not have the slightest idea where P.C. [Farias] might be. I would not flee even if I knew that I were about to be arrested and put in custody. It's no use to run away." But the sincerity evaporates as he tries to explain how he is supporting himself. "My expenses are modest," he begins, but abandons this tack when reminded that more than 20 guards, gardeners, cooks, butlers, and other employees work in his house...

The "truth" of his impeachment, he admits, is incomplete and, after a certain point, incredible. At the political level, the former president believes that he was overthrown by a huge conspiracy. Those who took part included the business elite ("I worked against their interests"), the heads of the labor movement ("they never accepted the defeat of Lula"—Luis Inácio da Silva—the union leader who lost to Collor in the 1989 presidential race), the politicians ("they saw themselves on the sidelines"), and the press ("which hyped everything"). He alleges that São Paulo business executives discussed removing him from the presidency during meetings in early 1991...

"It happened something like in *JFK*, Oliver Stone's film," Collor says. "Someone made a phone call, spoke a few vague words, and the person at the other end knew exactly what to do." The former president is fascinated with *JFK* because he sees so many similarities between Stone's version of the Kennedy assassination and his own impeachment. A copy of *JFK* on video sits on a shelf in Collor's game room.

"Collor in the Shadows," World Press Review, December 1993.

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Realism and its Rivals

Owen Harries and Michael Lind

IN THE PREMIER issue of this magazine, we stated the assumptions its editors shared:

> —that the primary and overriding purpose of American foreign policy must be to defend and advance the national interest of the United States (an interest that encompasses the values and aspirations of the American people, as well as their security from external threat and their material well-being);
>
> —that, for better or worse, international politics remains essentially power politics, and that the efficacy of military power in the conduct of foreign policy remains undiminished;
>
> —that the Soviet Union constitutes the single greatest threat to America's interests, and will continue to do so for the foreseeable future.

When the third of these assumptions was invalidated, *The National Interest* inaugurated the post-Cold War debate with a series of essays (later collected as a book, *America's Purpose*).[1] Since then, the evolution of that national debate has not been encouraging. All too often defenders of foreign-policy activism have misidentified its critics (for example, describing as "isolationists" people who clearly are not); attacked their motives; and relied on a tendentious misreading of American history, according to which either generations of foolish isolation suddenly gave way to heroic internationalism in 1941 or 1945, or an unbroken tradition of high-minded idealism from the time of the Founding Fathers on effectively rules out realism as an approach to American foreign policy. The essays by Alan Tonelson and Jonathan Clarke in this issue on current and historic realignments in U.S. foreign policy viewpoints will, we hope, help to combat the simplifications and distortions of the debate as it has evolved.

Readers of this magazine are familiar with the views of its editors, but a clarification might be helpful nonetheless. While open to a variety of views, *The National Interest* is particularly concerned to promote what is best described as classical realism. All too often, realists tend to be labelled, along with what Tonelson calls foreign policy "minimalists," as "isolationists" by proponents of ambitious efforts to promote global democracy and human rights. Realists are also frequently accused of isolationism by those who claim that the distinction between the national interest of the United States and the good of humanity in general is being rendered invalid by the alleged phenomenon of "interdependence." True, in ques-

Owen Harries is editor and Michael Lind is executive editor of *The National Interest*.

[1] San Francisco: ICS Press, 1991.

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tioning the premises of democratism and the interdependence school, classical realists and minimalists tend to agree. But that limited agreement may serve to disguise the very real differences between foreign policy minimalism and classical realism, at least as we understand it.

To begin with, there is the fact that classical, balance-of-power realism is a theory, not only about how states behave and how they should behave to protect and advance their interests, but about world order—not a "just" world order, but a reasonably *safe* world order. In any division of foreign policy positions between those who attach importance to world order and those who do not, classical realism belongs—however uncomfortably—alongside the democratists and the interdependence school in the family of "world-order" theories. A pre-eminent goal of foreign policy for realists is the preservation of a multipolar world of independent great powers (whether independent states, alliances, or blocs).

The modern global state system is quite different from its predecessor, the European state system, but the premise of equilibrist thinking in both has been the same—that the genuine long-term interest of all great powers is best served by a world order in which no power, and no combination of powers, strives for hegemony or empire. (This puts classical realists at odds with proponents of a Pax Americana or a Pax Universalis, however much the latter may invoke realist reasoning).

The careful attention paid by classical realists to the distribution of power in the world leads them to give an interpretation of the national interest which is more expansive than that of the minimalists. In the realist view, it is a mistake to identify "the national interest" only with a list of particulars, such as core territorial security, while leaving out any consideration of whether the alignments of power in the world are favorable or unfavorable in their implication. In the twentieth century, the United States, like Sweden, might have preserved its territory from invasion and maintained a high level of prosperity by choosing not to challenge Imperial German, Nazi, or Soviet predominance in Eurasia, but it could have done so only at the cost of great insecurity, and the loss of leverage in world politics—a factor that is as vital an interest of the state, properly understood, as preserving the beaches from invasion.

The paramount concern of classical realists with preserving a balance among the great powers also leads them to be less suspicious of alliances than foreign-policy minimalists. Realist theory both predicts and prescribes coalitions of states organized against would-be hegemonic powers; in other words, participation in alliances is, and always has been, an integral part of realist strategy. The distinction minimalists make between "rigid" and "ad hoc" alliances is beside the point; the nature of the alliance must depend on circumstances, and particularly on the nature of the threat. To have expected an ad hoc alliance against the Soviet Union to have done the work of NATO for more than forty years would have been as misguided as institutionalizing the ephemeral Gulf War alliance would have been.

REALISTS, LIKE internationalists, tend to believe that change should be orderly and gradual, and that convulsive and violent change in world politics is dangerous. In addition, the realist conviction that the interests of the United States must be pursued not only directly and by individual effort but through alliances and by maintaining the general equilibrium of the system parallels the internationalists' belief in salvation by systemic reform (which is emphasized in Alan Tonelson's article). But the *content* of the two beliefs is radically dif-

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ferent, and the kind and extent of intervention envisioned by them leads to very different policies. Realism takes for granted the continuing centrality of power and conflict and seeks to control and manipulate them to the extent necessary to further American interest. When the system's stability is not under serious threat, the need for intervention diminishes. Liberal internationalists, on the other hand, are always and necessarily in favor of maximum activism, for their ultimate purpose is to transform the whole system, root and branch.

The foregoing assumes that, while "economic power" and "soft power" may figure more prominently in the currency of world politics, military power will continue to be of decisive importance. Here classical realists depart from proponents of "geo-economics" like Edward Luttwak (reviewed in this issue). There is no doubt that "geo-economics" (what used to be called mercantilism) exists; but the proposition that geo-economics is replacing geo-politics is at best very premature and dubious. Balance-of-power reasoning is concerned with economic strength mainly to the extent that it is actually or potentially translated into military power; in any contest between money and munitions, the latter will win (as the hapless Emir of Kuwait discovered).

Among the great powers of the past, some were among the leading commercial powers of their day (Athens, Venice, the Netherlands, France, Britain, Germany, the United States); others, however, were backward regimes with impoverished populations and large and capable militaries—the Macedonians, the Arabs, the Mongols, the Ottoman Turks, the Spanish, the Russians. Any list of today's great powers would include China and Russia, countries which remain quite poor compared to the United States, Japan, and Germany.

PUBLIC DISCUSSION of realism involves a paradox: those who hold office cannot speak publicly in unadorned realist terms, while those who use realist reasoning in public may disqualify themselves from holding office. This is particularly a problem in the United States, in which "in-and-outers" form a large and valuable proportion of those engaged in both the making and discussion of foreign policy, and in which realist foreign policies are disguised by moral or ideological language to an even greater extent than they are in other countries. One of the important functions of a magazine like *The National Interest* is to serve as a forum for the discussion of ideas and beliefs which policymakers, at least in public, may be forced to disavow. To see realist strategies adopted even as they are denounced would be, in our view, no small success. □

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The Two Faces of National Interest

W. David Clinton

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